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Corporate tax rates have been significantly decreased, especially in the OECD 
countries in the past thirty years. In 1980, the average federal level corporate top 
statutory tax rate in the OECD countries was 42.35%, and in 1990, this number was 
36.35%. In 2010, this number has been decreased to less than 25%. Many economists 
(Slemrod, 2004; Winner, 2005; Schwarz, 2007; Devereux et al., 2008; Bellak and 
Leibrecht, 2009) investigate the causes, as well as the consequences of the decreasing 
corporate tax rate trend. The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive study 
of the causes of corporate tax rate changes by investigating the OECD countries first, 
and then extending to other developing countries.  
This dissertation contains three chapters. Chapter I documents the evolution of 
corporate tax policies in OECD countries. Chapter II studies international corporate tax 
competition within OECD countries. It focuses on controlling the effects of common 
shocks on strategic interactions with respect to corporate tax policies. Chapter III 
includes corporate tax policies of developing countries and investigates two questions. 
First, how do neighboring countries interact with each other regarding corporate top 
statutory tax rate (TSR)? Second, which countries are more likely to be leaders and 




The first chapter evaluates various aspects of corporate tax evolution in OECD 
countries. Corporate tax policy changes not only include changes in corporate tax rates, 
but also changes in corporate tax bases, as well as the changes in corporate tax 
structures. These changes differ across countries as well as through time. Despite the 
differences, however, there are several common features in OECD countries’ corporate 
tax policy changes. 
First of all, corporate tax rates in all OECD counties have been reduced. In contrast, 
the corporate tax bases have been broadened. The countries, such as Portugal, Finland, 
and Greece, had higher corporate tax rates than the other OECD countries at the 
beginning of the sample period, 1981, and also experienced larger corporate tax rate 
reductions. Second, most of the OECD countries impose a straight-forward corporate 
tax structure. More than half of the OECD countries do not collect local corporate tax. 
Also, most of the OECD countries implement a flat instead of progressive corporate tax 
rate structure. Third, in all OECD countries, corporate tax revenues only account for a 
small fraction of the total tax revenues, as well as GDP.  
The second chapter uses panel spatial analysis to study strategic interactions in 
OECD countries with respect to corporate tax rates. The data includes 21 developed 
countries which joined the OECD before 1980, for the period from 1981 to 2011. The 
main contribution of this chapter is analyzing the importance of accounting for common 
shocks which may have differential impacts on countries. To do this, I adopt the double 
xvi 
 
clustering method proposed by Thompson (2011), account for the effects of common 
shocks on the corporate tax competition via reaction functions, which represent how a 
country responds to other countries’ corporate tax rates. Both geometric and economic 
weighting matrixes are adopted to build the reaction functions.  
These findings demonstrate that an OECD country’s corporate tax rates are 
positively and significantly correlated with other OECD countries’ corporate tax rates. 
Generally, a country’s corporate tax rates fall by around 0.7 percentage points when the 
weighted average corporate tax rates in other OECD countries fall by 1 percentage point. 
This positive correlation is robust under various empirical specifications. As the 1998 
OECD report mentioned, corporate tax competition in OECD countries has been more 
intense since the early 1990s.The findings also indicate  that corporate tax rates in 
developing countries significantly affect OECD countries’ corporate tax rates. This 
suggests that international corporate tax competition among OECD countries is also 
influenced by developing countries. 
The third chapter contributes to the existing literature about international corporate 
tax competition in three ways. First, it adopts a larger sample than previous research 
which allows for a more comprehensive investigation on international corporate tax 
changes. The data includes 139 countries from 1981 to 2011. Second, instead of 
corporate tax rate levels, this chapter focuses on the observed corporate TSR changes 
and investigates corporate TSR change interactions among neighboring countries. Third, 
xvii 
 
this chapter sheds light on the leader follower problem in international corporate tax 
competition by investigating dynamic aspects of corporate TSR change interactions. 
The results of the third chapter are quite interesting. First, neighboring countries’ 
corporate TSR changes are found to interact with each other. Moreover, neighboring 
countries’ corporate TSR increases and decreases have opposite effects on home 
countries’ corporate TSR policies. Second, the structure of corporate TSR change 
interactions is complicated. Countries interact with each other contemporaneously, as 
well as dynamically with respect to corporate TSR changes. Third, this chapter finds 
that developed countries and tax havens are more likely to be leaders than developing 
and non-tax haven countries in corporate TSR change interactions. Regarding 
contemporaneous interactions, corporate TSR changes in emerging market countries are 
found to be significantly related to developed countries’ corporate TSR policies. 
From a policy perspective, attempts to regulate corporate tax competition in OECD 
and European Union (EU) countries which focus on cooperation among member 
countries alone are not sufficient. It is necessary to include developing countries, at least 
some of the emerging market countries, into international tax coordination. Moreover, 
since a country’s corporate tax policies not only depends on the interactions with other 
countries, but also on its own economic and political characteristics, it is difficult to 
enforce the same corporate tax rates and bases on all countries. However, countries may 
xviii 
 
agree to enhance the stability of corporate tax policies. By reducing the incentives to 
decrease corporate tax rates, international corporate tax competition can be attenuated. 
Overall, this dissertation investigates countries’ strategic interactions regarding 
corporate tax policies. The results provide some evidence to help policymakers, 
particularly those in OECD countries, understand the nature of corporate tax policy 
interactions. In doing so, it provides guidance to policymakers regarding policies aimed 
at curbing international corporate tax competition.
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Chapter I: The Evolution of Corporate Tax in OECD Countries 
In the past thirty years, OECD1 countries have significantly reduced their 
corporate tax rates. Several papers document the decreasing trend of different types 
of corporate tax rates, namely, corporate top statutory tax rate (TSR)2, corporate 
effective average tax rate (EATR) 3 , and corporate effective marginal tax rate 
(EMTR)4. Some papers specifically discuss the evolution of corporate tax (Devereux 
et al., 2002; Devereux and Sørensen, 2006; Abbas et al, 2012), both corporate tax 
rates and bases. Other papers that investigate the international tax competition, as 
well as the relationship between corporate tax rate and foreign direct investment 
(FDI)5, also briefly introduce the trend of corporate tax rates (Devereux et al., 2008; 
Rincke and Overesch, 2009; Devereux and Freeman, 1995; Bellak and Leibrecht, 
2009). 
The previous literature all focuses on showing that the average corporate tax 
rate is decreasing and/or the overall corporate tax base is broadening. Devereux et al. 
(2002) use data from 16 OECD countries from 1982 to 2001, and Devereux and 
Sørensen (2006) cover 19 OECD countries from 1982 to 2004. These two papers 
also show that for each country the corporate tax rate at the end of the sample period 
                                                     
1 In the rest of the paper, OECD is the abbreviation for Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. 
2 In the rest of the paper, TSR is the abbreviation for top statutory tax rate. 
3 In the rest of the paper, EATR is the abbreviation for corporate effective average 
tax rate. 
4 In the rest of the paper, EMTR is the abbreviation for effective marginal tax rate. 
5 In the rest of this paper, FDI is the abbreviation for foreign direct investment. 
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is lower than that at the beginning of the period, and the corporate tax base changes 
in the opposite direction. The paper by Abbas et al. (2012), which is to my 
knowledge, the only paper studying corporate tax rate in developing countries, 
includes 50 developing countries from 1996 to 2007. However, the evolution of 
corporate taxation is a more complex problem, which incorporates more than just 
the overall decreasing corporate tax rate and the broadening corporate tax base. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive study of corporate 
tax evolution in OECD countries, more specifically, corporate tax evolution in 
countries that joined OECD before 1980. The main reason for focusing on these 24 
countries6 is that they are usually considered to be developed countries. Having 
similar economic and social development, it is reasonable to believe that the 
mechanism determining the corporate taxation system is comparable across these 24 
OECD countries. Moreover, the OECD Tax Database and the AEI International Tax 
Database all provide high quality data about corporate tax in these OECD countries.  
Overall, this chapter not only investigates the trend of corporate tax rate, base, 
and revenues, but also includes some detailed information about corporate tax 
changes, such as the changes of corporate tax structure. The rest of this chapter is 
arranged as follows: Section 1.1 compares corporate tax structure across the 24 
OECD countries; Section 1.2 investigates the evolution of corporate tax rates, 
                                                     
6 The 24 countries that joined OECD before 1980 are Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Switzerland, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, New 
Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, United States 
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especially the evolution of corporate TSR; Section 1.3 studies the overall trend of 
corporate tax base; Section 1.4 briefly discusses corporate tax revenues; and Section 
1.5 provides detailed information and time series graphs of corporate tax rate 
changes in each OECD country. Finally, Section 1.6 is the conclusion part. 
1.1 Corporate Tax Structure 
The corporate tax structure in the 24 OECD countries is relatively stable. There 
are, however, differences across countries. For example, some countries only impose 
corporate taxes at the central level and not the local level, while other countries 
adopt both. Also, some countries have only one corporate tax bracket, e.g., a flat tax, 
while other countries use a progressive tax structure where the corporate tax rate 
increases as the corporate taxable income increases over multiple corporate tax 
brackets. 
1.1.1 Sub-national Corporate Tax vs. National Corporate Tax 
Figure 1.1.1 (a) reports the fraction of OECD countries that adopt sub-national 
and national corporate taxes. In the 24 OECD countries, more than half of the 
countries only collect corporate taxes on the central government level. The 15 
OECD countries that always only adopt central government corporate taxes in the 
sample period are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, 




Also, there are 7 OECD countries that have always collected both central and 
sub-national corporate taxes from 1981 to 2012, and they are Canada, Germany, 
Japan, Luxembourg, Portugal, Switzerland, and the United States. No OECD 
countries switched from the group, in which countries have no local corporate tax to 
the group that collects sub-national corporate taxes. Only 2 OECD countries, 
Norway and Sweden, stopped collecting sub-national corporate taxes at 1998 and 
1991, respectively. 
Figure 1.1.1 (b) summarizes the time trend of OECD countries’ sub-national 
corporate tax rate, if applicable. Compared to the central government corporate 
TSRs, the sub-national corporate tax rates are relatively stable. Among the 7 OECD 
countries that adopt a sub-national corporate tax, only Switzerland significantly 
reduced its sub-national corporate tax rate in the past 30 years, from 26.5% in 1981 
to 14.5% in 2012. The sub-national corporate tax rate in Germany even slightly 
increased, from 9.1% in 1981 to 14.4% in 2012. The other countries’ sub-national 
corporate tax rates are either quite stable (Canada, Japan, and the United States), or 
slightly decreased (Luxembourg and Portugal). Moreover, except Switzerland, all 
the other 6 OECD countries’ average sub-national corporate tax rates stayed low, at 
less than 15%. 
1.1.2 Progressive Tax vs. Flat Corporate Tax 
Figure 1.1.2 uses a Venn diagram to report the OECD countries that adopt a 
progressive and/or flat corporate tax from 1981 to 2011. Most of the 24 OECD 
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countries use flat corporate tax and have only one corporate tax bracket. In these 
countries, the corporate tax rate does not increase when the taxable corporate income 
increases. There are 15 OECD countries that always impose a flat corporate tax 
during the sample period: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Italy, Norway, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the 
United Kingdom. Moreover, 2 OECD countries, Austria and Switzerland, changed 
their corporate tax structure from progressive to a flat rate in 1989 and 1998, 
respectively. 
Of the remaining 7 OECD countries, Belgium and the United States are the 
only countries that stuck to a progressive corporate tax, and only Japan changed 
from using flat to progressive corporate tax, which happened in 2011. The other 4 
countries, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Portugal, have changed their 
number of corporate tax brackets more than once, and switched between progressive 
and flat corporate tax structures. Moreover, since 1993, the United States has had 
eight corporate tax brackets, which is the largest number in all OECD countries. 
Also, Netherlands changes 3 times between progressive and a flat corporate tax, 
which is the highest frequency among the 24 OECD countries. 
Table 1.1.2 groups and compares 24 OECD countries’ corporate tax structures 
in 1981 and 2011, according to whether the country had a sub-national corporate tax 
and whether it adopted a progressive corporate tax. The number of countries in each 
group is relatively stable. Also, the number of countries that adopted a flat corporate 
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tax and had only a national corporate tax increased slightly, from 12 to 15. Most of 
the 24 OECD countries prefer a simple corporate tax structure, as the number of 
countries that adopt a flat corporate tax is larger than that adopt a progressive 
corporate tax, and the number of countries that have only a national corporate tax is 
larger than the number that have a sub-national corporate tax. 
1.2 The Evolution of Corporate Tax Rates7 
Compared to corporate tax structures, changes in corporate tax rates are more 
frequent and have a clear decreasing trend over time. In the past thirty years, OECD 
countries have significantly reduced their corporate income tax rates, from over 40% 
to less than 25%. To measure corporate tax rates, economists adopt three different 
methods: corporate TSR, corporate EATR, and corporate EMTR. The corporate TSR 
is the top corporate tax rate explicitly determined by legislations, while corporate 
EATR and EMTR are implicit tax rates, incorporating both tax rate and base. The 
corporate effective tax rates are calculated under the same assumptions as used by 
Devereux and Griffith (2003), and are based on a hypothetical investment, which is 
financed by equity, on plant and machinery. 
Besides the overall decreasing trend, this section also discusses other 
characteristics of corporate tax rate evolution in OECD countries. First of all, not 
                                                     
7 Unless specifically mentioned, the corporate tax rate discussed in this paper is the 
corporate income tax rate. Other than income, a firm can also be taxed on its assets, 
such as real estate, by different tax rates. Appendix II provides detailed discussions 
about corporate EATR and EMTR, including how these effective rates are calculated 
and the advantages of using these rates to measure corporate tax policy changes. 
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only the average but also the standard deviation of corporate tax rate has been 
significantly reduced over time. However, the coefficient of variation (CV)8, which 
represents the dispersion of the data relative to the sample mean, has been increasing 
since 2000. Second, the frequency and magnitude of corporate tax rate changes 
differ across countries and over time, and exhibit certain patterns that are worth 
noticing. Third, although corporate tax cuts dominates corporate tax changes in 
OECD countries, there were quite a few corporate tax rate increases in the sample 
period. In general, the evolution of corporate tax rate is a complicated issue. 
1.2.1 Corporate Top Statutory Tax Rate 
The corporate TSR is the most basic and widely used measurement of corporate 
tax rate. The corporate TSR studied in this chapter is the central government 
corporate tax rate, and is adjusted for sub-central deductions, if applicable. The data 
of corporate TSR is from the AEI international database and OECD Tax Database, 
and covers 24 OECD countries from 1981 to 2012. In the 1980s, the 24 OECD 
countries’ average central government corporate TSR was more than 42%, and in 
2012, it was less than 25%. Also, the standard deviation of corporate TSR across 
countries decreased from over 11% in the early 1980s to 6.79% in 2012.  
As Figure 1.2.1 (a) shows, the trends of the mean and the standard deviation of 
corporate TSR are both decreasing. However, the CV of corporate TSR, which 
                                                     
8 In the rest of the paper, CV is the abbreviation for coefficient of variation. 
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measures the dispersion relative to the mean, was slightly reduced from 1981 to 
1999, but then, increased after 2000. Figure 1.2.1 (a) indicates that in the past thirty 
years, the average corporate TSR and the variance of corporate TSR in OECD 
countries have decreased, but since 2000, the variation, conditional on the mean, of 
corporate TSR in OECD countries has increased. 
Moreover, the distribution of corporate tax rate changes varies significantly 
across both country and time. Table 1.2.1 reports the central government corporate 
TSR changes in 24 OECD countries from 1981 to 2012. In this thirty-two year 
period, the 24 OECD countries had in total 185 central government corporate TSR 
changes. While 140 of the corporate TSR changes were tax decreases, only 45 of the 
changes were tax increases. The number of corporate tax cuts is more than three 
times that of corporate tax rate increases.  
The five countries that have the highest frequency of corporate TSR changes 
are Canada, France, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, and Germany9. Meanwhile, the 
five countries that have the lowest number of corporate TSR changes are 
Switzerland, Austria, Norway, Spain, and United States. Also, the five countries that 
have the highest frequency of corporate TSR cuts are Canada, France, United 
Kingdom, Ireland, and Luxembourg. On average, each country had over 7 corporate 
TSR changes in the past thirty-two years.  
                                                     




Among these 185 corporate TSR changes, the largest corporate TSR cut 
happened in Austria in 1989, where the Austrian government reduced the central 
government corporate TSR by 25%, from 55% to 30%, and this reduction lasted for 
five years. The largest corporate TSR increase happened in Sweden in 1985, where 
the central government corporate TSR increased by 20%, from 32% to 52%, and this 
corporate tax increase also lasted for five years, from 1985 to 1989. The average 
magnitude of the largest corporate TSR cuts in each OECD country was 9.28%, 
which is larger than that of corporate TSR increases, which was 3.94%. 
Figure 1.2.1 (b) shows the distribution of the federal level corporate TSR 
changes at five-year intervals in 24 OECD countries from 1981 to 2012. The 
frequency of corporate TSR cuts peaked twice, both in the late 1980s and the early 
2000s. Meanwhile, the frequency of corporate TSR increases has significantly 
decreased since the late 1990s. The total number of corporate TSR increases in 24 
OECD countries from 1996 to 2012 was merely 9, only one fourth of that in the first 
15 years of the sample.  
In addition, the countries that have a large number of corporate TSR changes, 
such as Canada, France, and Luxembourg, usually have a low average magnitude of 
corporate TSR changes. Figure 1.2.1 (c) demonstrates the scatter distribution of the 
average magnitude and the frequency of corporate TSR changes. The graph shows 
that the variation of the average magnitude of corporate TSR changes decreases 
when the frequency of corporate TSR increases. In other words, for OECD countries 
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that have a large number of corporate TSR changes, the average magnitude of 
corporate TSR changes is relatively small. But, for OECD countries that have a 
small number of corporate TSR changes, the average magnitude of corporate TSR 
changes is uncertain, and can be small or large. 
Although the central government corporate TSR reflects the tax policy of 
central government regarding corporate taxation, it does not incorporate aspects of 
the corporate tax base. Accordingly, it cannot represent the actual corporate tax 
burden that fell on firms. Corporate EATR and EMTR, on the other hand, are direct 
measurements of corporate taxation which take aspects of the corporate tax base into 
consideration. Also, these two measurements are forward-looking, and have the 
advantage that they are not influenced by the changes of total corporate revenues. 
Corporate EATR and EMTR can be calculated by the method developed by 
Devereux and Griffith (2003), and are widely used in the papers investigating the 
relationship between corporate tax rate and investment decisions. 
1.2.2 Corporate Effective Average Tax Rate 
According to Hassett and Mathur (2011), the corporate EATR “measures the 
average rate a firm might expect to face on an investment project over the possible 
distribution of profitability. The EATR informs location choices.” (2). Devereux and 
Griffith (2003) show that when the profitability for an investment is increasing, the 
corporate EATR approaches the corporate TSR. Figure 1.2.2 (a) shows the average, 
standard deviation, and coefficient of variation (CV) of corporate EATR. The 
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average and standard deviation of corporate EATR are both decreasing over time. 
Unlike the CV of corporate TSR, the CV of corporate EATR is relatively stable and 
only slightly increases after 2000. 
Figure 1.2.2 (b) compares the corporate EATRs in 1981 to those is 2011 for 21 
OECD countries. It is obvious that every OECD country cut its corporate EATR. 
Moreover, the OECD countries that had higher corporate EATRs at the beginning of 
the sample period, such as Portugal, Finland, and Germany, reduced their corporate 
EATRs to a greater extent. Figure 1.2.2 (c) shows that there is a positive relationship 
between the magnitude of corporate EATR reduction and the original level of 
corporate EATR in OECD countries. Overall, like corporate TSR, the corporate 
EATR also has decreased in OECD countries from 1981 to 2011.  
1.2.3 Corporate Effective Marginal Tax Rate 
Hassett and Mathur (2011) “The effective marginal tax rate measures the tax 
liability incurred on an additional dollar of investment. The EMTR informs scaling 
choices, conditional on the location.” (2). A higher corporate EMTR indicates a 
higher pre-tax rate of return for a particular investment. Thus, the main difference 
between corporate EATR and EMTR is that the former allows the profitability of an 
investment to change, while the latter does not and sets the post-tax return rate of an 
investment to be the minimum required level--just enough to offset the cost of that 
investment. 
Figure 1.2.3 (a) shows the average, standard deviation, and CV of corporate 
12 
 
EMTR in 21 OECD countries from 1981 to 2011, and has the similar pattern as 
Figure 1.2.2 (a). The average and standard deviation, as well as the CV of corporate 
EMTR, are all dramatically decreasing over time. The trend of corporate EMTR 
indicates that, in the past thirty years, OECD countries not only have reduced 
average corporate EMTRs, and the difference of corporate EMTR has narrowed 
among countries.  
Figure 1.2.3 (b) compares the corporate EMTR of each OECD country in 1981 
to the number in 2011. Except Canada, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, all the 
other 18 OECD countries have decreased their corporate EMTRs since 1981. For the 
OECD countries that reduced their corporate EMTRs, the countries with higher 
original EMTR level had a larger corporate EMTR reduction by 2011. Figure 1.2.3 
(c) demonstrates that there also exists a positive relationship between the magnitude 
of corporate EMTR reduction and the original level of corporate EMTR. Moreover, 
the scatter pattern of Figure 1.2.3 (c) is very similar to that of Figure 1.2.2 (c).  
1.3 The Evolution of Corporate Tax Base 
In OECD countries, the corporate tax base is extremely complex and differs 
across countries. The corporate tax base not only includes a firm’s current profits, 
but also includes various other sectors, such as a firm’s previous investments on 
properties/assets, dividend-paid and interest deductions, and capital repatriation, if 
applicable. Moreover, corporate tax rates differ even within the same country. For 
example, in the United States, corporate assets are unevenly taxed, with a higher rate 
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for inventories and a relatively lower rate for communication structures and aircraft. 
Also, the tax base for multinational companies is more complicated and difficult to 
measure, because it depends on both home and host countries’ tax legislation, 
including various bilateral tax agreements, such as double taxation treaties and 
exemptions. In general, it is impossible to accurately depict or summarize tax bases 
in OECD countries. 
1.3.1 The Present Discounted Value of Depreciation Allowances 
Although it is difficult to find a common ground to accurately describe and 
compare OECD countries’ corporate tax bases, economists employ some 
methods/variables to represent changes in corporate tax bases. One of the methods 
that are widely used in previous literature is the present discounted value (PDV)10 
of depreciation allowance, which measures a firm’s allowance for loss due to 
depreciation of capital expenditure and is adjusted for current inflation and real 
interest rate. 
There are two methods to calculate depreciation allowance, one is the straight 
line method, and the other is the reducing balance method. The former equally 
spreads the costs of an asset across its useful life, while the latter charges more 
depreciation at the first year, and then the depreciation rate gradually declines over 
time. Most of OECD countries adopt both methods, and allow firms to choose the 
depreciation method that they prefer. In some OECD countries, such as Canada, 
                                                     
10 In the rest paper, PDV is the abbreviation for present discounted value. 
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Spain, and Finland, the depreciation allowance rates vary across different types of 
assets. In order to keep PDV of depreciation allowance comparable, my analysis in 
this chapter follows Devereux et al. (2002) and Devereux and Sørensen (2006), and 
focuses on the depreciation allowance on investments in plant and machinery. 
The PDV of depreciation allowance is inversely related to the corporate tax 
base, that is, the decreasing PDV of depreciation allowance indicates that the 
corporate tax base is increasing. Figure 1.3.1 presents the average PDV of 
depreciation allowance of 21 OECD countries from 1981 to 2011. On average, the 
PDV of depreciation allowance is a decreasing trend over time. Especially, in the 
1980s, the average PDV of depreciation allowance fell from over 77% to around 
73%, and it also experienced a slight decrease at the beginning of 2000. Overall, the 
corporate tax base has been broadening in OECD countries in the past thirty years. 
1.3.2 Other Measurements of Corporate Tax Base 
Kawano and Slemrod (2012) provide new measures describing the corporate 
tax base, which are more comprehensive and cover a wider range than the PDV of 
depreciation allowance. Their data is collected from the International Bureau of 
Fiscal Documentation’s (IBFD) Annual Report, and contains 12 sub-sections of 
corporate tax base in OECD countries from 1980 to 2004. Although they do not 
have data on the magnitude of corporate tax base changes, they provide data about 
the frequency of corporate tax base changes, including changes in both base 
broadening and narrowing. They find that in OECD countries, most of corporate tax 
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base changes broaden the tax base, however, the frequency of corporate base 
narrowing is not rare, and is around three fourths of that of corporate tax broadening. 
Moreover, they point out that in contrast to the conventional knowledge, the 
corporate tax rate reductions are not always accompanied with corporate tax base 
broadening.  
1.4 Corporate Tax Revenue 
Devereux et al. (2002) point out corporate tax revenue does not provide a good 
measure of corporate tax policies, mainly because the companies’ profit does not 
equal the true corporate tax base set by legislation. With increasing capital mobility, 
it is easier for multi-national companies to transfer their profits from countries 
having high corporate tax rates to those having low corporate tax rates, in order to 
avoid high level taxation. Moreover, a company’s profit can be influenced by 
various macro and micro economic factors, such as wages, technology, and 
management skills. 
In OECD countries, corporate tax revenue is not the main tax revenue income 
resource. On average, corporate tax revenue only counts for less than 10% of total 
tax revenue. However, the combination of governments’ tax revenue income, as well 
as the fraction of corporate tax revenue changed significantly during the sample 
period, from 1965 to 2011. Corporate tax revenue not only varies across time, but 
also differs across countries. To comprehensively investigate corporate tax, and the 
impact of corporate tax policy changes, it is important to incorporate the influence of 
16 
 
corporate tax revenue. 
1.4.1 Corporate Tax Revenue and the Growth Rate of Corporate Tax Revenue 
Figure 1.4.1 shows the average corporate tax revenue and the growth rate of 
average corporate tax revenue in 24 OECD countries from 1965 to 2011. The trend 
shows the average corporate tax revenue increasing over time from 11.7 billion US 
dollars in 1965 to around 42 billion US dollars in 2006 and 2007, just before the 
2008 economic crisis. The growth rate of the average corporate tax revenue is more 
volatile, and exhibits a cyclical pattern.  
Moreover, economic crises have notable impact on both average corporate tax 
revenue and the growth rate of average corporate tax revenue. The shadow areas 
indicate the economic crisis periods. From 1960 to 2011, the significant global 
economic crisis/recession periods are 1971, 1974-1975, 1981-1982, 1990-1991, 
2001, and 2008. These six economic crisis periods are accompanied with large 
corporate tax revenue reduction and negative growth rate of average corporate tax 
revenue. 
1.4.2 Corporate Tax Revenue (%GDP) and Corporate Tax Revenue (%Total Tax 
Revenue) 
Compared to the average corporate tax revenue (constant at 2000 $US dollars) 
and the growth rate of average corporate tax revenue, the time trends of average 
corporate tax revenue (%GDP) and average corporate tax revenue (%total tax 
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revenue) are relatively stable and are not negatively and significantly affected by 
global economic crises/recessions. Figure 1.4.2 (a) shows the average and the 
median of corporate tax revenue (%GDP) and corporate tax revenue (%total tax 
revenue) of 24 OECD countries from 1965 to 2011. The average corporate tax 
revenue (%GDP) varies between 2% to 4%, and the average corporate tax revenue 
takes 8% to 11% of total tax revenue. Moreover, both trends slightly increased after 
the mid-1990s. 
Even though each OECD country’s corporate tax revenue (%GDP) and 
corporate tax revenue (%total tax revenue) are stable over time, there is 
cross-section difference in these two variables. Figure 1.4.2 (b) and (c) show the 
average and standard deviation of corporate tax revenue (%GDP) and corporate tax 
revenue (%total tax revenue) of each OECD country from 1965 to 2011, respectively. 
Except Norway, the standard deviations of each OECD country are small, which 
indicates that corporate tax revenue as a fraction of GDP and/or total tax revenue 
does not change dramatically over time. However, in some OECD countries, such as 
Japan, Luxembourg, and Australia, corporate tax revenue assumes/comprises a 
larger share of GDP and total tax revenue than in some other OECD countries, such 
as Iceland and Austria. 
Figure 1.4.2 (d) categorizes OECD countries into different groups, according to 
their average corporate tax revenue (%total tax revenue). For half of the 24 OECD 
countries, corporate tax revenue is 5% to 10% of total tax revenue. This share of 
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total tax revenues is very low, less than 5%, in four countries, namely, Austria, 
Denmark, Germany, and Iceland. Also, in Japan and Luxembourg, corporate tax 
revenue amounts to 19% and 16% of total tax revenue, respectively. With the 
exception of Australia, at 14.5%, the remaining four OECD countries’, Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, Norway, and the United States, average corporate tax 
revenue (%total tax revenue) is around 11%. 
The reasons that the corporate tax revenue has not been decreasing with falling 
corporate tax rates since the 1980s are twofold. First of all, although corporate tax 
rates have been decreasing, the corporate tax base has been broadening in the past 30 
years. For example, the present discounted value of depreciation allowances was 
reduced in most OECD countries. Second, the lower corporate tax rates in OECD 
countries, such as Ireland and Canada, could stimulate both domestic investment and 
FDI. Thus, higher investment leads to higher economic output, which means larger 
taxable corporate income. Overall, as Devereux et al. (2002) argue, corporate tax 
revenue (%GDP) and corporate tax revenue (%total tax revenue) are improper 
measurements of corporate tax policies. 
1.5 Corporate Tax Rate Graphs for Each OECD Country and Brief Discussions  
Figure 1.5.1 summarizes the time trends of 24 OECD countries’ corporate tax 
rates, and both corporate TSR and effective tax rates have decreasing trends in each 
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country11. In general, corporate TSR and effective tax rates move closely with each 
other, especially in Greece, Japan, and New Zealand. Most countries’ corporate tax 
policy changes are in corporate tax rates. However, in several countries, such as 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland, the corporate TSR is relatively stable 
while the effective tax rates are relative volatile, which suggests these countries’ 
corporate tax policy changes are more targeted toward corporate tax bases rather 
than rates. 
Moreover, in nine OECD countries12, the corporate TSR is always higher than 
effective tax rates. In some other countries, such as Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, 
Portugal, and Spain, the corporate TSR is higher than effective tax rates at first, then 
abruptly lower than effective rates. The cross points of the corporate TSR and 
effective tax rates time trends essentially point out the year that a central 
governments broadened its corporate tax base, holding  the corporate tax rate 
constant. Also, most of the corporate tax base broadening policies are adopted in the 
1990s. 
Overall, in the 24 OECD countries, the changes in corporate tax rates are more 
frequent than the changes in bases. This situation is probably due to the fact that 
corporate tax rate changes are more explicit signals of central governments corporate 
tax policies, and corporate tax rate cuts are more politically favored by both 
                                                     
11 The effective tax rates data is not available for Iceland, Luxembourg, and Turkey.  
12  These nine countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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domestic firms and multinational companies.  
1.6 Conclusions 
This chapter documents, demonstrates, and compares the corporate tax changes 
in the 24 OECD countries in the past thirty years. Corporate tax changes not only 
include the basic corporate tax rates and bases changes, but also include corporate 
tax structures and revenue changes. Besides the common rate reducing and base 
broadening processes in OECD countries, the magnitude and frequency of corporate 
tax rate changes differ across time and country. Overall, there are several 
characteristics of OECD countries’ corporate tax changes that are interesting and 
worth studying. 
First of all, most OECD countries prefer simpler corporate tax structures. The 
number of OECD countries that do not adopt sub-national/local corporate tax is 
larger than those that do. Also, more than half of the OECD countries use a flat, 
instead of progressive corporate tax structure. Second, the relationship between 
corporate tax rate change frequency and magnitude is quite intriguing. Generally, the 
OECD countries have a higher frequency of corporate tax rate changes and have a 
lower average magnitude of change. However, things are more complicated when 
countries have a low frequency of corporate tax rate changes. The average 
magnitude of change can be both small and large. 
Third, the OECD countries that had higher corporate effective tax rates at the 
beginning of the sample period, also experience larger corporate effective tax rate 
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reductions. This positive relationship can be found in both corporate EATRs and 
EMTRs. Fourth, the frequency of corporate TSR changes is higher than that of 
corporate base changes. This situation indicates that governments in OECD 
countries prefer to adjust corporate tax policies through rates, not bases. Also, 
corporate tax rate reductions are more favored by both domestic and multinational 
firms. Last but not least, in the OECD countries, although the corporate tax revenues 
only count for a small proportion of GDP and total tax revenues and are very stable 
across time, the absolute value of corporate tax revenues are increasing and reflect 
the  macroeconomic environment.  
In addition, each of these 24 OECD countries exhibits notable decreasing 
corporate tax rate trends, but none of them have the same pattern. Some economic 
papers point to economic integration and international corporate tax competition as 
causes of decreasing corporate tax rates. However, the decreasing corporate tax rates 
may also be driven by common shocks. Moreover, some papers argue that the 
international corporate tax competition is so intense that it distorts capital 
investments, and thus harms the overall welfare. As a result, OECD countries need 
to set harmonize corporate tax policies.  
Whether it is necessary to regulate OECD countries’ corporate tax policies is an 
important issue. Addressing this requires convincing empirical evidence concerning 
how the corporate tax rates are set, as well as identifying international and domestic 
factors that influence corporate tax policy choices. The next chapter provides an 
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empirical approach to investigate why corporate tax rates are decreasing and 




Table 1.1.2 Corporate Tax Structure in 24 OECD Countries, 1981 and 2011 






























































Data Source: the AEI International Tax Database and the OECD Tax Database 
(contains data up to and including 2012). For Luxembourg and Turkey, the data of 




Table 1.2.1 Corporate TSR Changes (Central Government) in 24 OECD Countries 
















Australia 4 2 6 3 -10 
Austria 2 1 3 4 -25 
Belgium 5 1 6 1.17 -6.18 
Canada 13 3 16 1.8 -7.21 
Denmark 7 1 8 10 -10 
Finland 6 3 9 6 -10 
France 11 3 14 5 -5 
Germany 8 2 10 3.375 -15.825 
Greece 6 2 8 5.1 -11 
Iceland 7 3 10 3 -14 
Ireland 9 1 10 5 -8 
Italy 4 3 7 6 -5.5 
Japan 6 2 8 1.3 -4.5 
Luxembourg 9 4 13 1.05 -8.32 
Netherlands 8 0 8 0 -7 
New Zealand 3 2 5 5 -20 
Norway 1 2 3 1 -1 
Portugal 6 1 7 1.5 -5 
Spain 2 1 3 2 -2.5 
Sweden 5 1 6 20 -12 
Switzerland 1 0 1 0 -1.3 
Turkey 4 6 10 8.3 -22.47 
United Kingdom 11 0 11 0 -5 
United States 2 1 3 1 -6 
Total 140 45 185 20 -25 
Mean 5.83 1.88 7.71 3.94 -9.28 
Std. dev 3.28 1.39 3.74 4.32 6.31 
Data Source: the data of central government corporate TSRs from 1981 to 2011 is 
from the AEI International Tax Database and in 2012 is from the OECD Tax 




Figure 1.1.1 (a) Corporate Tax Structure in 24 OECD Countries: Sub-national vs. 
National Corporate Tax 
 
Data Source: The OECD Tax Database (contains data up to and including 2012).  
Note: Sweden and Norway no longer collect sub-national corporate tax since 1991 
and 1998, respectively. Moreover, the data of Luxembourg and Turkey is not 
available until 2000. From the available data, Luxembourg collects 





Figure 1.1.1 (b) Sub-national Corporate Tax Rate in 7 OECD Countries* from 1981 to 
2012 
 
Data Source: The OECD Tax Database (contains data up to and including 2012). 
**Note: In the sample period 1981- 2012, the 7 OECD countries that always adopt 
sub-national corporate tax are Canada, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, Portugal, 










Data Source: the OECD Tax Database (contains data up to and including 2012). 
* Note: There are seven OECD countries switching between flat and progressive 
corporate tax: Austria, Switzerland, Japan, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and 
Portugal. Austria and Switzerland changed from progressive to flat corporate tax at 
1989 and 1998, respectively. Japan changed from flat to progressive corporate tax at 
2011. Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Portugal changed more than once. At 
first, Ireland adopted flat corporate tax, and then it switched to progressive corporate 
tax at 1996. After four years, 2000, Ireland changed back to flat corporate tax again. 
Luxembourg changed from progressive to flat corporate tax at 2002, and then 
switched back to progressive corporate tax at 2011. The situation is very similar in 
Portugal. At 1989, Portugal changed from progressive to flat corporate tax, and then 
at 2008, it changed back to progressive corporate tax. Netherlands is the OECD 
country that switched between flat and progressive corporate tax most frequently. At 
1989, Netherlands changed from flat to progressive corporate tax, and then at 1998, 
it changed back to flat corporate tax. Eventually, at 2001, Netherlands adopted 





Figure 1.2.1 (a) the Average, Standard Deviation, and Coefficient of Variation (CV) 
of Corporate TSR in 24 OECD Countries from 1981 to 2012 
 
Data Source: the data of central government corporate TSRs from 1981 to 2011 is 
from the AEI International Tax Database and in 2012 is from the OECD Tax 





Figure 1.2.1 (b) Central Government Corporate TSR Changes in 24 OECD Countries 
from 1981 to 2012 
 
** Note: The data is from 1981 to 2012, in total 32 years. So, when grouping the 
data every five years, there are seven intervals, which are 1981-1985, 1986-1990, 
1991-1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005, and 2006-2010. The last two years, 2011 and 
2012, are left behind. To have a complete observation, the last two years are grouped 
as one interval and reported as the previous intervals. 
Data Source: the data of central government corporate TSRs from 1981 to 2011 is 
from the AEI International Tax Database and in 2012 is from the OECD Tax 





Figure 1.2.1 (c) the Average Magnitude and the Frequency of Corporate TSR 
Changes in 24 OECD Countries 
 
Data Source: the average magnitude and frequency of corporate TSR changes is 
based on the authors’ calculation. The original data is central government corporate 
TSRs, and is from the AEI International Tax Database and the OECD Tax Database 
(contains data up to and including 2012). 






Figure 1.2.2 (a) the Average, Standard Deviation, and CV of Corporate EATR in 21 
OECD Countries* from 1981 to 2011 
 
Data source: Calculated using the method provided by Devereux and Griffith 
(2003). The depreciation rates are from the AEI international tax database. EATRcpi 
denotes the corporate EATRs that are calculated using the actual Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) as the inflation rate. EATRex denotes the corporate EATRs that are 
calculated using the expected 3.5% inflation rate. Appendix III contains detailed 
information about how corporate EATRs are calculated and the differences between 
EATRcpi and EATRex. 
** Note: The data of these 21 OECD countries does not include Iceland, Turkey, 
and Luxembourg. The data of Iceland is missing because the AEI international tax 
database does not provide information on the Iceland’s depreciation rates, which are 
the key variables to calculate corporate EATRs. The data of Turkey and 
Luxembourg is not provided because the AEI International Tax Database and the 
OECD Tax Database (contains data up to and including 2012) do not have these two 
countries’ combined corporate tax rate until 2000. So, there are too many missing 
values for Turkey and Luxembourg. Also, the sample ends in 2011 because the AEI 





Figure 1.2.2 (b) the Corporate EATR in 21 OECD Countries, 1981 vs. 2011 
 
Data source: Calculated using the method provided by Devereux and Griffith 
(2003). The depreciation rates are from the AEI international tax database. EATRcpi 
denotes the corporate EATRs that are calculated using the actual Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) as the inflation rate. EATRex, which is calculated using the expected 
3.5% inflation rate, is not reported but has the same pattern.  






Figure 1.2.2 (c) the Relationship between Original Corporate EATRs and the 
Magnitude of Corporate EATR Reductions in OECD Countries 
 
Data source: Calculated using the method provided by Devereux and Griffith 
(2003). The depreciation rates are from the AEI international tax database. EATRcpi 
denotes the corporate EATRs that are calculated using the actual Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) as the inflation rate. EATRex, which is calculated using the expected 
3.5% inflation rate, is not reported but has the same pattern.  






Figure 1.2.3 (a) the Average, Standard Deviation, and CV of Corporate EMTR in 21 
OECD Countries* from 1981 to 2011 
 
Data source: Calculated using the method provided by Devereux and Griffith 
(2003). The depreciation rates are from the AEI international tax database. 
EMTRcpi denotes the corporate EMTRs that are calculated using the actual 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) as the inflation rate. EMTRex denotes the corporate 
EMTRs that are calculated using the expected 3.5% inflation rate. Appendix III 
contains detailed information about how corporate EMTRs are calculated and the 
differences between EMTRcpi and EMTRex. 
** Note: The data of these 21 OECD countries does not include Iceland, Turkey, 
and Luxembourg. The data of Iceland is missing because the AEI international tax 
database does not provide information on the Iceland’s depreciation rates, which are 
the key variables to calculate corporate EMTRs. The data of Turkey and 
Luxembourg is not provided because the AEI International Tax Database and the 
OECD Tax Database (contains data up to and including 2012) do not have these two 
countries’ combined corporate tax rate until 2000. So, there are too many missing 
values for Turkey and Luxembourg. Also, the sample ends in 2011, because the AEI 





Figure 1.2.3 (b) the Corporate EMTR in 21 OECD Countries, 1981 vs. 2011 
 
Data source: Calculated using the method provided by Devereux and Griffith 
(2003). The depreciation rates are from the AEI international tax database. 
EMTRcpi denotes the corporate EMTRs that are calculated using the actual 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) as the inflation rate. EMTRex, which is calculated using 
the expected 3.5% inflation rate, is not reported but has the same pattern.  






Figure 1.2.3 (c) the Relationship between Original Corporate EMTRs and the 
Magnitude of Corporate EMTR Reductions in OECD Countries 
 
Data source: Calculated using the method provided by Devereux and Griffith 
(2003). The depreciation rates are from the AEI international tax database. 
EMTRcpi denotes the corporate EMTRs that are calculated using the actual 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) as the inflation rate. EMTRex, which is calculated using 
the expected 3.5% inflation rate, is not reported but has the same pattern.  






Figure 1.3.1 Average PDV of Depreciation Allowance in 21 OECD Countries* from 
1981 to 2011 
 
Data Source: The AEI International Tax Database. The PDV of depreciation 
allowance is calculated under the same assumption as Devereux et al. (2002). The 
inflation rate is assumed to be 3.5%, and the real discount rate is assumed to be 10%. 
Also, the firms are allowed to switch between straight line method and reduced 
balance method, based on their preference.  
**Note: The 21 OECD countries studied in this sector are Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 





Figure 1.4.1 Average Corporate Tax Revenue (constant at 2000 $US dollars, billion) 
and the Growth Rate of Average Corporate Tax Revenue in 24 OECD Countries, from 
1965 to 2011 
 
Data Source: the data of corporate tax revenue (constant at 2000 $US dollars, 
billion) is calculated based on the data of corporate tax revenue (%GDP) and the 
data of GDP (constant at 2000 $US dollars). The data of corporate tax revenue 
(%GDP) is from the OECD. StatExtracts, and the data of GDP (constant at 2000 
$US dollars) is from the World Bank. The growth rate of average corporate tax 













  , where tG is the 
growth rate of average corporate tax revenue at year t, and the tR is the average 





Figure 1.4.2 (a) the Average and Median Corporate Tax Revenue (%GDP) and the 
Average and Median Corporate Tax Revenue (%Total Tax Revenue) of 24 OECD 
Countries, 1965-2011 
 
Data Source: the OECD. StatExtracts. 
 
Figure 1.4.2 (b) the Average and Std. dev of Corporate Tax Revenue (%GDP) of 24 
OECD Countries, 1965-2011 
 
Data Source: the OECD. StatExtracts. 





Figure 1.4.2 (c) the Average and Std. dev of Corporate Tax Revenue (% Total Tax 
Revenue) of 24 OECD Countries, 1965-2011 
 
Data Source: the OECD. StatExtracts. 
**Note: The OECD countries names and corresponding IOC codes are in Appendix 
I.  
 
Figure 1.4.2 (d) Average Corporate Tax Revenue (%Total Tax Revenue) of Each 
OECD Country from 1965 to 2011 
 
Data Source: the OECD. StatExtracts. 
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Chapter II: Corporate Tax Competition in OECD Countries: 
Evidence from a Panel Spatial Approach 
This paper investigates international corporate tax competition in Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The key focus is the extent of 
strategic interaction with respect to corporate tax rates among OECD countries. The 
investigation also sheds light on several aspects of corporate taxation. First, has 
international corporate tax competition become more intense in the recent years, as 
the 1998 OECD report suggests? Second, compared to the OECD countries that 
adopt a flat corporate tax rate, do the countries with progressive corporate tax rates 
respond differently to other countries’ corporate tax rate changes? Third, is strategic 
interaction asymmetric regarding the direction of corporate tax rate changes? That 
is, are countries more sensitive to the other countries’ corporate tax rate decreases 
than increases? Finally, do the lower corporate tax rates in developing countries also 
impose downward pressure on developed countries’ corporate tax rates? Overall, 
this paper comprehensively investigates the characteristics of corporate tax strategic 
interactions in OECD countries. 
The main contribution of this paper is that it specifically controls for the effects 
of common shocks, which can be both idiosyncratic and persistent over time, by 
using the double clustering method (Thompson, 2011). Thus, the empirical results 
are robust to shocks that may cause countries’ corporate tax policies to move in the 
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same direction. The empirical specification uses a panel spatial analysis for 21 
OECD countries from 1981 to 2011. Following Devereux et al. (2008), I assume that 
a country can correctly predict the other countries’ corporate tax policies, and then 
adjust its own corporate tax policy accordingly. In other words, the countries’ 
corporate tax rates are always at the Nash equilibrium. Also, both geographic and 
economic distances are adopted to build the inverse distance weighting matrix. 
The empirical results from the panel spatial lag model suggest that corporate 
tax competition does exist in OECD countries. On average, a country’s corporate tax 
rates fall around 0.7 percentage points, when the weighted average of other 
countries’ corporate tax rates fall by one percentage point. I also find that the OECD 
countries’ corporate tax strategic interaction has been more intense since the early 
1990s. Meanwhile, the developing countries significantly reduce their corporate tax 
rates and affect the corporate tax policy changes in the developed OECD countries. 
Interestingly, OECD countries are more responsive to each other’s corporate tax rate 
increases than decreases. The OECD countries with a progressive corporate tax rate 
react less to other countries’ corporate tax rates than countries with a flat tax rate, 
although this conclusion only holds in the geographic weighting specification.  
In addition, OECD countries corporate tax rates are affected by countries’ own 
characteristics. Generally speaking, OECD countries that have higher levels of trade 
and capital openness are associated with lower corporate tax rates. However, OECD 
countries with a larger government deficit to GDP ratio, a higher top statutory 
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personal income tax rates and a change in government are usually associated with 
higher corporate tax rates. So, a country’s corporate tax rates are jointly determined 
by not only the strategic interactions with the other countries but also its own 
economic and political characteristics.  
Recently, policymakers in OECD countries, especially those in the European 
Union (EU), have discussed how to structure tax policies to enhance tax 
harmonization, so as to increase the overall welfare of all member countries. 
However, some economists argue that tax competition is necessary and beneficial to 
individual country’s economic growth. This paper sheds light on the fundamental 
questions in this current tax debate, that is, how OECD countries compete with each 
other over corporate tax rates. Furthermore, this paper provides some evidence 
regarding whether governments should regulate international corporate tax 
competition, and whether tax harmonization can be achieved by cooperation within 
OECD countries.  
2.1 Literature Review 
Since the 1980s, corporate tax rates in countries have decreased from over 40% 
to less than 25%. This decreasing corporate tax trend, according to many 
economists, is caused increased integration of the world’s economy and increased 
capital mobility. In order to attract more FDI which can create more job 
opportunities and stimulate economic growth, OECD countries have reduced their 
corporate tax rates and built an environment that is more benevolent to business and 
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investment. Some economists point out that there is strategic interaction among 
OECD countries regarding corporate tax policies. That is, corporate tax rate policy 
choices respond the other countries’ corporate tax rate policies. The economic 
intuition behind such corporate tax competition is quite straightforward. Because 
economic resources are limited, OECD countries try to undercut neighboring and 
competing countries corporate tax rates in order to attract more capital inflows into 
their own country and to discourage capital outflows. 
2.1.1 Previous Literature about Why Corporate Tax Rates have been Decreased 
The previous literature studying the decreasing trend of corporate tax rates 
generally focuses on two factors: the relationship between FDI and corporate tax 
rates, and the effect of openness on corporate tax rates (Devereux and Griffith, 1998; 
Bellak and Leibrecht, 2009; Slemrod, 2004; Winner, 2005; Schwarz, 2007). Many 
papers find that countries with lower corporate tax rates attract more FDI inflows 
(Bellak and Leibrecht, 2009; Egger et al. 2009; Djankov et al. 2010). Theoretical 
research shows that corporate tax rates can be one of the determinants of 
international capital allocation (Devereux and Griffith, 2003). 
The papers that study the effect of economic openness on corporate tax rates 
usually use two methods to measure economic openness: capital openness and trade 
openness. The empirical evidence of the relationship between economic openness 
and corporate tax rates is mixed. Some papers (Bretschger and Hettich, 2002; 
Slemrod, 2004; Winner, 2005; Schwarz, 2007) find a negative and significant 
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relationship between capital and/or trade openness and corporate tax rates. Others 
(Davies and Voget, 2008, Gomes and Pouget, 2008) find this relationship to be 
insignificant and/or are not robust under different specifications. All of these papers 
take the assumption that OECD countries compete over corporate tax rates as a 
given. The very first paper that provides empirical evidence about international 
corporate tax competition is Devereux et al. (2008).  
2.1.2 International Corporate Tax Competition: the Strategic Interaction among 
OECD Countries 
The theoretical and empirical research argues that attracting more FDI is the 
key motivation for countries to reduce corporate tax rates (Janeba, 1995; Devereux 
and Griffith, 2003; Devereux et al., 2008). Intense corporate tax competition, 
however, may lead to inefficient capital allocation and reduce government revenue 
and/or investment (Janeba, 1995; Gomes and Pouget, 2008). For good surveys of the 
theoretical literature about tax competition, see Wilson (1999) and Fuest et al. 
(2005). 
A fundamental concern in the empirical literature on international corporate tax 
competition is how to control for common shocks. More specifically, global shocks 
can cause corporate tax rates move to the same direction, and produce correlations 
that can be falsely captured by the reaction function as strategic interactions. The 
previous international tax competition literature does not specifically discuss the 
effects of common shocks. Most of the papers either use a time trend (Devereux et 
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al., 2008; Davies and Voget, 2008; Redoano, 2007) or selected year dummies 
(Rincke and Overesch, 2009) to control for common shocks13. 
Some papers studying the tax competition within the U.S. States do consider 
the possibility of idiosyncratic common shocks. However, these papers either use 
the spatial error model, which imposes spatial dependence on error terms (Saavedra 
and Wilson, 2007) or model the heterogeneous state responses to time specific 
shocks (Chirinko and Wilson, 2011). Both methods require impose some strict 
assumptions on how each state responds differently to the same common shock.  
The main contribution of this chapter is that it estimates the level of 
international corporate tax competition, which is robust to the effects of common 
shocks. In fact, this chapter not only controls for heterogeneous common shocks, but 
also controls for shocks that are both idiosyncratic and persistent over time. 
Figure.2.1.2 shows how common shocks can affect corporate tax rates in different 
countries, as well as how the effects of corporate tax strategic interaction can be 
overestimated when common shocks are omitted. The double clustering method 
used in this chapter to control for common shocks is proposed by Thompson (2011).  
Thompson estimates a firm-level financial panel regression with the standard errors 
                                                     
13 No previous international tax competition literature use year dummies to control 
for homogeneous common shocks. Partly because once including year dummies in 
the regressions, the results change dramatically. Such huge estimation differences, as 
Devereux et al. (2008) mentioned, is because the nature of the data, that is, the 
effects of weighted average of other countries’ corporate tax rates can be not 
separated estimated from a time dummy. In fact, the corporate tax rate data varies 
significant across time, but not across country. So, the time dummies are highly 
correlated with the weighted average corporate tax rates, and significantly increase 
the standard deviations of the coefficients. 
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of the coefficients robust to heterogeneous and persistent market-wide common 
shocks.  
Some empirical papers (Devereux et al., 2008; Davies and Voget, 2008) find 
that international corporate tax competition does exist. However, the magnitude of 
competition varies from 3.993 to 0.232. Such huge differences in the estimated level 
of corporate tax competition arise for many reasons. Two factors are critical for 
understanding the variation in the estimated strategic interaction. First, the method 
used to construct the reaction functions, which capture how a country responds to 
other countries’ corporate tax rate changes. Second, the weighting variables that are 
used to build the reaction functions. Many papers point out that in the spatial 
analysis, the regression results can be significantly influenced by the choice of 
weighting methods (Arbia and Fingleton, 2008; LeSage and Pace, 2012). 
Research such as Devereux et al. (2008), Davies and Voget (2008), and 
Redoano (2007) use the simple weighting method to construct the reaction function. 
This method directly uses countries’ economic and/or demographic characteristics, 
such as GDP, FDI, and population as weighting variables, and does not calculate the 
geometric, economic, or demographic distance between each pair of countries. The 
advantage of this method is that it allows the weighting matrix to vary across time. 
However, this method suffers from at least two problems. 
First, the key motivation for the spatial analysis is that “everything is related to 
everything else, but near things are more related than distant things” (Waldo R. 
51 
 
Tobler, 1970). In the strategic interaction case, one important assumption to 
construct the reaction function is that a country should have stronger responses to 
the changes of closer neighboring countries. In econometric analysis, the “closer” 
countries refer to not only geographically but also economically closer countries. 
That is, a country’s corporate tax policy should be more sensitive to the corporate 
tax policy changes in the countries in closer geographic proximities or more similar 
economic circumstances. 
The simple weighting method does not account for geographic factors and 
simply assigns higher weights to the countries that have larger GDP or FDI or 
population. For example, if the FDI is used as the weighting variable to construct the 
reaction function, under the spatial analysis assumptions, the Greek corporate tax 
policy should be more sensitive to the corporate tax changes in New Zealand, 
because these two countries have closer amount of net FDI inflows. But, under the 
simple weighting method, the corporate tax policy in Greece is more responsive to 
the American corporate tax policy changes, because the U.S. has higher net FDI 
inflows, and thus receives higher weights in the reaction function.  
Second, endogeneity is also a concern when economic and/or demographic 
characteristics are chosen as the weighting variables. Many papers point out that the 
endogenous weighting matrix can lead to biased and inconsistent estimators, 
because it is correlated with the error terms (Pinkse and Slade, 2009; Anselin, 2010; 
Qu and Lee, 2012). Domestic factors, such as, population, and GDP size, can impact 
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a country’s corporate tax policy (Slemrod, 2004; Schwarz, 2007; Rincke and 
Overesch, 2009). International factors, such as FDI and trade openness, can also 
influence a country’s corporate tax policy (Devereux and Griffith, 1998; Bellak and 
Leibrecht, 2009; Winner et al., 2009). So, directly using economic and/or 
demographic characteristics, such as GDP, FDI, and population, as weighting 
variables can induce correlations between explanatory variables and error terms, and 
thus bias the results. 
Some papers use a geographic spatial weighting matrix to specify reaction 
functions. For example, Crabbe and Vandenbussche (2007) use panel data from 
1993 to 2006 to study corporate tax competition between 10 new EU countries and 
15 former EU countries. They find that the corporate tax competition is more 
significant among countries closer to new EU countries. Also, Davies and Voget 
(2008) use panel data of 35 countries from 1980 to 2005 to study the effects of EU 
expansion on international corporate competition. They find that EU expansion 
intensifies corporate tax competition. Overesch and Rincke (2008) use a time-space 
recursive model to study the dynamic interaction of 32 European countries’ 
corporate tax rates from 1980 to 2007. They build the reaction function using the 
other countries’ one-year lagged corporate tax rates. According to their model 
specification, they estimate how one country responds to other countries’ corporate 
tax policies at the previous year rather than the contemporaneous corporate tax 
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competition. Overall, no convincing empirical evidence about the contemporaneous 
corporate tax competition within OECD countries has been provided.  
In additional to the two reasons mentioned above, the differences in the 
estimated level of corporate competition may be caused by differences in empirical 
specifications. First, sets of control variables differ across analyses. For example, 
some research (Devereux et al., 2008; Rincke and Overesch, 2011) include trade or 
capital openness as an explanatory variable, while others (Hines, 2005; Crabbe and 
Vandenbussche, 2009) do not. Second, investigations adopt different datasets, which 
cover different countries and time frames. For example, Chatelais and Peyrat (2008), 
Crabbe and Vandenbussche (2009), and Rincke and Overesch (2011) study 
corporate tax competition within European countries, while others, Egger et al. 
(2007) and Devereux et al. (2008), include OECD countries.   
Table 2.1.2 summarizes and compares the previous literature about the 
international corporate tax competition. No previous paper in the international 
corporate tax competition literature specifically discusses and controls for 
heterogeneous and persistent common shocks. This paper imposes assumptions on 
error terms to control the effect of common shocks on international corporate tax 
competition. The spatial analysis is adopted to specify reaction functions, which 
incorporate both geographic and economic distances in the weighting matrix. This 
paper not only studies the characteristics of corporate tax strategic interaction in 
OECD countries, but also extends the investigation to developing countries, and 
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studies how developing and developed OECD interact with each other regarding 
corporate tax rates.  
The following paper is arranged into five sections. Section 2.2 discusses the 
empirical model, particularly how to control for the effects of different types of 
shocks on strategic interaction. There are two specific types of shocks: isolated 
country shocks and common shocks. The former generate country specific shocks 
that are correlated over time but uncorrelated across countries. The latter could cause 
global reactions at different speeds and magnitudes, and are persistent over certain 
periods. Section 2.3 briefly introduces the data used in this paper and its sources. 
Also, this section discusses different types of corporate tax rates. Section 2.4 shows 
the basic regression results and explanations. Section 2.5 provides some extensions 
and robustness checks. Finally, Section 2.6 is conclusions with policy implications. 
2.2 Model 
This paper uses spatial analysis to investigate the contemporaneous corporate 
tax competition in 21 OECD countries14. The inverse distance weighting matrix, as 
well as both geographic and economic distances, are used to construct the reaction 
functions. Because this paper adopts panel data from 21 countries and over a 31-year 
                                                     
14 The 21 OECD countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, 
Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, and the United 
States. These 21 OECD countries all joined OECD before 1980, and are classified as 
developed countries. Iceland, Luxembourg, and Turkey, who also joined OECD 
before 1980, are not included in the sample, because these three countries’ corporate 
tax rate data, especially corporate EATRs and EMTRs, has too many missing values.  
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period, the country heterogeneity can be controlled by both random effects and fixed 
effects. I employ the double clustering method, which essentially allows error terms 
to be clustered on both country and time dimensions and to control the idiosyncratic 
effects of common shocks on the strategic interaction (Thompson, 2011).  
2.2.1 The Advantages of Using Spatial Analysis to Build the Reaction Function 
To empirically study the strategic interactions among countries, many papers 
use spatial analytic techniques, which allow observations to be spatially dependent 
to each other. The reaction function with the spatial autoregressive parameter shows 
how changes in “neighboring” countries may affect the home country. The basic 
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                           (2.2.1.b), 
where  is the autoregressive parameter, which represents the level of 
corporate tax competition in this paper; 
ijw is the weight assigned to country j, when 
the home/reacting country is country i; ijd  can be either the geographic or 
economic distance between country i and j. The inverse distance weighting matrix 




If the data generating process in the model has some cross-sectional spatial 
dependence, failing to control for such dependence would cause error terms to 
correlate with each other. In such cases, still using the assumption that error terms 
are identically and independently distributed to estimate the coefficient variances 
would lead to smaller standard errors (Petersen, 2009; Thompson, 2011). Thus, the 
t-statistics will be larger and falsely cause the insignificant coefficients to be 
statistically significant. 
2.2.2 The Basic Empirical Model: Panel Spatial Lag Model 
This paper uses panel spatial analysis to study the strategic interaction of 
corporate tax competition in OECD countries. The dependent variable is the 
corporate tax rate. The basic model is a spatial lag model, which includes a spatially 
lagged dependent variable on the RHS of the regression (Anselin, 1988a).  
, 1( )it T N it i t ity I W y X                                     (2.2.2.a), 
where ity  is the corporate tax rate in country i at year t.  is the spatial 
autoregressive parameter and also known as the coefficient of the reaction function. 
The implication when  is positive and significant is that corporate tax competition 
does exist, and a country will reduce its corporate tax rates when its “neighboring” 
countries do so. 
NW is an N N  cross-sectional time-constant weighting matrix with zeros in 
the diagonal and ijw at ith row and jth column. , 1i tX  includes all the other 
explanatory variables in country i year t-1, such as top statutory personal income tax 
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rate, unemployment rate, GDP growth rate, and openness. All the explanatory 
variables in X are one-year lagged in order to avoid the potential endogeneity 
problem between the dependent and explanatory variables, as well as to allow the 
potential time lag between the decision and the implementation of corporate tax rate 
changes (Gomes and Pouget, 2008, Crabbe and Vandenbussche, 2009; Rincke and 
Overesch, 2011). 
it denotes the error terms. This paper assumes that ~ . . .it i i d  
2(0, )N  , when the error terms satisfy the assumption of homogenous and 
independent across both time and section. 
Because this paper uses panel data, potential country heterogeneity can be 
controlled for by imposing some assumptions on the error terms: it i it    , it
contains two parts: country specific effect i , which is time-invariant but different 
across countries, and 2~ (0, )it N   , which is uncorrelated with both explanatory 
variables and i . 
Country heterogeneity is captured by i , which has mean zero and variance
2
 . 
If i  is uncorrelated with other explanatory variables, the random effect 
specification is sufficient to identify the model. However, if i   is correlated with 
other explanatory variables, fixed effect is required to control for the endogeneneity 
between the explanatory variables and it . Also, it  may not be independently 
distributed. That is, it  can be either correlated across time within each country, or 
correlated across countries in each year, or both. To get the efficient estimators, 
either clustered or robust standard errors are needed in the regressions. 
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One identification issue related to the spatial lag model is that the spatial lag 
term ( )T N itI W y is endogenous. In order to obtain unbiased estimators, this paper 
adopts two-stage least square (2SLS). Following Kelejian and Robinson (1993) and 
Kelejian and Prucha (1998): the spatial lagged exogenous explanatory variables,
( )T NI W X , are adopted as instrument variables (IVs) for the spatial lagged 
dependent variable. 
Another important issue related to the spatial analysis is choosing a proper 
weighting matrix: NW . This paper adopts two types of weighting matrix to build 
reaction functions, one is purely geographic, and the other is economic. NGW
denotes the geographic weighting matrix, which uses the distance between capital 
cities in kilometers for each pair of countries. NEW denotes the weighting matrix 
using economic “distance”, which measures the overall differences in two countries’ 
economic characteristics, such as FDI and GDP size. According to Devereux et al. 
(2008), the main motivation for reducing corporate tax rates is to attract more FDI. 
Some papers (Devereux et al., 2008) directly use FDI and/or GDP size as the 
weighting variables. As discussed above in Section 2.1.2, such simple weighting 
method can cause biased and inconsistent estimators. 
This paper measures the economic distance by using the Euclidean distance of 
the economic weighting variable between each pair of countries. The formula is: 




im and jm are two row vectors, which contain either FDI or GDP of 
country i and j from 1981 to 2011, respectively. The Euclidean distance measures 
the overall economic distance between each pair of countries across the sample 
period. Compared with the simple weighting method, the Euclidean distances 
mitigate the correlation between the dependent variable and the weighting variables, 
and thus, guarantee the exogenous of the weighting matrix. Moreover, the time 
invariant economic distance weighting matrix, which is constructed by using the 
Euclidean distances, provides simple and clear marginal effects, as well as easily 
computable and interpretable spillover effects of the explanatory variables. 
2.2.3 Strategic Interaction vs. Common Shocks 
Previous papers (Devereux et al., 2008; Gomes and Pouget, 2008; Davies and 
Voget, 2008; Overesch and Rincke, 2009) interpret the positive and significant 
spatial autoregressive parameter  as the evidence that the corporate tax 
competition does exist among OECD countries. However, the possibility that this 
positive parameter  is caused by common shocks, which simultaneously drive 
OECD countries’ corporate tax rates in the same direction, cannot be ruled out. To 
obtain robust evidence about the strategic interaction, the effects of common shocks 
must be controlled for the international corporate tax competition.  
The international tax competition literature does not specifically discuss 
common shocks. Some papers studying tax competition within the U.S. States do 
discuss how to control the idiosyncratic common shocks. However, these papers 
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either use the spatial error model, which imposes spatial dependence on error terms 
(Saavedra and Wilson, 2007), or try to model the heterogeneous state responses to 
time specific shocks (Chirinko and Wilson, 2011).  
However, neither of these two methods fundamentally captures the effects of 
the common shocks. The problems associated with spatial error model and the 
method by Chirinko and Wilson (2011) are similar. First, these two methods all 
impose very strict assumptions on error terms. The spatial error model assumes that 
the common shocks can generate spatially dependent error terms. The method 
proposed by Chirinko and Wilson (2011) estimates the common shocks by obtaining 
the residuals of average cross-sectional regressions. Second, both methods only 
control for the contemporaneous common shocks, and do not allow the idiosyncratic 
common shocks to be persistent over time.  
Thompson (2011) introduces the double clustering method that has a general 
form for the persistent market-wide common shocks, that is, it does not impose a 
specific model on common shocks. The double clustering method also allows 
heterogeneous firm responses and induces correlations across both firms and time. 
This paper implements the double clustering method on the country level, in order to 
simultaneously handle the country effects and the persistent heterogeneous common 
shocks. Following Thompson (2011), I assume:  
it i t it it        , and  
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1it it it    , 0 0i  , where it has mean zero, it  and it are independently 
and identically distributed error terms with mean zero. 
it  and i  are two vectors. t are random time effects, which can be 
considered as some global shocks that can affect OECD countries’ corporate tax 
policies and are common to all countries in each time period. i  are country 
specific effects determined by each country’s underlying time-invariant 
characteristics, which are constant across time but differs across country. As a result, 
i t   gives idiosyncratic country responses to time specific global shocks. In other 
words, this term allows countries’ corporate tax rates to exhibit heterogeneous 
adjustments with respect to the same shock in a year.  
Country specific shocks, it , are assumed to be an AR(1) process, which 
gradually die out over time. it  allows the corporate tax rates to be consistently 
affected by some unobservable country characteristics. Unlike the unobservable 
country specific characteristics controlled by fixed effects in panel data, the 
unobservable country specific shocks, it , are uncorrelated with other explanatory 
variables and vary over time. 
To control for the persistent common shocks, t , the random time effects that 
influence all countries’ corporate tax rates at the same time, are assumed to be 
correlated over time. The autocorrelation of t is assumed to be disappear after L 
periods. In this case, i t   loads heterogeneous country responses to persistent 
common shocks, and the effects of common shocks on countries’ corporate tax rates 
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die out after L periods. To get the robust estimators with respect to persistent 
common shocks, this paper assumes that L=215. That is, the persistent common 
shocks, which influence countries’ corporate tax rates, disappear after 2 periods. 
The double clustering method is easy to compute. Following the method 
proposed by Thompson (2011), this paper calculates the variance of the estimated 
coefficients, which is double clustering robust using the formula: 
,0 ,0 , , , ,
1 1
( ) ( )
L L
double country t white t l t l white l white l
l l 
             , 
where 
country is the matrix with the standard errors clustered by country, ,0t  
is the matrix with the standard errors clustered by time, and 
,0white is the ordinary 
least squares error (OLS)16 variance and covariance (VCV) matrix, which is robust 
to hetersoskedasticity. The formula for 
,t l and ,white l are also straight-forward.  
1 1
, =( ) ( )t t lt l
t
X X s s X X 

    
1 1
,, ( ) ( )it i t lwhite l
t i
X X u u X X 

    , with it ititu x  , and t it
i
s u , which 
is the summation of itu for time t. 
2.3 Data 
The data used in this paper covers 21 developed countries from 1981 to 2011, 
and these countries all joined the OECD before 1980. The main reason to include 
                                                     
15 Thompson (2011) also assumes L=2 for the robust estimation of the persistent 
and idiosyncratic common shocks.  
16 In the rest of the paper, OLS stands for the ordinary least square. 
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these 21 OECD countries in the sample is that these countries are usually classified 
as developed countries, and have similar economic and political background. So, it 
is reasonable to believe that the mechanism for determining corporate tax policies is 
similar and comparable among OECD countries. Moreover, the OECD Tax 
Database and the AEI International Tax Database all provide high quality data of 
corporate taxation in these OECD countries. The data is available from 1981 
through 2011. 
2.3.1 The Dependent Variables: Different Measurements of Corporate Tax Rates 
The dependent variable used in this paper is the corporate tax rate. The 
previous literature uses three different measurements of corporate tax rates, namely, 
corporate TSR, EATR and EMTR. Each of these three measurements has its pros 
and cons. The corporate TSR is the statutory rate imposed on taxable corporate 
income. In order to truly reflect the central governments’ corporate tax policies, this 
paper uses the central/federal level corporate TSR, which is adjusted for 
sub-national deductions if applicable.  Changes in corporate TSR can be viewed as 
the central governments’ corporate tax policy changes with respect to rates, but not 
changes with respect to corporate tax bases or structures. 
In contrast, the corporate EATR and EMTR incorporate changes in both 
corporate tax rates and bases. These two types of corporate effective tax rates are 
proposed by Devereux and Griffith (1999). The corporate EATR measures the 
average tax rate a firm may face on a hypothetical investment, which is financed by 
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equity, on plant and machinery. Many papers argue that corporate EATR 
comprehensively measures corporate tax policies (Devereux and Griffith 2003; 
Hassett and Mathur, 2011) and is one of the determinants of the location choice of 
FDI. The corporate EATR is widely used in the literature analyzing the relationship 
between FDI and corporate tax rates (Devereux and Griffith 1999 and 2003; Bellak 
et al. 2007; Bellak and Markus Leibrecht, 2009). 
The corporate EMTR is also calculated under the assumption of a hypothetical 
investment, where the post-tax return just equals to the capital cost. The main 
difference between corporate EATR and EMTR is that the former is adjusted for the 
distribution of the investment’s profitability, while the latter assumes that the 
post-tax return just offsets the capital cost. Essentially, Devereux and Griffith (1999) 
show that the corporate EATR is a weighted average of corporate TSR and EMTR, 
and when an investment’s profitability increases, the corporate EATR approaches 
the corporate TSR. Consequently, the corporate EMTR is related to the scale of 
investment, and is conditional on the location choice/country. 
Another advantage of corporate EATR and EMTR is that they are 
forward-looking measurements, and they are not directly influenced by taxable 
corporate income. One the other hand, the backward-looking corporate tax 
measurement, which is calculated by Total Revenue/Total Taxable Income, not only 
incorporates the changes in corporate tax policies but also incorporates changes in 
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corporate taxable incomes.17  This paper uses all three types of corporate tax 
measurements as robustness checks.  
2.3.2 The Control Variables: Openness, Government Fiscal Conditions, and Other 
Macro Variables 
This paper uses three categories of control variables: openness, government 
fiscal conditions, and other macroeconomic variables that indicate the general 
economic activities. The previous literature finds mixed evidence about the effects 
of openness on corporate tax rates. In contrast to the existing literature which usually 
only includes either trade openness or capital openness, this chapter includes both 
types of openness. Trade openness is calculated using the equation 
(export+import)/GDP. Capital openness is an indicator provided by Chinn and Ito 
(2008) which is constructed based on the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). 
Government fiscal conditions include four variables: top personal income tax 
rate (PTSR), government consumption, gross government debt, and annual 
government deficit. The latter three variables are included to control for the 
government’s financial situation and are all weighted by GDP. The PTSR is 
included because some researchers argue that the corporate tax is the backstop of 
                                                     
17 Reed and Rogers (2006) demonstrate, at least half of the variation of de facto tax 
burden, which is calculated by using the state tax revenue divided by personal 
income, is contributed by the changes of incomes. So, it is reasonable to believe that 
changes of de facto corporate tax burden, which is calculated by using tax revenue 
divided by taxable corporate income, also suffers the similar problem. 
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personal income tax (Slemrod, 2004; Overesch and Rincke, 2008). That is, if 
corporate tax was abandoned, people would transfer their personal capital income 
into the retention of corporate income in order to avoid personal income tax. Thus, 
there may be a positive relationship between corporate and personal income tax 
rates.  
This paper also includes two macroeconomic variables and a variable that 
measures domestic political changes. The two macroeconomic variables that capture 
the general economic activity level are unemployment and GDP growth rate. Some 
papers argue that the central government may adopt aggressive corporate tax 
policies, i.e. lower corporate tax rate, to stimulate economy, when the country has a 
low economic growth rate and/or a high unemployment rate. The Gov_chan 
measures the number of government changes, such as election, resignation of the 
Prime Minister, per year. The coefficient of Gov_chan captures the potential 
correlation between corporate tax policy changes and political changes. 
2.3.3 Data Summarization: Data Sources and Statistics 
Table 2.3.3 summarizes the basic statistics, definitions and sources of the 
variables used in this paper. The dependent variables are the corporate TSR, which is 
directly provided by OECD Tax Database, and the corporate EATR and EMTR, 
which are estimated using the method proposed by Devereux and Griffith (1999). 
The subscript cpi denotes that the variables are calculated using the actual CPI as the 
inflation rate, and the subscript expected denotes that the variables are calculated 
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using the expected annual inflation rate 3.5%, which is also used in Devereux et al. 
(2002). The PTSR and trade openness are provided by OECD Tax Database and 
World Development Indicators, respectively. All the other explanatory variables are 
all from Comparative Political Data Set I. 
2.4 Basic Regression Results and Explanations: 
The basic regression model is  
, 1( )it T N it i t ity I W y X                                   (2.4.1) 
This section reports the regression results from using different corporate tax 
rate measurements, and compares the results from different regression methods. 
Table 2.4 (a) to (e) summarizes the results of regressions that use corporate TSR, 
EATRcpi, EATRexpected, EMTRcpi, EMTRexpected as dependent variables, 
respectively. The first column in each table reports the estimates using the average 
weighting matrix and the other columns report the results using the inverse distance 
weighting matrix.   
In addition, columns (1) to (6) in each table reports the results of regressions, 
which adopt different assumptions on the error terms. The regression in column (1) 
uses the simplest assumption that the error terms are homoskedasticity and 
independently identically distributed. The regression in column (2) uses the panel 
random effects and assumes the error terms contain a country specific component, 
which is uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables. The regressions in 
columns (3) and (4) use the pooled ordinary least square (OLS), and the regressions 
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in columns (5) and (6) adopt the panel fixed effects. The standard deviations of the 
coefficients in columns (3) and (5) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. The 
standard deviations in columns (4) and (6) are adjusted for heterogeneous and 
persistent common shocks.  
The problems with the regressions in columns (1) (2) (3) (5) are similar, that is, 
they do not control for the heterogeneous country responses to common shocks, as 
well as the potential persistence of common shocks. The regressions in columns (4) 
and (6) use the double clustering method, which adjusts for idiosyncratic responses 
to common shocks, also assume that the common correlated disturbances is up to 2 
periods. Comparing the results of column (3) to column (4), as well as column (5) to 
(6), the standard deviations increase when the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
are controlled as Thompson (2011) points out. 
2.4.1 Does Corporate Tax Competition Exist in OECD Countries and to What Extent? 
In the spatial lag model, the autoregressive parameter  , which captures the 
spatial correlation of the dependent variable, measures the level of corporate tax 
strategic interactions in OECD countries. In all regressions, autoregressive 
parameter, ρs, are positive and significant, even after controlling for persistent 
common shocks. This suggests that the international corporate tax competition does 
exist: an OECD country does cut its own corporate tax rates when other OECD 
countries do so. 
69 
 
When the inverse distance weighting matrix is used, there is evidence that 
OECD countries compete over all types of corporate tax rates, corporate TSR, 
EATR, and EMTR. Using the regression results from Table 2.4 (a) to (e), the size of 
 varies from 0.481 to 0.814, which means when there is one percentage reduction 
in the weighted average corporate tax rate in other OECD countries, the home 
country’s corporate tax rate will decrease 0.481 to 0.814 percentage points, 
simultaneously. These findings are in line with, but slightly larger than the results in 
Devereux et al. (2008), who suggest that a country cuts corporate tax rates by 0.34 to 
0.67 percentage points, when the weighted average corporate tax rates in its 
“neighboring” countries decrease by one percentage point. 
2.4.2 The Effects of Other Control Variables on Corporate Tax Rates 
The main objective of this chapter is to investigate whether international 
corporate tax competition exists, and if so, to what extent. The direct and indirect 
effects, as LeSage and Pace (2009) defined, are difficult to calculate and hard to 
interpret. Since the spill-over effects of the other exogenous control variables are not 
the main concern of this chapter, I focus on the marginal effects of a country’s 
control variables on its own dependent variable. Such marginal effects can be 
directly interpreted by the coefficients of other explanatory variables.  
The relationships between other explanatory variables and the dependent 
variable need to be carefully explained. Because the corporate tax policies are 
relatively independent and set by governments, the coefficients of the other 
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explanatory variables may simply represent correlations instead of causalities. Some 
findings are quite robust to different specifications, while others are not. This section 
mainly discusses the regression results showed in columns (4) and (6), which are 
robust to common shocks. 
Consistent with the previous literature, this chapter finds strong evidence that 
the corporate taxation serves as the “backstop” of personal income tax18. There is a 
positive and significant relationship between a country’s corporate tax rates and 
personal top income tax rate. That is, if a country has a higher (lower) top personal 
income tax rate, it also tends to have a higher (lower) corporate tax rate. 
Government changes, such as election and prime minister resignation, are positively 
correlated with corporate tax rates, as well. These two findings are robust under 
different specification. 
Regarding the three variables that control for the central government fiscal 
condition, the government deficit to GDP ratio is positively and significantly 
correlated with corporate tax rates under different specifications. The coefficients of 
the debt to GDP ratio are positive, but significant only when pooled OLS is used. 
The evidence about how government consumption affects corporate tax rates is quite 
                                                     
18 Winner et al. (2007) indicate that OECD countries also compete with each other 
regarding personal income tax rates. It is possible that including the personal income 
tax rate as an explanatory variable may cause underestimation of the magnitude of 
corporate tax strategic interactions. Accordingly, I exclude PTSRt-1 as a robustness 
check. The results show that the autoregressive parameters ρs are positive and 
significant and increase by around 0.12, when PTSRt-1 is excluded. The larger ρs 
suggest that the intense level of corporate tax strategic interactions may be 
underestimated in the baseline model. 
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mixed. I find government consumption to GDP ratio is positively correlated with 
corporate TSR, but negatively correlated with corporate EMTR.  
Generally speaking, an OECD country with a higher level of economic 
openness has lower corporate tax rates. Trade openness and capital openness are 
both negatively correlated with corporate tax rates, but the results vary under 
different specification. Comparing Table 2.4 (a) to (e) column (5) to (6), some 
estimated coefficients, such as the unemployment rate, are not robust to using the 
double clustering method to control for the effects of common shocks. The 
coefficients of unemployment and GDP growth rate are consistently insignificant, 
using double clustering method and inverse geographic distance matrix to estimate 
to basic regression equation (2.4.1). 
Overall, from the basic regression results, I find that an OECD country’s 
corporate tax rates are also correlated with its own economic and political 
characteristics. This conclusion indicates that when governments set their corporate 
tax rates, they not only compete with “neighboring” countries, but also need to 
consider domestic factors, such as government revenues, expenditure. 
2.5 Robustness Checks and Some Extensions 
This section includes some robustness checks and extensions. First, this section 
adopts economic inverse distance weighting matrix, which are constructed by FDI 
and GDP size, to investigate whether the effects of strategic interactions on 
corporate tax rates are significant and robust. Second, this section investigates four 
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novel questions, which provide more information about the characteristics of 
corporate tax strategic interactions in OECD countries, as well as, how the 
developed OECD countries interact with developing countries with respect to 
corporate tax rates. 
2.5.1 Different Weighting Matrix: FDI and Economic Size 
I still use the basic regression model  
, 1( )it T N it i t ity I W y X                                        (2.5.1),  
but adopt economic distance to construct the weighting matrix, WN. Table 2.5.1 (a) 
and (b) report the regression results using net FDI inflow and GDP as weighting 
variables, respectively. Both corporate TSR and effective tax rates are adopted as 
dependent variables. I only report the regressions results using both double 
clustering method and country fixed effect. In order to show the differences between 
double clustering method and robust standard errors, I also use italic and underscore 
numbers to report the standard deviations robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity in 
Table 2.5.1 (a) and (b). 
Compared to results using the geographic distance, the economic weighting 
matrix yields similar autoregressive parameters, ρs. The positive and significant 
parameter estimate suggests that the OECD countries’ corporate strategic 
interactions are robust to economic weighting matrix. The magnitude of ρ is around 
0.6, which indicates that an OECD country decreases (increases) it corporate tax 
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rates by 0.6 percentage points, when the other OECD countries’ weighted average 
corporate tax rates reduce (increase) by 1 percentage points.  
The regression results of other coefficients estimated by using economic 
weighting matrix are also similar to those using geographic weighting matrix. I find 
that the corporate tax rate and top personal income tax rate, as well as government 
deficit to GDP ratio are positively correlated with each other. Higher trade and 
capital openness are associated with lower corporate tax rates. Interestingly, 
effective corporate tax rates are positively affected by government changes19. 
2.5.2 Has International Corporate Tax Competition Become More Intense in the 
Recent Years? 
The 1998 OECD report Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue 
and several theoretical papers argue that corporate tax competition has been more 
intense in recent years, and thus is harmful to the overall welfare of OECD 
countries. However, no empirical evidence about more intense international 
corporate tax competition has been provided to support this argument. My research 
addresses this hole in the empirical literature. 
                                                     
19 Different political parties may have different corporate tax policies. It is possible 
that the positive correlation between government changes and corporate tax rates are 
driven by the cabinet composition of political parties, left, right and central, in 
governments. Replacing Gov_chant-1 with the cabinet composition of political 
parties as a robustness test, I find that the composition of political parties does not 
significantly affect corporate tax rates. In other words, corporate tax rates are 
significantly influenced by government changes, such as elections, instead of the 
dispersion of political parties. 
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Since my data covers 31 years, it is natural to break it into ten-year periods to 
see whether the strategic interaction in OECD countries with regard to corporate tax 
rates significantly differs across periods. Table 2.5.2 (a) and (b) summarize the 
regression results of the autoregressive parameters ρs, which are estimated by 
adopting both geographic and economic weighting matrix, in each period. The 
results show the evidence of corporate tax competition in OECD countries in each 
period, but are stronger after 1990.  
To get the conclusive evidence regarding whether corporate tax competition in 
OECD countries has been more intense in recent years, it is necessary to show that 
the autoregressive parameter ρ is significantly larger in later years than in the 
previous years. According to Figure 1.2.1 (a) in Chapter I, I find a clear corporate 
TSR structure break point at 1993. So I estimate the following equation:   
 1993 , 1
1 1
N N
it ij jt ij jt i t it
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                          (2.5.2) 








   is a new interaction term. A positive and significant ϕ 
indicates that an OECD country is more responsive to other OECD countries’ 
corporate tax changes after 1993, and can be viewed as evidence that OECD 
countries’ corporate tax competition has become more intense in recent years.  
Table 2.5.2 (c) shows the regression results by estimating equation (2.5.2). The 
autoregressive parameter ρ is still consistent and stays positive and significant in all 
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regressions, after including the interaction term. The coefficient ϕ is also positive 
and significant, when corporate TSR and EATR are used as dependent variables. 
However, at about 0.05, the magnitude of ϕ is not very large. The results suggest 
that OECD countries’ corporate tax competition became more intense in recent 
years, but the level of increase is small. I also use 1994 and 1995 as the break point 
to estimate equation (2.5.2) as robustness checks. The regression results summarized 
in Table 2.5.2 (d) and (e) are similar to those in Table 2.5.2 (c). Indeed, the intense 
level of corporate tax competition in OECD countries appears to have increased. 
The reason that the corporate tax competition in developed OECD countries 
has been more intense since the early 1990s is probably due to the expansion of 
OECD after 1993. Some emerging market countries, such as Mexico, South Korea, 
Hungary and Poland, became new OECD members and cut their corporate tax rates 
aggressively. For example, in 1990, the corporate TSR in South Korea was 37.5%, 
but in 1996, the year South Korea joined OECD, it was only 25%. The developed 
OECD countries which joined OECD before 1980 may face the competitive 
pressure from new member countries and become more responsive in corporate tax 
strategic interactions. 
2.5.3 Do Countries with Progressive Corporate Tax Rates Respond Differently to 
Corporate Tax Competition? 
Figure 1.1.2 shows that some OECD countries adopt flat corporate tax rates, 
while others adopt progressive corporate tax rates, which have more than one tax 
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bracket. As a part of corporate tax policy, corporate tax brackets may affect 
countries’ strategic behavior regarding corporate tax competition. I incorporate 
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where
progressiveD  is a dummy variable, which equals to 1, if an OECD country adopts 
progressive corporate tax at year t; equals to 0, otherwise. 
Table 2.5.3(a) summarizes the regression results. I find that the OECD 
countries adopting progressive corporate tax rates have higher corporate TSRs than 
those with flat tax rates. This situation is probably because countries using 
progressive tax rates need higher corporate TSRs to raise sufficient corporate tax 
revenue to cover expenditures. Also, when the geographic distance is used as the 
weighing variable, I find that the OECD countries with progressive corporate tax 
rates are less responsive to the other countries’ corporate TSR changes20. In other 
words, OECD countries with progressive corporate tax rates respond less 
aggressively to neighboring countries’ corporate tax rate changes. 
                                                     
20 I find the conclusion that OECD countries with progressive corporate tax rates 
are less responsive to the other OECD countries’ corporate tax rate changes is robust 
to all three types of weighting matrix, namely, geographic, FDI and GDP, when I use 
the normal heteroscedasticity consistent standard deviations to do the t-test. 
However, when I use the double clustering method, the coefficient φ, which 
indicates the effects of progressive corporate tax on OECD countries’ corporate tax 
strategic behavior, is not significant under the economic weighting matrix cases.   
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Also, some OECD countries adopt local corporate tax, while most of the OECD 
countries only collect corporate taxes at national level. It is plausible that OECD 
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where Dlocal is a dummy variable, which equals to 1, if an OECD country adopts 
local corporate tax at year t; equals to 0, otherwise. However, when I use the double 
clustering method and country fixed effects to estimate the regression, I find that 
OECD countries with local corporate tax do not act differently regarding corporate 
tax strategic interactions. The results are summarized in Table 2.5.3 (b).  
2.5.4 Are Countries More Responsive to the Other Countries’ Corporate Tax 
Decreases than Increases? 
Figure 1.2.1 (b) and Table 1.2.1 all show that although the corporate tax rates in 
OECD countries have decreased over time and corporate tax decreases dominate the 
OECD countries’ corporate tax rate changes, there are still a considerable amount of 
corporate tax increases. Of the 185 central government corporate TSR changes in the 
past 31 years, 45 of them are corporate tax increases, which are concentrated in the 
1980s. 
It is plausible that OECD countries may have different sensitivity to other 
countries’ corporate tax increases and decreases. To test this hypothesis, I create two 
dummy variables: Dincrease equals to one if the country has corporate tax increase at 
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year t, and equals to zero otherwise; Ddecrease equals to one if the country has 
corporate tax decreases at year t, and equals to zero otherwise. I multiply these two 
dummy variables with the dependent variables, and then weighted the interaction 





it ij jt ij jt increase i t it
j j
y w y w y D X   
 





it ij jt ij jt decrease i t it
j j
y w y w y D X   
 
                      (2.5.4.b)   
, 1
1 1 1
( ) ( )
N N N
it ij jt ij jt increase ij jt decrease i t it
j j j
y w y w y D w y D X    
  
              (2.5.4.c) 
The coefficients α and β are two indicators represent whether an OECD country 
is more responsive to other OECD countries’ corporate tax increases or decreases, 
and cannot be interpreted as marginal effects. 
Table 2.5.4 (a), (b) and (c) summarize the regression results associated with 
estimating equation 2.5.4 (a), (b) and (c), respectively. Overall, I find that the 
coefficient α stays positive and significant, meanwhile, the coefficient β is negative 
in most cases. When I estimate equation 2.5.4 (c), which includes both Dincrease and 
Ddecrease in the regression, α is still positive and significant and β becomes 
insignificant. These findings indicate that an OECD country is more responsive to 
other OECD countries’ corporate tax increases than decreases. 
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2.5.5 Do Developing Countries also Strategically Interact with Developed OECD 
Countries Regarding Corporate Tax Rates? 
The developing countries’ corporate TSRs have been decreasing considerably 
in the past thirty years. Figure 2.5.5 shows that the average corporate TSRs in 
developed OECD countries and developing countries move downward together. The 
data of the developing countries’ corporate TSR is from the AEI International Tax 
Database, and covers 50 developing countries from 1981 to 201121. It is plausible 
that the developing countries’ lower corporate tax rates also put some pressure on 
developed OECD countries’ corporate tax rates, since the developing countries are 
all eager to attract more FDI. In other words, the developed OECD countries may 
not only contemporaneously compete with each other regarding corporate tax rates, 
but also simultaneously compete with developing countries.  
I use a spatial Durbin model to study how developing countries’ TSRs affect 
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where, zqt  is the developing country q’s corporate TSR at year t, wiq is the weight of 
developing country q corresponding to developed OECD country i. θ measures how 
the developed OECD countries respond to the corporate tax rate changes in 
                                                     
21 I do not calculate the developing countries’ effective tax rates, because the data of 
the present discounted value (PDV) of depreciation allowance for developing 
countries has too many missing values. Also, the capital returns for developing 
countries vary significantly across both time and country, and make it difficult to 
obtain a reasonable expected value for each developing country to calculate effective 
tax rates.  
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developing countries. Again, both geographic and economic distances are used to 
build the weighting matrix. 
Table 2.5.5 reports the results when the developing countries are included in 
the regressions. The parameters, θs, are positive and significant, especially when the 
geographic distance and FDI are used to construct the weighting matrices. The 
positive θs indicate that when the developing countries’ corporate tax rates decrease 
(increase) by 1 percentage point, the developed OECD countries decrease (increase) 
their average corporate tax rates by around 0.35 percentage point. The corporate tax 
strategic interactions exist between developing and developed countries, as well.  
Moreover, compared to the basic regression results of equation 2.5.1, the ρs in 
Table 2.5.5 are much smaller, only around 0.45. The smaller ρs indicate that the 
intense level of OECD countries corporate tax competition may be overestimated in 
the previous literature. Since the reaction function in the spatial lag model 
essentially captures the variations within the group, it cannot distinguish whether 
such variations are caused by strategic interactions with each other or some other 
shocks from outside. In this case, even though the OECD countries’ decreasing 
corporate tax rates are partially caused by the low corporate tax rates in developing 
countries, the reaction function in equation 2.5.1 can still capture the downward 
trend, thus, falsely indicate a higher level of corporate tax competition in OECD 
countries. In general, how both OECD and developing countries strategically 
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interact with each other regarding corporate tax rates is a complex question, which 
deserves further investigation. 
2.5.6 Do OECD Countries Behave Differently in International Corporate Tax 
Competition? 
Given similarities in economic and political backgrounds, I assume that OECD 
countries have similar reactions to other OECD countries’ corporate tax rate changes. 
It is plausible that within OECD countries, the corporate tax strategic reactions can 
differ from each other. That is, some OECD countries may be more responsive, 
while others may be less responsive, perhaps even not responsive, to other countries’ 
corporate tax changes. To address this issue, I run the regressions country by 
country, to obtain the autoregressive parameters of each country. These results are 
not adjusted to country fixed effects and common shocks, but can reflect how 
individual OECD country respond to others’ corporate tax rate changes. 
Table 2.5.6 summarizes the coefficients of the reaction function by estimating 
equation 2.5.1 for each country. I find that even with similar economic and political 
background, strategic interactions do differ in OECD countries. For example, Japan, 
Germany, Spain, Italy and Norway, are very insensitive, almost not responsive, to 
other countries’ corporate tax rate changes. On the other hand, Austria, France, 
Sweden, Greece, and Canada are very sensitive to other countries’ corporate tax rate 
changes, and have coefficients with magnitude above 1. These findings indicate that 
some OECD countries may not contemporaneously compete with each other 
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regarding corporate tax rates. There might be potential leader and follower 
relationship in OECD countries’ corporate tax strategic interactions. 
Also, different weighting variables affect regression results in each country. For 
example, when I use economic weighting variables, FDI and GDP size, to build the 
reaction function, the coefficients of the U.S. are more significant. In contrast, the 
coefficients for Finland are more significant when geographic distance is used as the 
weighting variable. These results indicate that with respect to corporate tax rates, 
some OECD countries may compete with geographic neighboring countries, while 
some others may compete with countries with similar economic characteristics. 
Overall, international corporate tax strategic interactions may be more nuanced than 
previous literature suggests. This opens the avenue for further study 
2.6 Conclusions 
Motivated by the current debate about whether OECD countries need to 
regulate corporate tax competition, this paper comprehensively studies how OECD 
countries strategically interact with each other regarding corporate tax rates. The 
empirical evidence strongly suggests that the corporate tax competition does exist in 
OECD countries. This result is robust after I control for heterogeneous and 
persistent common shocks and use different specifications. I find that the OECD 
countries are more responsive to each other’s corporate tax rate increases than 
decreases. In addition, the empirical results suggest that the OECD countries with 
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progressive corporate tax rates are less aggressively engage in strategic interaction 
regarding corporate TSRs with neighboring countries.  
I also find that the OECD countries corporate tax competition has intensified 
after 1993, but only a little bit. Corporate tax strategic interactions not only exist 
within developed OECD countries, but also exist between developing and developed 
OECD countries. Once developing countries are included in the regressions, I find 
the autoregressive parameters to be smaller, which indicates that the level of OECD 
countries’ corporate tax strategic interaction may be overestimated in the previous 
literature. This suggests that the justification for regulating corporate tax 
competition within OECD countries may be over emphasized. More importantly, 
since the developing countries also strategically interact with OECD countries in 
corporate tax rates, cooperation would be needed not only from OECD countries but 
also from developing countries. Such cooperation between countries is hard to 
achieve. 
OECD countries’ corporate tax rates are determined by strategic interactions 
with other countries and are also correlated with countries’ own economic 
characteristics, such as economic openness level, government deficit to GDP ratio. 
Attempts at tax harmonization would be hindered by unavoidable differences in 
domestic factors across OECD. Moreover, the corporate tax rate that maximizes the 
overall welfare of the OECD countries may not serve the best interest of each 
individual OECD country. Unless the fiscal and economic conditions become more 
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integrated and uniformed in OECD countries, governments will have an incentive to 




Table 2.4 (a) the Dependent Variable is the Corporate TSR, Inverse Distance 
between Capital Cities in Kilometers. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 TSR TSR TSR TSR TSR TSR 
ρ 0.551*** 0.675*** 0.516*** 0.516*** 0.696*** 0.696*** 
 (0.0531) (0.0584) (0.0577) (0.126) (0.0646) (0.129) 
PTSRt-1 0.344*** 0.182*** 0.343*** 0.343*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0286) (0.0192) (0.0512) (0.0319) (0.0422) 
Trade/GDPt-1 -0.0884*** -0.125*** -0.0940*** -0.0940*** -0.156*** -0.156*** 
 (0.00747) (0.0157) (0.00713) (0.0185) (0.0233) (0.0578) 
Kopent-1 -0.0301 -0.281 -0.153 -0.153 -0.458 -0.458 
 (0.267) (0.293) (0.333) (0.708) (0.298) (0.633) 
Gconsumpt-1 0.759*** 1.168*** 0.782*** 0.782*** 1.438*** 1.438*** 
 (0.0627) (0.127) (0.0602) (0.186) (0.179) (0.325) 
UEt-1 0.0280 -0.0250 0.0288 0.0288 -0.0161 -0.0161 
 (0.0670) (0.0946) (0.0672) (0.0947) (0.102) (0.181) 
Ggdpt-1 0.139 0.0843 0.158 0.158 0.109 0.109 
 (0.110) (0.100) (0.113) (0.111) (0.0979) (0.140) 
Debt/GDPt-1 0.0345*** 0.0101 0.0353*** 0.0353* -0.0142 -0.0142 
 (0.00835) (0.0122) (0.00671) (0.0181) (0.0135) (0.0310) 
Def/GDPt-1 0.436*** 0.554*** 0.428*** 0.428*** 0.632*** 0.632*** 
 (0.0673) (0.0685) (0.0661) (0.0717) (0.0734) (0.118) 
Gov_chant-1 -0.431 0.286 -0.445 -0.445 0.326 0.326** 
 (0.385) (0.339) (0.406) (0.346) (0.326) (0.163) 
Cons -11.92*** -12.18*** -10.64*** -10.64*   
 (2.430) (3.536) (2.590) (5.698)   
Spatial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effect OLS RE Pooled Pooled FE FE 
Error Term i.i.d.  Robust DC Robust DC 
N 630 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.660 0.552 0.647 0.647 0.607 0.607 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2.4 (b) the Dependent Variable is the Corporate EATRcpi, Inverse Distance 
between Capital Cities in Kilometers. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 EATRcpi EATRcpi EATRcpi EATRcpi EATRcpi EATRcpi 
ρ 0.606*** 0.677*** 0.677*** 0.677*** 0.731*** 0.731*** 
 (0.0453) (0.0549) (0.0499) (0.115) (0.0601) (0.0721) 
PTSRt-1 0.180*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 
 (0.0168) (0.0176) (0.0169) (0.0527) (0.0288) (0.0579) 
Trade/GDPt-1 -0.106*** -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.0246 -0.0246 
 (0.00681) (0.00677) (0.00684) (0.0131) (0.0209) (0.0203) 
Kopent-1 -1.488*** -1.335*** -1.335*** -1.335** -1.673*** -1.673*** 
 (0.247) (0.300) (0.251) (0.638) (0.272) (0.381) 
Gconsumpt-1 -0.0228 0.0422 0.0422 0.0422 -0.453*** -0.453 
 (0.0572) (0.0559) (0.0571) (0.0766) (0.159) (0.415) 
UEt-1 -0.235*** -0.186*** -0.186*** -0.186 -0.411*** -0.411 
 (0.0612) (0.0548) (0.0613) (0.152) (0.0903) (0.255) 
Ggdpt-1 -0.121 -0.135 -0.135 -0.135*** -0.169* -0.169 
 (0.100) (0.101) (0.100) (0.0481) (0.0867) (0.106) 
Debt/GDPt-1 0.0360*** 0.0349*** 0.0349*** 0.0349 0.0266** 0.0266 
 (0.00765) (0.00704) (0.00761) (0.0213) (0.0120) (0.0233) 
Def/GDPt-1 0.362*** 0.365*** 0.365*** 0.365*** 0.181*** 0.181** 
 (0.0615) (0.0651) (0.0614) (0.0799) (0.0654) (0.0783) 
Gov_chant-1 0.689** 0.778** 0.778** 0.778** 0.987*** 0.987*** 
 (0.352) (0.357) (0.351) (0.306) (0.290) (0.234) 
Cons 13.23*** 9.709*** 9.709*** 9.709**   
 (1.987) (2.452) (2.160) (4.713)   
Spatial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effect OLS RE Pooled Pooled FE FE 
Error Term i.i.d.  Robust DC Robust DC 
N 630 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.659 0.661 0.661 0.661 0.708 0.708 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2.4 (c) the Dependent Variable is the Corporate EATRex, Inverse Distance 
between Capital Cities in Kilometers. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 EATRex EATRex EATRex EATRex EATRex EATRex 
ρ 0.686*** 0.706*** 0.730*** 0.730*** 0.758*** 0.758*** 
 (0.0514) (0.0582) (0.0564) (0.114) (0.0639) (0.104) 
PTSRt-1 0.171*** 0.130*** 0.167*** 0.167*** 0.107*** 0.107** 
 (0.0156) (0.0233) (0.0157) (0.0508) (0.0255) (0.0458) 
Trade/GDPt-1 -0.106*** -0.0694*** -0.103*** -0.103*** -0.0495** -0.0495*** 
 (0.00636) (0.0138) (0.00639) (0.0128) (0.0191) (0.0181) 
Kopent-1 -0.218 -0.931*** -0.134 -0.134 -0.994*** -0.994*** 
 (0.230) (0.237) (0.265) (0.641) (0.242) (0.302) 
Gconsumpt-1 0.0423 -0.0986 0.0994** 0.0994 -0.192 -0.192 
 (0.0534) (0.108) (0.0483) (0.0774) (0.143) (0.309) 
UEt-1 -0.209*** -0.275*** -0.154*** -0.154 -0.269*** -0.269 
 (0.0570) (0.0756) (0.0532) (0.158) (0.0809) (0.251) 
Ggdpt-1 -0.0763 -0.0879 -0.0914 -0.0914 -0.118 -0.118 
 (0.0939) (0.0784) (0.0911) (0.0722) (0.0783) (0.0780) 
Debt/GDPt-1 0.0447*** 0.0253** 0.0424*** 0.0424** 0.0254** 0.0254 
 (0.00711) (0.00981) (0.00692) (0.0214) (0.0107) (0.0199) 
Def/GDPt-1 0.361*** 0.265*** 0.361*** 0.361*** 0.252*** 0.252*** 
 (0.0573) (0.0543) (0.0604) (0.0590) (0.0585) (0.0893) 
Gov_chant-1 0.836** 0.858*** 0.916*** 0.916*** 0.875*** 0.875*** 
 (0.328) (0.264) (0.327) (0.268) (0.260) (0.202) 
Cons 6.715** 11.79*** 4.291* 4.291   
 (2.047) (3.116) (2.301) (4.130)   
Spatial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effect OLS RE Pooled Pooled FE FE 
Error Term i.i.d.  Robust DC Robust DC 
N 630 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.614 0.571 0.606 0.606 0.658 0.658 




Table 2.4 (d) the Dependent Variable is the Corporate EMTRcpi, Inverse Distance 
between Capital Cities in Kilometers. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 EMTRcpi EMTRcpi EMTRcpi EMTRcpi EMTRcpi EMTRcpi 
ρ 0.481*** 0.621*** 0.594*** 0.594*** 0.763*** 0.763*** 
 (0.0639) (0.0793) (0.0844) (0.176) (0.0865) (0.112) 
PTSRt-1 0.197*** 0.194*** 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.160*** 0.160** 
 (0.0239) (0.0363) (0.0226) (0.0667) (0.0398) (0.0791) 
Trade/GDPt-1 -0.134*** -0.0297 -0.127*** -0.127*** 0.0368 0.0368 
 (0.00973) (0.0212) (0.0113) (0.0242) (0.0299) (0.0297) 
Kopent-1 -2.073*** -1.942*** -1.769*** -1.769** -1.747*** -1.747*** 
 (0.355) (0.383) (0.432) (0.814) (0.387) (0.264) 
Gconsumpt-1 -0.102 -0.761*** -0.0335 -0.0335 -1.245*** -1.245* 
 (0.0819) (0.165) (0.0748) (0.118) (0.224) (0.640) 
UEt-1 -0.291*** -0.541*** -0.225*** -0.225 -0.568*** -0.568 
 (0.0875) (0.119) (0.0857) (0.251) (0.127) (0.345) 
Ggdpt-1 -0.0782 -0.109 -0.108 -0.108 -0.214* -0.214*** 
 (0.144) (0.124) (0.153) (0.0705) (0.122) (0.0698) 
Debt/GDPt-1 0.0172 0.000368 0.0162* 0.0162 0.0177 0.0177 
 (0.0109) (0.0154) (0.00972) (0.0315) (0.0168) (0.0283) 
Def/GDPt-1 0.416*** 0.117 0.422*** 0.422*** 0.0184 0.0184 
 (0.0879) (0.0859) (0.102) (0.128) (0.0921) (0.0872) 
Gov_chant-1 0.984** 1.189*** 1.091** 1.091*** 1.297*** 1.297*** 
 (0.503) (0.421) (0.518) (0.352) (0.408) (0.235) 
Cons 19.92*** 25.89*** 15.13*** 15.13**   
 (2.643) (4.469) (3.500) (7.282)   
Spatial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effect OLS RE Pooled Pooled FE FE 
Error Term i.i.d.  Robust DC Robust DC 
N 630 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.522 0.407 0.521 0.521 0.580 0.580 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2.4 (e) the Dependent Variable is the Corporate EMTRex, Inverse Distance 
between Capital Cities in Kilometers. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 EMTRex EMTRex EMTRex EMTRex EMTRex EMTRex 
ρ 0.552*** 0.674*** 0.631*** 0.631*** 0.814*** 0.814*** 
 (0.0781) (0.0906) (0.0886) (0.172) (0.0998) (0.171) 
PTSRt-1 0.193*** 0.148*** 0.191*** 0.191*** 0.112*** 0.112* 
 (0.0220) (0.0324) (0.0208) (0.0657) (0.0352) (0.0632) 
Trade/GDPt-1 -0.131*** -0.0426** -0.126*** -0.126*** 0.00983 0.00983 
 (0.00904) (0.0198) (0.0103) (0.0225) (0.0278) (0.0203) 
Kopent-1 -0.293 -0.849** -0.112 -0.112 -0.815** -0.815*** 
 (0.326) (0.341) (0.378) (0.715) (0.345) (0.133) 
Gconsumpt-1 -0.0444 -0.629*** 0.0183 0.0183 -0.994*** -0.994* 
 (0.0759) (0.153) (0.0661) (0.109) (0.203) (0.588) 
UEt-1 -0.243*** -0.342*** -0.177** -0.177 -0.339*** -0.339 
 (0.0810) (0.108) (0.0823) (0.249) (0.115) (0.334) 
Ggdpt-1 -0.0580 -0.119 -0.0880 -0.0880 -0.212* -0.212*** 
 (0.134) (0.113) (0.143) (0.118) (0.112) (0.0781) 
Debt/GDPt-1 0.0303*** 0.0113 0.0272*** 0.0272 0.0204 0.0204 
 (0.0101) (0.0139) (0.00962) (0.0308) (0.0151) (0.0235) 
Def/GDPt-1 0.419*** 0.178** 0.420*** 0.420*** 0.106 0.106 
 (0.0814) (0.0777) (0.0951) (0.0939) (0.0829) (0.105) 
Gov_chant-1 1.200*** 1.127*** 1.325*** 1.325*** 1.205*** 1.205*** 
 (0.466) (0.379) (0.476) (0.305) (0.370) (0.221) 
Cons 12.44*** 20.66*** 8.916*** 8.916   
 (2.783) (4.415) (3.227) (6.322)   
Spatial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effect OLS RE Pooled Pooled FE FE 
Error Term i.i.d.  Robust DC Robust DC 
N 630 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.450 0.314 0.432 0.432 0.462 0.462 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2.5.1 (a) Inverse Distance (Euclidean) of Net Inflow FDI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 TSR EATRcpi EMTRcpi EATRex EMTRex 
ρ 0.678*** 0.571*** 0.549*** 0.628*** 0.622*** 
 (0.137) (0.0716) (0.0875) (0.0973) (0.108) 
 (0.0676) (0.0557) (0.0713) (0.0609) (0.0841) 
PTSRt-1 0.115*** 0.158*** 0.171** 0.115** 0.119* 
 (0.0446) (0.0596) (0.0825) (0.0507) (0.0695) 
 (0.0306) (0.0389) (0.0484) (0.0304) (0.0407) 
Trade/GDPt-1 -0.176*** -0.0497** 0.00256 -0.0658*** -0.0143 
 (0.0579) (0.0173) (0.0282) (0.0148) (0.0130) 
 (0.0269) (0.0204) (0.0333) (0.0204) (0.0340) 
Kopent-1 -0.576 -1.691*** -1.767*** -1.057*** -0.841*** 
 (0.625) (0.414) (0.391) (0.349) (0.314) 
 (0.301) (0.307) (0.445) (0.278) (0.414) 
Gconsumpt-1 1.369*** -0.529 -1.356** -0.246 -1.103* 
 (0.334) (0.377) (0.631) (0.275) (0.586) 
 (0.191) (0.197) (0.304) (0.160) (0.272) 
UEt-1 -0.0215 -0.429 -0.599* -0.297 -0.363 
 (0.178) (0.268) (0.363) (0.266) (0.350) 
 (0.112) (0.102) (0.151) (0.0939) (0.131) 
Ggdpt-1 0.122 -0.152 -0.184*** -0.106* -0.179*** 
 (0.145) (0.0997) (0.0428) (0.0591) (0.0173) 
 (0.107) (0.104) (0.154) (0.0908) (0.142) 
Debt/GDPt-1 -0.0159 0.0241 0.0151 0.0267 0.0236 
 (0.0319) (0.0246) (0.0284) (0.0223) (0.0258) 
 (0.0137) (0.0120) (0.0149) (0.0106) (0.0137) 
Def/GDPt-1 0.621*** 0.172** -0.000822 0.254*** 0.103 
 (0.118) (0.0720) (0.0990) (0.0886) (0.115) 
 (0.107) (0.0699) (0.104) (0.0688) (0.100) 
Gov_chant-1 0.270 0.912*** 1.178*** 0.820*** 1.070*** 
 (0.177) (0.234) (0.221) (0.200) (0.149) 
 (0.311) (0.296) (0.420) (0.263) (0.384) 
Spatial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effect FE FE FE FE FE 
Error Term DC DC DC DC DC 
N 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.620 0.711 0.583 0.658 0.466 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
**Note: The italic and underscore numbers in parenthesis are std. dev. calculated by 
adopting only country fixed effect and robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 2.5.1 (b) Inverse Distance (Euclidean) of GDP (Constant at 2000 US Dollars) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 TSR EATRcpi EMTRcpi EATRex EMTRex 
ρ 0.678*** 0.547*** 0.445*** 0.576*** 0.468*** 
 (0.149) (0.0844) (0.111) (0.105) (0.126) 
 (0.0664) (0.0570) (0.0795) (0.0617) (0.0868) 
PTSRt-1 0.106** 0.178** 0.220** 0.132** 0.163** 
 (0.0535) (0.0715) (0.0964) (0.0603) (0.0799) 
 (0.0314) (0.0390) (0.0486) (0.0308) (0.0395) 
Trade/GDPt-1 -0.189*** -0.0526** -0.0117 -0.0797*** -0.0394 
 (0.0587) (0.0264) (0.0385) (0.0199) (0.0266) 
 (0.0267) (0.0214) (0.0346) (0.0204) (0.0331) 
Kopent-1 -0.345 -1.578*** -1.954*** -0.939*** -1.010*** 
 (0.609) (0.331) (0.261) (0.281) (0.187) 
 (0.310) (0.316) (0.453) (0.286) (0.412) 
Gconsumpt-1 1.450*** -0.557 -1.397** -0.264 -1.146** 
 (0.334) (0.354) (0.613) (0.252) (0.580) 
 (0.190) (0.202) (0.318) (0.165) (0.286) 
UEt-1 -0.00228 -0.448 -0.650* -0.301 -0.390 
 (0.172) (0.284) (0.385) (0.276) (0.365) 
 (0.114) (0.107) (0.157) (0.0963) (0.134) 
Ggdpt-1 0.152 -0.112 -0.119 -0.0594 -0.108 
 (0.141) (0.0873) . (0.0447) . 
 (0.108) (0.106) (0.158) (0.0909) (0.144) 
Debt/GDPt-1 -0.0151 0.0231 0.0140 0.0238 0.0209 
 (0.0305) (0.0226) (0.0274) (0.0200) (0.0229) 
 (0.0141) (0.0124) (0.0157) (0.0108) (0.0142) 
Def/GDPt-1 0.623*** 0.147*** -0.0355 0.237*** 0.0800 
 (0.115) (0.0554) (0.0773) (0.0756) (0.0957) 
 (0.111) (0.0724) (0.109) (0.0719) (0.105) 
Gov_chant-1 0.211 0.903*** 1.200*** 0.792*** 1.053*** 
 (0.190) (0.221) (0.217) (0.187) (0.124) 
 (0.314) (0.299) (0.435) (0.264) (0.392) 
Spatial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effect FE FE FE FE FE 
Error Term DC DC DC DC DC 
N 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.603 0.696 0.552 0.646 0.442 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
**Note: The italic and underscore numbers in parenthesis are std. dev. calculated by 







Table 2.5.2 (a) OECD Countries’ Corporate Tax Strategic Interactions in Three Ten-year Periods 
















1982-1991 1.129*** 0.742* 0.500 1.132*** 0.526 -0.0856 0.976*** 0.574* 0.388 
 (0.236) (0.400) (0.684) (0.256) (0.324) (0.545) (0.233) (0.300) (0.435) 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
adj. R2 0.217 0.181 0.060 0.086 0.143 0.110 0.204 0.166 0.064 
1992-2001 0.558*** 1.155*** 1.044*** 0.161 0.868*** 0.885*** 0.332 0.571** 0.553*** 
 (0.197) (0.426) (0.342) (0.264) (0.293) (0.259) (0.233) (0.246) (0.182) 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
adj. R2 0.109 0.131 0.191 0.182 0.155 0.176 0.171 0.214 0.229 
2002-2011 0.873*** 1.025*** 1.118 0.792*** 0.893*** 0.952*** 0.873*** 0.943*** 1.000*** 
 (0.182) (0.133) . (0.195) (0.166) (0.102) (0.192) (0.142) (0.106) 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
adj. R2 0.353 0.261 0.175 0.336 0.239 0.156 0.350 0.311 0.239 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 








Table 2.5.2 (b) OECD Countries’ Corporate Tax Strategic Interactions in Three Ten-year Periods 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
**Note: The double clustering method and country fixed effect are used in estimating the results. 
  
  Distance   GDP   FDI  
 TSR EATRcpi EMTRcpi TSR EATRcpi EMTRcpi TSR EATRcpi EMTRcpi 
1982-1991 1.132*** 0.432 -0.204 0.976*** 0.504* 0.429 1.129*** 0.667* 0.595 
 (0.256) (0.303) (0.477) (0.233) (0.277) (0.395) (0.236) (0.370) (0.621) 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
adj. R2 0.086 0.124 0.162 0.204 0.129 0.097 0.217 0.140 0.089 
1992-2001 0.161 0.901*** 0.977*** 0.332 0.730** 0.681** 0.558*** 1.259*** 1.307*** 
 (0.264) (0.318) (0.333) (0.233) (0.320) (0.320) (0.197) (0.425) (0.460) 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
adj. R2 0.182 0.112 0.079 0.171 0.172 0.142 0.109 0.050 0.018 
2002-2011 0.792*** 0.871*** 0.896*** 0.873*** 0.911*** 0.918*** 0.873*** 0.954*** 0.969*** 
 (0.195) (0.184) (0.180) (0.192) (0.149) (0.118) (0.182) (0.147) (0.119) 
N 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
adj. R2 0.336 0.273 0.188 0.350 0.348 0.274 0.353 0.285 0.195 
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Table 2.5.2 (c) More Intense, 1993 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 TSR EATRcpi EMTRcpi EATRex EMTRex 
Distance      
ρ 0.741*** 0.829*** 0.854*** 0.830*** 0.853*** 
 (0.0992) (0.125) (0.184) (0.133) (0.204) 
      
  0.0374** 0.0590 0.0638 0.0403 0.0334 
 (0.0151) (0.0367) (0.0632) (0.0291) (0.0412) 
N 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.637 0.716 0.595 0.675 0.496 
FDI      
ρ 0.704*** 0.629*** 0.604*** 0.642*** 0.630*** 
 (0.117) (0.0681) (0.102) (0.0762) (0.110) 
      
  0.0319** 0.0662** 0.0764 0.0378* 0.0424 
 (0.0163) (0.0287) (0.0579) (0.0226) (0.0402) 
N 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.632 0.720 0.595 0.671 0.489 
GDP      
ρ 0.741*** 0.618*** 0.513*** 0.636*** 0.537*** 
 (0.130) (0.0868) (0.123) (0.103) (0.159) 
      
  0.0679*** 0.0794** 0.0606 0.0583* 0.0440 
 (0.0234) (0.0397) (0.0719) (0.0319) (0.0593) 
N 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.636 0.714 0.580 0.666 0.475 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
**Note: The double clustering method and country fixed effect are used in 




Table 2.5.2 (d) More Intense, 1994 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 TSR EATRcpi EMTRcpi EATRex EMTRex 
Distance      
ρ 0.751*** 0.855*** 0.846*** 0.851*** 0.847*** 
 (0.0991) (0.112) (0.185) (0.119) (0.201) 
      
  0.0474 0.0729*** 0.0585 0.0507*** 0.0296 
 . (0.0266) (0.0649) (0.0197) (0.0436) 
N 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.638 0.717 0.594 0.676 0.496 
FDI      
ρ 0.719*** 0.617*** 0.563*** 0.639*** 0.600*** 
 (0.117) (0.0614) (0.0973) (0.0661) (0.0995) 
      
  0.0438 0.0618*** 0.0454 0.0383** 0.0247 
 . (0.0183) (0.0500) (0.0158) (0.0397) 
N 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.634 0.720 0.594 0.671 0.488 
GDP      
ρ 0.751*** 0.596*** 0.462*** 0.617*** 0.492*** 
 (0.133) (0.0927) (0.145) (0.104) (0.172) 
      
  0.0794*** 0.0699* 0.0189 0.0515 0.0159 
 (0.0155) (0.0381) (0.0835) (0.0324) (0.0679) 
N 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.638 0.713 0.579 0.665 0.474 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
**Note: The double clustering method and country fixed effect are used in 




Table 2.5.2 (e) More Intense, 1995 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 TSR EATRcpi EMTRcpi EATRex EMTRex 
Distance      
ρ 0.766*** 0.802*** 0.745*** 0.829*** 0.804*** 
 (0.103) (0.113) (0.181) (0.118) (0.200) 
      
  0.0571 0.0493** 0.00174 0.0416** 0.00710 
 . (0.0237) (0.0623) (0.0181) (0.0475) 
N 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.639 0.715 0.593 0.675 0.495 
FDI      
ρ 0.733*** 0.584*** 0.501*** 0.623*** 0.560*** 
 (0.119) (0.0599) (0.0963) (0.0609) (0.0948) 
      
  0.0539 0.0404** -0.00831 0.0297** -0.00115 
 . (0.0159) (0.0520) (0.0146) (0.0455) 
N 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.635 0.718 0.593 0.670 0.487 
GDP      
ρ 0.745*** 0.543*** 0.399*** 0.578*** 0.444** 
 (0.136) (0.0949) (0.147) (0.105) (0.174) 
      
  0.0802*** 0.0344 -0.0421 0.0301 -0.0190 
 (0.0140) (0.0382) (0.0863) (0.0339) (0.0740) 
N 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.639 0.711 0.580 0.663 0.474 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
**Note: The double clustering method and country fixed effect are used in 





Table 2.5.3 (a) Strategic Behavior, Progressive Tax Rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 TSR EATRcpi EMTRcpi EATRex EMTRxpected 
Distance      
ρ 0.734*** 0.732*** 0.760*** 0.776*** 0.817*** 
 (0.0897) (0.116) (0.164) (0.121) (0.178) 
      
ϕ -0.287* -0.151 -0.120 -0.195 -0.150 
 (0.171) (0.228) (0.274) (0.199) (0.255) 
      
Dprogressive 11.02** 6.876 5.691 7.508 5.782 
 (5.595) (6.439) (6.354) (5.829) (6.192) 
N 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.641 0.719 0.598 0.678 0.499 
FDI      
ρ 0.703*** 0.554*** 0.522*** 0.611*** 0.583*** 
 (0.0936) (0.0635) (0.0873) (0.0728) (0.0915) 
      
ϕ -0.255 -0.144 -0.0967 -0.192 -0.128 
 (0.191) (0.167) (0.194) (0.152) (0.197) 
      
Dprogressive 9.215 6.617 5.087 7.286 5.092 
 (5.721) (4.850) (4.801) (4.534) (5.008) 
N 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.635 0.723 0.597 0.674 0.490 
GDP      
ρ 0.669*** 0.526*** 0.450*** 0.569*** 0.482*** 
 (0.111) (0.0726) (0.105) (0.0892) (0.122) 
      
ϕ -0.250 -0.148 -0.0799 -0.184 -0.0890 
 (0.163) (0.178) (0.212) (0.151) (0.211) 
      
Dprogressive 9.130* 6.585 4.524 6.783 3.902 
 (4.829) (4.924) (4.813) (4.221) (4.705) 
N 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.636 0.716 0.583 0.668 0.476 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
**Note: The double clustering method and country fixed effect are used in 
estimating the results. Due to the limited space, I do not report the coefficients of 
other explanatory variables in Table 2.5.3(a), since these coefficients do not change 
significantly compared to the regression results of the basic equation 2.5.1. 
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Table 2.5.3 (b) Strategic Behavior, Local Tax Rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 TSR EATRcpi EMTRcpi EATRex EMTRex 
Distance      
ρ 0.669*** 0.606*** 0.595*** 0.609*** 0.602** 
 (0.120) (0.139) (0.207) (0.164) (0.245) 
      
κ 0.0109 0.140 0.230 0.167 0.285 
 (0.228) (0.144) (0.201) (0.166) (0.231) 
      
Dlocal -0.399 -0.112 -1.462 -0.179 -2.696 
 (8.343) (4.549) (5.900) (5.054) (5.928) 
N 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.634 0.721 0.601 0.686 0.507 
FDI      
ρ 0.659*** 0.465*** 0.423*** 0.481*** 0.431** 
 (0.138) (0.0921) (0.134) (0.123) (0.173) 
      
κ -0.0241 0.103 0.150 0.125 0.201 
 (0.247) (0.130) (0.165) (0.155) (0.209) 
      
Dlocal 0.864 1.111 0.723 1.229 -0.353 
 (9.217) (4.710) (5.950) (5.034) (5.852) 
N 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.631 0.725 0.601 0.684 0.501 
GDP      
ρ 0.643*** 0.457*** 0.368*** 0.476*** 0.377** 
 (0.157) (0.0908) (0.139) (0.120) (0.178) 
      
κ -0.0815 0.0691 0.133 0.0673 0.140 
 (0.226) (0.102) (0.145) (0.126) (0.183) 
      
Dlocal 3.634 3.493 2.858 4.181 2.881 
 (7.845) (3.793) (5.273) (4.060) (4.848) 
N 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.632 0.721 0.590 0.681 0.489 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
**Note: The double clustering method and country fixed effect are used in 
estimating the results. Due to the limited   space, I do not report the coefficients of 
other explanatory variables in Table 2.5.3(b), since these coefficients do not change 
significantly compared to the regression results of the basic equation 2.5.1. 
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Table 2.5.4 (a) Corporate Tax Increases 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 TSR EATRcpi EMTRcpi EATRex EMTRex 
Distance      
ρ 0.694*** 0.701*** 0.719*** 0.741*** 0.791*** 
 (0.132) (0.0734) (0.101) (0.104) (0.165) 
      
α 0.00796 0.212*** 0.356*** 0.153** 0.287*** 
 (0.0671) (0.0662) (0.0486) (0.0611) (0.0686) 
N 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.607 0.713 0.589 0.661 0.470 
FDI      
ρ 0.656*** 0.537*** 0.517*** 0.598*** 0.594*** 
 (0.136) (0.0655) (0.0820) (0.0910) (0.0981) 
      
α 0.0815** 0.166*** 0.188*** 0.145*** 0.172 
 (0.0399) (0.0419) (0.0631) (0.00128) . 
N 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.621 0.714 0.586 0.661 0.469 
GDP      
ρ 0.659*** 0.516*** 0.415*** 0.550*** 0.444*** 
 (0.151) (0.0818) (0.108) (0.0994) (0.123) 
      
α 0.0559 0.180** 0.210* 0.174*** 0.207** 
 (0.0850) (0.0837) (0.125) (0.0655) (0.0958) 
N 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.605 0.700 0.556 0.651 0.447 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
**Note: The double clustering method and country fixed effect are used in 
estimating the results. Due to the limited space, I do not report the coefficients of 
other explanatory variables in Table 2.5.4(a), since these coefficients do not change 




Table 2.5.4 (b) Corporate Tax Decreases 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 TSR EATRcpi EMTRcpi EATRex EMTRex 
Distance      
ρ 0.683*** 0.734*** 0.778*** 0.758*** 0.820*** 
 (0.127) (0.0695) (0.107) (0.102) (0.167) 
      
α -0.0208** -0.0327* -0.0550 -0.0198 -0.0326*** 
 (0.00965) (0.0197) (0.0367) (0.0128) (0.00886) 
N 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.608 0.708 0.580 0.657 0.461 
FDI      
ρ 0.663*** 0.574*** 0.551*** 0.630*** 0.624*** 
 (0.132) (0.0670) (0.0859) (0.0905) (0.108) 
      
α -0.107 -0.0623*** -0.0202 -0.0613 -0.0208 
 . (0.0166) (0.0495) . (0.0412) 
N 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.623 0.711 0.583 0.658 0.465 
GDP      
ρ 0.660*** 0.548*** 0.440*** 0.578*** 0.465*** 
 (0.145) (0.0803) (0.113) (0.0986) (0.131) 
      
α -0.0492*** -0.0262 0.0417 -0.0328 0.0206 
 (0.00484) (0.0403) (0.0709) (0.0352) (0.0720) 
N 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.605 0.695 0.552 0.645 0.442 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
**Note: The double clustering method and country fixed effect are used in 
estimating the results. Due to the limited space, I do not report the coefficients of 
other explanatory variables in Table 2.5.4(b), since these coefficients do not change 




Table 2.5.4 (c) Corporate Tax Increases and Decreases 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 TSR EATRcpi EMTRcpi EATRex EMTRex 
Distance      
ρ 0.685*** 0.699*** 0.717*** 0.736*** 0.782*** 
 (0.129) (0.0751) (0.106) (0.105) (0.169) 
      
α -0.00285 0.222*** 0.373*** 0.163** 0.306*** 
 (0.0841) (0.0775) (0.0756) (0.0776) (0.106) 
      
β -0.0212 0.0151 0.0289 0.0140 0.0305 
 (0.0261) (0.0249) (0.0456) (0.0268) (0.0412) 
N 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.607 0.713 0.588 0.661 0.470 
FDI      
ρ 0.653*** 0.542*** 0.516*** 0.603*** 0.594*** 
 (0.131) (0.0617) (0.0825) (0.0865) (0.102) 
      
α 0.0452 0.152*** 0.191*** 0.130*** 0.173*** 
 (0.0316) (0.0383) (0.0685) (0.0146) (0.0153) 
      
β -0.101 -0.0382 0.00883 -0.0411 0.00342 
 . . (0.0467) . (0.0407) 
N 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.623 0.714 0.585 0.661 0.469 
GDP      
ρ 0.650*** 0.514*** 0.396*** 0.549*** 0.431*** 
 (0.148) (0.0800) (0.113) (0.0966) (0.134) 
      
α 0.0394 0.183** 0.251* 0.172*** 0.236** 
 (0.0772) (0.0832) (0.129) (0.0649) (0.0929) 
      
β -0.0429 0.00609 0.0869 -0.00355 0.0595 
 . (0.0356) (0.0692) (0.0316) (0.0698) 
N 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.605 0.700 0.558 0.650 0.448 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
**Note: The double clustering method and country fixed effect are used in 
estimating the results. Due to the limited   space, I do not report the coefficients of 
other explanatory variables in Table 2.5.4(c), since these coefficients do not change 
significantly compared to the regression results of the basic equation 2.5.1. 
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Table 2.5.5 Interactions between Developing and Developed OECD Countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
TSR EATRcpi EMTRcpi EATRex EMTRex 
Distance      
ρ 0.548*** 0.371** 0.465* 0.626*** 0.885*** 
 (0.143) (0.165) (0.247) (0.116) (0.193) 
      
φ -0.305* -0.179 -0.144 -0.210 -0.142 
 (0.176) (0.222) (0.269) (0.198) (0.269) 
      
Dprogressive 11.64
** 7.761 6.287 7.954 5.597 
 (5.868) (6.325) (6.263) (5.845) (6.516) 
      
θ 0.249* 0.429*** 0.346* 0.154 -0.0656 
 (0.140) (0.0724) (0.186) . (0.116) 
N 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.643 0.724 0.599 0.678 0.498 
FDI      
ρ 0.514** 0.423*** 0.501** 0.628*** 0.981*** 
 (0.252) (0.135) (0.213) (0.0163) (0.155) 
      
φ -0.0582 0.0590 0.109 -0.0332 0.0797 
 (0.286) (0.202) (0.218) (0.178) (0.223) 
      
Dprogressive 5.350 1.700 1.023 3.359 0.588 
 (9.187) (5.862) (5.206) (5.257) (5.537) 
      
θ 0.374 0.283** 0.153 0.0388 -0.374 
 (0.342) (0.145) (0.301) . (0.230) 
N 540 540 540 540 540 
adj. R2 0.667 0.728 0.583 0.675 0.481 
GDP      
ρ 0.505*** 0.321*** 0.0858 0.452*** 0.309** 
 (0.169) (0.110) (0.185) (0.103) (0.153) 
      
φ -0.253 -0.150 -0.0826 -0.184 -0.0885 
 (0.171) (0.181) (0.212) (0.155) (0.212) 
      
Dprogressive 9.286* 6.752 4.844 6.830 3.944 
 (5.128) (4.987) (4.725) (4.312) (4.728) 
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θ 0.213 0.313*** 0.564*** 0.142*** 0.197* 
 (0.160) (0.110) (0.206) (0.0497) (0.119) 
N 630 630 630 630 630 
adj. R2 0.637 0.719 0.590 0.668 0.477 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
**Note: The double clustering method and country fixed effect are used in 
estimating the results. Due to the limited   space, I do not report the coefficients of 
other explanatory variables in Table 2.5.5, since these coefficients do not change 







Table 2.5.6 Corporate Tax Strategic Interaction (Country by Country) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 










Australia 0.598 0.684*** 0.921*** 0.389 0.421 Japan 0.154 0.118 0.168 -0.0344 0.0818 
Distance (0.370) (0.216) (0.198) (0.325) (0.325) Distance (0.255) (0.161) (0.175) (0.228) (0.254) 
Australia 0.442** 0.548*** 0.730*** 0.376*** 0.455*** Japan 0.333 0.136 0.138 0.0235 0.0299 
FDI (0.191) (0.0950) (0.0847) (0.145) (0.152) FDI (0.267) (0.124) (0.138) (0.154) (0.158) 
Australia 0.235 0.556*** 0.678*** 0.339** 0.433** Japan 0.159 0.139 0.215 0.0837 0.276 
GDP (0.195) (0.117) (0.149) (0.161) (0.172) GDP (0.220) (0.168) (0.187) (0.249) (0.296) 
Austria 2.282** 1.315** 0.828** 1.295** 0.585 Netherlands 1.503*** 1.972*** 2.182** 1.677*** 0.657 
Distance (1.138) (0.594) (0.348) (0.651) (0.463) Distance (0.183) (0.539) (0.900) (0.277) (0.439) 
Austria 2.237** 1.223** 0.841** 1.309** 0.808* Netherlands 1.478*** 1.303*** 1.295** 0.906*** 0.274 
FDI (1.001) (0.480) (0.376) (0.544) (0.435) FDI (0.208) (0.388) (0.529) (0.315) (0.303) 
Austria 2.341** 0.828** 0.466* 0.997** 0.709** Netherlands 1.380*** 1.037*** 0.957** 0.846*** 0.533** 
GDP (1.146) (0.373) (0.248) (0.437) (0.332) GDP (0.344) (0.356) (0.432) (0.284) (0.266) 
Belgium 0.584*** 0.191 0.215 0.00432 -0.192 New Zealand 1.031*** 1.358* 0.782 1.361** 1.356* 
Distance (0.125) (0.170) (0.249) (0.156) (0.137) Distance (0.390) (0.708) (0.581) (0.639) (0.759) 
Belgium 0.644*** -0.0813 -0.205 -0.159 -0.277*** New Zealand 0.0640 -0.555 -0.477 -0.329 -0.521 
FDI (0.194) (0.143) (0.184) (0.127) (0.0968) FDI (0.293) (0.405) (0.394) (0.413) (0.523) 






GDP (0.200) (0.125) (0.156) (0.0976) (0.0810) GDP (0.251) (0.367) (0.336) (0.359) (0.457) 
Canada 1.208*** 0.847*** 0.619*** 0.977*** 1.133** Norway 0.0105 0.0690 -0.203 0.146 -0.105 
Distance (0.189) (0.120) (0.226) (0.210) (0.487) Distance (0.0135) (0.434) (0.470) (0.507) (0.672) 
Canada 1.073*** 0.738*** 0.599*** 0.824*** 0.915** Norway 0.00751 0.154 -0.0823 0.225 -0.152 
FDI (0.134) (0.117) (0.155) (0.210) (0.413) FDI (0.0125) (0.287) (0.318) (0.331) (0.368) 
Canada 1.156*** 0.796*** 0.745*** 0.885*** 1.041** Norway 0.000221 0.355 0.129 0.478* 0.355 
GDP (0.134) (0.141) (0.212) (0.238) (0.475) GDP (0.0106) (0.273) (0.332) (0.273) (0.303) 
Denmark 1.392** 0.736*** 0.681** 0.838*** 0.870*** Portugal 1.280*** -0.280 -0.524 -0.0233 -0.566 
Distance (0.654) (0.262) (0.268) (0.291) (0.305) Distance (0.354) (0.603) (0.490) (0.441) (0.413) 
Denmark 1.038* 0.703*** 0.648** 0.794*** 0.759** Portugal -0.393 -1.650*** -1.404*** -0.511 -0.886* 
FDI (0.595) (0.250) (0.278) (0.287) (0.319) FDI (0.587) (0.587) (0.451) (0.474) (0.462) 
Denmark 0.849 0.432** 0.391* 0.453** 0.412** Portugal -0.173 -0.985*** -0.790** -0.746** -1.090*** 
GDP (0.607) (0.188) (0.205) (0.194) (0.208) GDP (0.390) (0.367) (0.355) (0.327) (0.310) 
Finland 0.214 1.952*** 1.976** 0.809 -0.746 Spain 0.119 -0.218 -0.576 -0.178 0.143 
Distance (0.556) (0.658) (0.915) (0.645) (0.664) Distance (0.366) (0.533) (0.749) (0.578) (0.543) 
Finland 0.319 0.821 0.721 0.637 -0.0340 Spain -0.216 -0.487 -0.125 -0.680 -0.220 
FDI (0.395) (0.651) (0.748) (0.568) (0.508) FDI (0.315) (0.440) (0.427) (0.547) (0.499) 
Finland 0.147 0.369 0.0442 0.0707 -0.666** Spain -0.129 -0.859* -0.481 -0.973 -0.763 
GDP (0.366) (0.554) (0.593) (0.346) (0.264) GDP (0.327) (0.494) (0.610) (0.670) (0.685) 
France 1.186*** 1.648*** 1.005 1.323*** 0.762 Sweden 1.686*** 2.219*** 2.473*** 2.421*** 3.005*** 
Distance (0.198) (0.371) (0.622) (0.368) (0.547) Distance (0.485) (0.429) (0.469) (0.523) (0.714) 






FDI (0.229) (0.231) (0.289) (0.262) (0.326) FDI (0.627) (0.615) (0.683) (0.852) (1.176) 
France 1.729*** 2.144*** -0.127 1.364** -0.147 Sweden 2.333*** 2.996*** 3.112*** 3.230*** 3.874*** 
GDP (0.256) (0.564) (0.489) (0.549) (0.327) GDP (0.775) (0.589) (0.563) (0.776) (0.981) 
Germany -1.109 -0.0295 0.412 0.281 0.763 Switzerland 0.0398 0.377*** 0.402*** 0.530*** 0.351** 
Distance (1.137) (0.486) (0.541) (0.543) (0.473) Distance (0.0302) (0.0940) (0.0857) (0.139) (0.157) 
Germany 0.327 -0.222 -0.194 0.301 0.459* Switzerland 0.00673 0.237** 0.259** 0.349*** 0.237* 
FDI (0.784) (0.392) (0.497) (0.326) (0.266) FDI (0.0324) (0.0989) (0.111) (0.119) (0.123) 
Germany -0.0485 -0.264 -0.404 0.473 0.457 Switzerland 0.00112 0.120 0.129* 0.180** 0.138* 
GDP (0.830) (0.361) (0.429) (0.387) (0.278) GDP (0.0194) (0.0766) (0.0721) (0.0824) (0.0742) 
Greece 1.058* 1.157*** 1.414*** 1.255*** 1.559*** 
United 
Kingdom 
1.085*** 0.617*** 0.329 0.277*** 0.201 
Distance (0.552) (0.388) (0.336) (0.469) (0.469) Distance (0.347) (0.107) (0.294) (0.0961) (0.271) 
Greece 0.110 0.378 0.814*** -0.0311 0.212 
United 
Kingdom 
1.102*** 0.603*** 0.555*** 0.246*** 0.0802 
FDI (0.414) (0.322) (0.285) (0.398) (0.414) FDI (0.294) (0.0706) (0.214) (0.0947) (0.292) 
Greece 0.617 1.129*** 1.212*** 1.124*** 1.282*** 
United 
Kingdom 
1.048*** 0.602*** 0.570** 0.234** -0.0888 
GDP (0.446) (0.371) (0.380) (0.351) (0.366) GDP (0.301) (0.0825) (0.244) (0.100) (0.325) 
Ireland 1.250*** -0.0157 -1.991 -1.344* -4.481*** United States 0.573*** 0.284 -0.180 0.231 -0.618* 
Distance (0.249) (0.655) (1.465) (0.715) (1.161) Distance (0.119) (0.202) (0.268) (0.211) (0.319) 
Ireland 0.981*** -0.350 -1.371 -1.096* -3.203*** United States 0.578*** 0.403*** 0.444*** 0.357*** 0.276* 
FDI (0.312) (0.528) (0.901) (0.580) (0.969) FDI (0.112) (0.105) (0.160) (0.115) (0.159) 






GDP (0.305) (0.387) (0.684) (0.389) (0.636) GDP (0.105) (0.101) (0.149) (0.107) (0.146) 
Italy 1.233*** 0.741 1.178 -1.882 -2.350 
Distance (0.421) (0.915) (0.806) (1.735) (1.949) 
Italy 0.452 0.413 0.601 -0.543 -1.165 
FDI (0.314) (1.382) (1.206) (1.732) (1.729) 
Italy 1.048*** 0.380 -0.225 -1.359 -2.484 
GDP (0.315) (1.219) (1.315) (1.634) (1.536) 












Figure.2.5.5 the Average Corporate TSRs in 21 Developed OECD Countries and 50 
Developing Countries 
 






Chapter III: Corporate Tax Policy Interactions: Keeping Up with 
the Neighbors? 
3.1 Introduction 
Corporate tax rates have been dramatically decreasing around the world over 
the last three decades. Economists employ both empirical and theoretical methods to 
explain the decreasing trend of corporate tax rates. Many empirical papers find 
OECD and European countries compete with each other regarding corporate tax 
rates. Meanwhile, theoretical papers provide different theories about the structure of 
international tax competition, specifically, how countries’ corporate tax policies 
simultaneously and/or dynamically interact with each other.  
This chapter contributes to the existing corporate tax competition literature in 
three ways. First, this chapter not only studies OECD and European countries, but 
also includes other developing countries. To the best of my knowledge, this research 
uses a larger sample than previously used in the international corporate competition 
literature. With 139 countries22 from 1981 to 2011, the sample provides a more 
comprehensive picture about how corporate tax policies in different countries 
interact with each other. Second, compared to the previous empirical literature 
focusing on corporate tax rate levels, this chapter studies the actual corporate tax 
rate changes. That is, this chapter investigates the factors which influence 
                                                     




governments to adopt corporate tax decreases, as well as increases. Third, this paper 
also sheds light on the dynamic nature of international corporate tax competition and 
provides some evidence about which countries are more likely to be leaders and 
which countries are more likely to be followers in the competition. 
The following chapter includes six sections. Section 3.1 briefly summarizes the 
related literature and introduces some characteristics about the international 
corporate TSR changes. Section 3.2 discusses the models used in this chapter and 
compares the model with the standard model used in the previous research. Section 
3.3 summarizes the statistics and sources of data. Section 3.4 shows the results of 
the baseline model, which answers two questions. First, do countries change their 
corporate tax policies in response to changes made by neighboring countries the 
previous year? Second, what factors drive governments to decrease and increase 
corporate TSRs? Section 3.5 provides some extensions and robustness checks, and 
identifies leaders and followers in international corporate tax competition. Section 
3.6 provides conclusions and policy implications. 
3.1.1 Literature Review: The Interactions of Corporate Tax Rate Changes  
Many theoretical papers build sophisticated models to explain how countries 
engage in international corporate tax competition, which drives down corporate tax 
rates. Keen and Konrad (2012) provide a very good survey about the theoretical 
work regarding international tax competition and coordination. The early theoretical 




al. (2008), models simultaneous reaction functions such that countries 
simultaneously respond to each other’s corporate tax policies. Later theoretical 
research focuses on the asymmetric and dynamic structure of corporate tax 
competition and studies incentives to reduce corporate tax rates. These 
investigations are more interested in the leader and follower problem in international 
tax competition.  
Some papers (Janeba and Peters ,1999; Marceau et.al, 2010) suggest that 
countries with a larger stock of old capital have higher opportunity costs associated 
with  reducing corporate tax rates, and thus, act less aggressively in tax 
competition. Kempf and Rota Graziosi (2010) use an equilibrium selection model 
and argue that the countries with less capital productivity have more incentive to 
reduce corporate tax rates. Baldwin and Krugman (2004) show countries with 
agglomeration advantages are less likely to reduce their corporate tax rates. In other 
papers (Huizinga and Nielsen, 1997, 2002, 2008; Fuest 2005), a higher degree of 
international portfolio diversification and international firm ownership leads to 
fewer tax rate reductions and less severe tax competition. Notably, a shortcoming of 
most theoretical models is the lack of empirical support. 
The previous empirical literature (Devereux et al., 2008; Davies and Voget, 
2008) studying international corporate tax competition uses either OECD data or 
European countries’ data for two reasons. First, international tax competition has 




report Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue in 1998. For 
developing countries corporate tax competition and coordination is a less urgent 
problem compared to other economic issues. Accordingly, it is reasonable to focus 
on OECD and EU countries because international tax competition is very intense. 
Second, corporate tax policy data of OECD and EU countries is very detailed and 
includes both corporate tax rates and bases. In contrast, corporate tax policy data of 
most developing countries is difficult to obtain, especially data regarding corporate 
tax bases which is not readily available for most developing countries. 
Previous empirical research finds some evidence suggesting that 
OECD/European countries either simultaneously or dynamically engage in 
international corporate tax competition. In terms of simultaneous tax competition, 
Winner et al. (2007) and Devereux et al. (2008) both find that OECD countries 
indeed change their corporate tax rates when the other OECD countries do so. 
Empirical research on dynamic corporate tax competition (Rincke and Overesch, 
2011; Crabbe and Vandenbussche, 2009; Redoano, 2007), suggests that countries 
dynamically interact with each other with respect to corporate tax policies. 
However, no conclusive results about the structure of dynamic interactions have 
been established. Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002) suggest that America is the leader 
of international corporate tax competition, while Chatelais and Peyrat (2008) 
suggest that small European countries are the leaders. Rincke and Overesch (2011) 




research (e.g., Redoano, 2007) suggests that the expansion of the EU membership 
intensifies corporate tax competition, and new and/or small EU countries act more 
aggressively. 
3.1.2 Some Stylized Facts about the Corporate Top Statutory Tax Rates (TSR) around 
the World 
The sample used in this paper covers 139 countries from 1981 to 2011. These 
countries not only include developed countries but developing and emerging market 
countries. As Figure 3.1.2 (a) shows, the average corporate TSRs in both developing 
and developed countries have decreased, from over 40% in 1981 to less than 25% in 
2011. Before 1985, the average corporate TSR in emerging market countries was 
slightly higher than in developed countries. Also, the differences between developed 
and developing countries’ average corporate TSRs in 1990s and early 2000s are 
notable. Over the last few years, the average corporate TSRs in developed, 
developing and emerging market countries have been converging, and the 
differences among these average tax rates are less than 1%.  
Despite the converging average corporate TSRs in developed and developing 
countries, regional average corporate TSRs are notably different from each other. 
Figure 3.1.2 (b) shows the average corporate TSRs of seven regions in 1981, 1991, 
2001 and 2011, respectively. All regional average corporate TSRs have been 
decreasing since 1981, but the magnitudes of corporate TSRs decreases are 




regions is in South America, but the average corporate TSRs in South America are 
relatively stable compared to other regions. On the other hand, European countries 
have experienced the most dramatic corporate TSR decrease, from 40.7% in 1981 to 
18% in 2011. The average corporate TSRs in African and Caribbean countries are 
always relatively higher. In addition, the average corporate TSR decrease in African 
countries is the second largest, from the highest one among seven regions, 47.6% in 
1981, to 27.9% in 2011. Overall, the corporate TSRs demonstrate strong regional 
patterns. 
3.1.3 Some Stylized Facts about the Corporate TSR Changes around the World 
From 1982 to 2011, the 139 countries studied in this chapter experiences a total 
of 675 corporate TSR changes. Not all corporate TSR changes involved decreases, 
almost a quarter of the changes (151) were corporate TSR increases. In other words, 
on average, every country has at least one corporate TSR increase in the past thirty 
years. This fact is never mentioned in the previous literature and has been ignored 
by researchers until now. Previous literature (Devereux et al., 2008; Rincke and 
Overesch, 2011; Crabbe and Vandenbussche, 2009; Redoano, 2007) focuses on the 
decreasing corporate tax rate trend, not the actual corporate TSR changes. The 
corporate TSR changes vary across time and country23, and also exhibit very strong 
regional patterns.  
                                                     
23More detailed discussion about corporate TSR changes is presented in the first 




I equally divide the thirty years, from 1982 to 2011, into six 5-year periods. 
Figure 3.1.3 (a) shows the numbers of corporate TSR increases and decreases in 
each five-year period. Except for the first-five year period, the number of corporate 
TSR decreases is notably larger than the number of increases in each period. In the 
first five-year period, the number of corporate TSR decreases is only slightly larger 
than the number of increases, that is, 40 versus 36. In the last five-year period, the 
number of corporate TSR decreases is more than twelve times of the number of 
increases, that is, 113 versus 19. Moreover, the number of corporate TSR decreases 
has been increasing over time. The number of decreases in the second five-year 
period is more than doubled that of the first period. On the contrary, the number of 
corporate TSR increases is relatively stable and has been decreasing over time.  
Similar to average corporate TSRs, the number of corporate TSR changes also 
exhibits strong regional patterns. Figure 3.1.3 (b) shows the numbers of corporate 
TSR changes across seven geographic regions in six sequential periods from 1982 to 
2011. European countries have the largest number of corporate TSR changes in 
total, as well as in each period. The number of corporate TSR changes in Asia is the 
second largest. In addition, each region has its unique pattern of corporate TSR 
changes across time. For instance, only in Europe does, the number of corporate 
TSR changes exhibits a clear increasing trend over time. In Africa and Asia, the 




America, the number of corporate TSR changes during the late 1990s is significantly 
lower than the other periods. 
Table 3.1.3 (a) separately shows the number of corporate TSR decreases and 
increases across regions in each five-year period. The number of corporate TSR 
decreases and increases demonstrates strong regional patterns. However, there are 
still some common features of corporate TSR changes across regions. For example, 
the number of corporate TSR increases in the first fifteen years is larger than the 
number in the latter fifteen years in all regions, except Caribbean. Other than South 
America and Caribbean, which contain only a small fraction of countries in the 
sample, the overall number of corporate TSR decreases is almost four times larger 
than that of increases in each region. 
Although European countries have changed their corporate TSRs more than 
other countries, it does not mean that the corporate tax change is more intense in 
European countries. The larger number of corporate TSR changes in a region is 
related to the larger number of countries in the corresponding region in the sample. 
After considering the number of countries in each region, the average numbers of 
corporate TSR changes in different regions are shown in the last column in Table 
3.1.3 (b). 
The average number of corporate TSR changes is the highest in Asia, followed 




international corporate tax competition is not only intense in European countries but 
also in Asian and North American countries. It is also possible that the corporate 
TSR changes in different regions are not only driven by competitive forces but also 
underlying regional factors. To better understand the incentives of countries’ 
corporate tax policy changes and how countries interact with each other, it is helpful 
to expand the sample size and include developing and/or non-European countries 
into the study. 
3.2 Model 
Weighting methods, spatial analysis and dynamic panels are widely adopted in 
the previous literature studying international corporate tax competition (Winner et 
al., 2007; Devereux et al., 2008; Rincke and Overesch, 2011; Crabbe and 
Vandenbussche, 2009; Redoano, 2007; Chatelais and Peyrat, 2008). All of these 
papers find that country level corporate tax rates are positively and significantly 
correlated with the weighted average of other countries’ corporate tax rates, either 
contemporaneously or dynamically. The researchers argue that this positive 
correlation indicates countries that interact with each other regarding corporate tax 
rates, thus, provides evidence of international corporate tax competition. This 




3.2.1 The Problems with the Standard Models in the Previous Literature  
Generally speaking, the standard spatial model and dynamic panel models 
commonly used in the previous literature (Devereux et al., 2008; Rincke and 
Overesch, 2011; Winner et al., 2007) have at least three problems. The first problem 
is associated with the nature of spatial analysis. The weighting matrix utilized in 
spatial models represents the spatial relationships among different units. Because the 
true corporate tax policy interactions among countries are unknown, there is no 
assurance that the weighting matrix used in the previous literature correctly captures 
how countries compete with each other. To the extent that the weighting matrix 
misspecifies true relationships, estimates could be misleading. 
The second problem is that the previous literature studying international 
corporate tax competition uses corporate tax rates as dependent variables, and shows 
that a country’s corporate tax rates are positively correlated with the weighted 
average of other countries’ corporate tax rates. It is plausible that this positive 
correlation is due to global shocks that put downward pressure on all countries’ 
corporate tax rates. In other words, the previous literature does not provide direct 
evidence that a country will decrease or increase its corporate tax rates in response 
to changes made by other countries.  
Moreover, the previous papers do not distinguish corporate tax increases from 
decreases: other countries’ corporate tax increases and decreases are assumed to 




mentioned in section 3.1, not all the corporate tax rate changes are tax decreases. 
Because a quarter of corporate tax changes involve increases, it is important to 
distinguish potential impacts of increases from decreases. It is logical to expect that 
the motivation driving tax rate changes is different for corporate TSR increases than 
for decreases. 
The previous literature uses dynamic panels and includes the lagged value of 
weighted average of other countries’ corporate tax rates to investigate how countries 
engage in the dynamic competition. However, countries’ tax policies require 
complex political and legal processes to make changes and, consequently, tend to be 
relatively stable for several years. Thus, the lagged values included in the dynamic 
panel are strongly correlated with each other. Consequently, the coefficients of the 
lagged independent variables cannot be directly interpreted as the magnitudes of 
dynamic interactions among countries’ corporate tax rates.  
3.2.2 Basic Model: Multinomial Logit and Probit 
To address the above three problems in the previous literature, this chapter 
abandons the commonly used spatial analysis and dynamic panels, and by doing so, 
does not impose assumptions on spatial relationships of corporate tax policies in the 
first place. Instead of the level of corporate tax rates, this chapter focuses on the 
changes of corporate TSRs. Also, this paper distinguishes corporate tax increases 
from decreases, in order to control for the possible asymmetric effects on corporate 




countries’ corporate tax increases and decreases as explanatory variables to capture 
the previous changes of other countries’ corporate tax rates. In so doing, my analysis 
avoids the big problem, which is strong correlation of lagged explanatory variables 
in the dynamic panel. 
The baseline model adopted in this paper is pooled multinomial logit and probit 
models: 
Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ℎ|𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1) = 𝑝𝑖𝑡,ℎ,     for i =1, 2, ……, n; t =1,2, ……, t; h =-1, 0, 1. 
The explanatory variables included in the model are lagged by one year for two 
reasons. First, tax policies are usually designed from the previous economic 
conditions. Implementation of a fiscal policy change takes time. Second, the current 
economic characteristics, such as trade and capital openness, may be influenced by 
the current fiscal policies, especially corporate tax policies. Including one-year 
lagged explanatory variables can avoid potential endogeneity problems. 
The advantages of using multinomial logit and probit models to study corporate 
TSR changes are threefold. First and most importantly, the dependent variable of 
multinomial logit and probit models is a categorical variable, which can clearly 
represent three different choices a country has with respect to corporate tax rate 
policies. In each year, a county can either increase or decrease its corporate TSR or 
make no change. Second, compared to the previous literature that only shows the 
correlations between home and neighboring countries’ corporate tax rates, the 




likely to increase or decrease corporate TSRs. Also, because corporate TSR 
increases and decreases are considered separately, it is easy to investigate that 
whether some explanatory variables have asymmetric, even opposite impacts on 
corporate TSR changes.  
Third, multinomial logit and probit models can investigate the leader and 
follower dynamics much better than spatial models. As long as the assumption about 
leader and follower structure is imposed, the multinomial logit and probit models 
can show the extent to which the probability of follower countries’ corporate TSR 
increases and decreases are indeed influenced by the leaders’ tax policy changes. In 
addition, regarding simultaneous corporate TSR changes, countries can also be 
separated into two groups according to economic characteristics, such as GDP size. 
The common factor is assumed to influence all countries corporate tax rates, 
contemporaneously. However, if the results show that one group of countries’ 
corporate TSR changes affect the other group of countries’ probability of adopting 
corporate TSR changes, and not the other way around, the assumption that some 
common factors cause corporate tax policy co-movement among different countries 
can be rejected, at least in the simultaneous tax competition setting. 
3.3 Data 
To the best of my knowledge, my analysis uses a larger sample, covering 139 
countries from 1981 to 2011, than the previous international corporate tax 




countries’ corporate tax policy changes interact with each other, this analysis 
includes both developed and developing countries and expands investigations to 
non-European countries. 
3.3.1 The Dependent and Independent Variables  
The dependent variable used in this paper is a categorical variable, which 
equals 1 if a country’s corporate TSR increases in year t; equals -1 if a country’s 
corporate TSR decreases in year t, and equals 0 if the corporate TSR does not 
change. The corporate TSR increases and decreases are created by the author. The 
raw corporate TSR data is obtained from the AEI International Tax Database. 
This paper uses corporate TSR changes instead of EMTR and EATR changes 
because statutory corporate tax rates are legally imposed by law, and can best 
represent the corporate tax policies changes regarding rates. Efficient rates measure 
two aspects of rate structure, both tax rates and bases, and have to be estimated by 
using other macro variables, such as inflation and depreciation rates. As a result, 
efficient rate change variables may contain some adjustments other than corporate 
tax policy changes. Since it is difficult to measure corporate tax bases and almost 
impossible to keep records on all countries’ corporate tax base changes, this analysis 
omits corporate tax base changes24. In addition, the corporate TSR data can be easily 
                                                     
24 The only paper recording the changes of corporate tax base is Kawano and 
Slemrod (2012). Their data is restricted within OECD countries from 1980 to 2004, 
but contains changes of 12 sub-sections of corporate tax base. They also find that 
corporate tax base broadening is not necessary companied by a rate reduction. In 




obtained, but the corporate base data is missing for most of the countries, especially 
for developing countries. 
The independent variables can be classified into four different groups. The first 
group contains variables that represent other countries’ corporate TSR changes. 
N_increase is the number of neighboring countries’ corporate TSR increases; 
N_decrease is the number of neighboring countries’ corporate TSR decreases. 
Neighbor is the number of neighboring countries by land and maritime borders. In 
the baseline regression, N_%increase= N_increase/Neighbor, which represents the 
proportion of neighboring countries adopting corporate TSR increases. While, 
N_%decrease= N_decrease/Neighbor represents the proportion of neighboring 
countries adopting corporate TSR decreases.  Low is a dummy variable, which 
equals 1 if the country’s corporate TSR is lower than the world average; equals 0, 
otherwise.  
The second group of variables captures countries’ economic characteristics. 
Trade measures trade openness, which represents a country’s economic openness. 
K_open is capital openness, which measures the capital mobility of a country. 
Log(GDP) is the logarithm of GDP, which controls the size of an economy. Growth 
is the GDP growth rate, which measures the economic prosperity. The third group 
captures government activities. Gconsump is a country’s general government 
                                                                                                                                                     
time. So, in this paper, the lack of corporate tax base change data would not affect 
the results significantly. Moreover, it is plausible that countries compete over 
corporate tax rates and bases independently and use two different mechanisms to 




consumption weighed by GDP. Leader is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a new 
political leader comes into power in year t, and equals 0, otherwise. Legislative and 
Executive are also dummy variables that capture a country’s political elections. The 
reason for including political changes in the model is that fiscal policies are usually 
hot topics in election campaigns. New administrations often adopt fiscal policy 
changes to separate themselves from the old ones. The last group contains a 
country’s other characteristics, such as the geographic location and international 
organization membership, that may influence corporate TSR changes. 
3.3.2 Data Summarization: Data Sources and Statistics 
Table 3.3.2 summarizes basic statistics, definitions and sources of the main 
variables used in this paper. Corporate TSR is obtained from the AEI International 
Tax Database, and the author calculates the numbers of neighboring countries’ 
corporate TSR increases and decreases. Political elections and leader changes are 
obtained from Database of Political Institutions. The number of neighboring 
countries Neighbor and geographic dummy variables European and Africa are 
provided by Wikipedia. Developed and emerging market countries are listed by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The list of tax haven countries is obtained from 
Gravelle (2013). Trade and capital openness, as well as government consumption 
are from Comparative Political Data Set I. The rest of the explanatory variables are 




3.4 Basic Empirical Results and Explanations 
This section provides basic empirical results and explanations about two 
questions never been studied in the previous literature. First, do countries’ corporate 
TSR changes exhibit a regional pattern, that is, do countries change their corporate 
TSRs because the neighboring countries did so in the past. Second, since corporate 
TSR changes include both increases and decreases, is it possible that the explanatory 
variables, such as economic size and political elections, have asymmetric or 
opposite effects on corporate TSR changes?  
All tables report the marginal effects of the explanatory variables, because the 
coefficients and the actual marginal effects may have different signs and magnitudes 
in multinomial logit and probit models. Moreover, since the marginal effects of 
non-linear models are difficult to explain, this analysis focuses on interpreting the 
signs of marginal effects, instead of the magnitudes. For each table, the left half 
reports the results obtained from multinomial logit model and the right half shows 
the results obtained from multinomial probit model as robustness checks. 
3.4.1 Do Countries’ Corporate TSR Changes Keeping Up with the Neighbors? 
Table 3.4.1 (a), (b) and (c) use legislative election, executive election, and 
leader change variable to capture a country’s political changes, respectively. The 
base outcome is when the dependent variable TSR_change equals 0. Columns (1) to 




models, respectively. The columns with odd (even) numbers show the marginal 
effects of decreasing (increasing) corporate TSR, compared to the base outcomes. 
Moreover, the standard errors are either robust or clustered by time or group, in 
order to control for possible misspecification and intragroup correlations.  
N_%increase_1 is negatively and significantly correlated with the probability 
of corporate TSR decreases, but does not significantly affect the probability of 
corporate TSR increases. In contrast, N_%decrease_1 is positively and significantly 
correlated with the probability of corporate TSR decreases, and is negatively and 
significantly correlated with the probability of corporate TSR increases. The 
marginal effects and the significance levels of N_%increase_1 and N_%decrease_1 
are very similar over different specifications.  
Overall, the basic results suggest that countries’ corporate TSR changes do 
keep up with their neighbors’ changes. Neighboring countries’ corporate TSR 
increases and decreases in the previous year have offsetting effects on home 
countries’ corporate TSR policies. A country is more likely to decrease and less 
likely to increase corporate TSR when a larger proportion of neighboring countries 
decreased their corporate TSRs last year. A country is less likely to decrease its 
corporate TSR when a larger proportion of neighboring countries increased their 
corporate TSRs in the previous year. 
Countries dynamically interact with each other with respect to corporate tax 




TSRs, then a larger proportion of countries will adopt the same policy next year. 
Also, when more countries decrease corporate TSRs, fewer countries will increase 
corporate TSRs. This circle explains why the number of corporate TSR decreases 
has been increasing and the number of corporate TSR increases has been decreasing 
over time. However, neighboring countries’ corporate TSR increases are not 
followed by home countries’ TSR increases, but decrease the probability of home 
countries to decrease corporate TSRs. The asymmetric effects of corporate TSR 
changes suggest that countries’ corporate tax policies are more responsive to 
neighboring countries’ corporate TSR decreases than increases. 
3.4.2 The Asymmetric Effects of Other Independent Variables on Corporate TSR 
Decreases and Increases 
Most of the other explanatory variables also have asymmetric and sometimes 
opposite effects on home countries’ corporate TSR policies. Low_1 compares 
countries’ corporate TSRs to the world average. In some sense, it captures how a 
country’s corporate TSR responds to the world’s common trend. Low_1 is 
negatively and significantly correlated with the probability of corporate TSR 
decrease, but is positively and significantly correlated with the probability of 
corporate TSR increase. The opposite effects of this variable indicate that when 
making the policy decisions regarding corporate TSRs, countries not only consider 
the neighboring countries’ policies, but also compare their corporate TSRs with the 




Countries are less likely to decrease corporate TSRs, but are more likely to 
increase corporate TSRs next year when their corporate TSRs are already lower than 
the world average. These results indicate that a regional corporate tax decrease may 
have world-wide influence. For example, when some European countries 
dramatically decrease their corporate TSRs it drives down the world average TSR. 
Then, other countries, even those outside of Europe, whose corporate TSRs are 
higher than the world average, are more likely to decrease corporate TSRs in the 
following year. In other words, the effects of regional corporate tax competition 
probably are not restricted within a region, but can have global impacts. The results 
of the previous literature (Devereux et al., 2008; Rincke and Overesch, 2011) may 
be explained by lower average corporate TSRs in other regions or in some 
developing countries.   
Trade openness also has opposite effects on the probability of country’s 
corporate TSR changes. Countries with higher trade openness in the previous year 
are more likely to decrease corporate TSRs and less likely to increase corporate 
TSRs. However, countries with higher capital openness are less likely to decrease 
corporate TSRs. It is possible that capital is more mobile in countries with higher 
capital openness, thus, the corporate tax base is more flexible and the opportunity 
costs to decrease corporate TSR is higher in these countries. 
This analysis finds the logarithm of GDP to be positively and significantly 




suggests that countries with larger economic size have a higher probability of 
decreasing corporate TSRs. Also, economic size has no significant influence on the 
probability of corporate TSR increases. For the political changes, only legislative 
election has positive and significant effects on the probability of corporate TSR 
increases. This positive relationship is robust under different specifications, and 
suggests that countries are more likely to increase their corporate TSRs right after 
the legislative election year.  
Economic growth rate and government consumption as a percentage of GDP do 
not significantly affect the probability of corporate TSR changes, both increases and 
decreases. The lack of significant correlations is probably due to two reasons. First, 
corporate tax revenue only takes a small fraction of total government income in 
most of the countries, so the influence of government consumption on corporate tax 
policy is limited. Second, compared to collecting tax revenue and attracting 
investment, economic growth rate may not be the priority when policymakers design 
and construct corporate tax policies. Surprisingly, the results suggest that European 
countries are not more or less likely to changes their corporate tax policies than 
other countries after controlling for the dynamic interactions with neighboring 
countries.  
In sum, neighboring countries’ corporate TSR changes display  dynamic 
interactions with each other. Countries’ corporate TSR policies are more responsive 




set corporate TSR policies, they not only consider neighboring countries’ corporate 
TSR changes, but also consider global corporate TSRs. Other explanatory variables, 
such as trade and capital openness, GDP level (economic size), have asymmetric and 
even opposite effects on corporate TSR changes. Overall, the factors associated with 
corporate TSR decreases are quite different from those associated with TSR 
increases. 
3.5 Robustness Checks and Some Extensions 
This section provides robustness checks and some extensions and focuses on 
three questions. First, are the dynamic interactions of countries’ corporate TSR 
changes robust to different specifications and driven by some special countries, such 
as tax havens? Second, which countries are more likely to be leaders and which 
countries are more likely to be followers with respect to corporate TSR changes? 
Third, in the contemporaneous corporate TSR interactions, is it possible that the 
changes of corporate TSRs in different countries are due to some common causes?  
3.5.1 Robustness Check: 2-year Lag and 3-year Lag of Neighboring Countries 
Corporate TSR Changes 
It is possible that countries not only respond to neighbors’ corporate TSR 
changes in the previous year, but also respond to the corporate TSR changes from 
two or three years in past. Moreover, the coefficients of lagged neighboring 




corporate TSR policies. Table 3.5.1 reports the marginal effects of the main 
variables of interest, which are the lagged values of neighboring countries’ corporate 
TSR changes. Because the results of the other explanatory variables are very similar 
to the baseline model, in order to save some space, the marginal effects of the other 
explanatory variables are not reported in the table25.  
Table 3.5.1 contains three sections. Section 1 reports the marginal effects of 
2-year lagged neighboring countries’ corporate TSR changes in the model. Section 2 
reports the marginal effects of both 1-year and 2-year lagged variables and Section 3 
includes all three years’ lagged variables of neighboring countries’ corporate TSR 
changes. The results in Section 2 and Section 3 both indicate that a country is less 
likely to increase its corporate TSR when a larger proportion of neighboring 
countries decreased TSR in the previous year. Section 2 shows that the probability 
of corporate TSR decreases is negatively and significantly affected by the proportion 
of neighboring countries increasing TSRs in the previous year. The results in 
Section 3 suggest that when a larger proportion of neighboring countries decreased 
their corporate TSRs last year, home countries are more likely to follow neighbors’ 
policy changes. 
Overall, a country’s corporate TSR changes are only significantly influenced 
by neighboring countries’ corporate TSR changes in the previous year. The effects 
of neighboring countries’ corporate TSR changes become insignificant after two 
                                                     




years. This suggests that it is sufficient to include one-year lagged corporate TSR 
changes in the model when analyzing dynamic corporate TSR interactions among 
countries.. 
3.5.2 Robustness Check: Excluding European Countries and/or Tax Haven Countries 
Previous research shows that corporate tax competition exists in European 
countries and becomes more intense with the expansion of the EU membership 
(Redoano, 2007; Davies and Voget, 2008). It is possible that the basic results, which 
suggest neighboring countries’ corporate TSR changes dynamically interact with 
each other, are driven by tax competition in European countries. It is also plausible 
that the countries classified as tax havens behave differently with respect to 
corporate TSR changes. Table 3.5.2 reports the marginal effects of regressions 
excluding European and tax haven countries26 in the sample, respectively. The 
results of other explanatory variables are similar to the basic results. In order to save 
some space, this table also only reports the results of the main interested variables. 
Sections 1 and 2 in Table 3.5.2 report the marginal effects of regressions using 
samples, which exclude European countries and tax haven countries, respectively. 
Section 3 in Table 3.5.2 reports the marginal effects of regressions using a sample 
excluding both European and tax haven countries. Moreover, a dummy variable 
Africa is used to capture the potential regional characteristics after excluding 
European countries.  
                                                     




The results in all three sections suggest that the interactions of countries’ 
corporate TSR changes are not driven by European or tax haven countries, but exist 
in all countries around the world. Countries are more responsive to neighboring 
countries’ corporate TSR decreases than increases. The probability that a country 
decreases (increases) corporate TSR is positively (negatively) and significantly 
correlated with the proportion of neighboring countries decreasing corporate TSRs 
in the previous year. The dummy variable Africa is negatively and significantly 
correlated with the probability of corporate TSR decrease, when excluding European 
countries in the sample. This negative correlation suggests that after excluding 
European countries, African countries are less likely to decrease corporate TSRs 
than the rest of countries in the world. Overall, the results about neighboring 
countries’ corporate TSR change interactions are quite robust. 
3.5.3 Extension: Corporate TSR Interactions between Developed, Developing and 
Emerging Market Countries 
The previous papers suggest countries either contemporaneously or 
dynamically interact with each other regarding corporate tax rates. However, there is 
no conclusive evidence about two questions. First, is it possible that the worldwide 
decrease in corporate tax rates is not due to tax competition but rather to common 
factors, such as the global economic crisis or oil shocks? Second, in regard to 
dynamic corporate tax policy interactions, which countries are leaders and which 




groups, and then test different leader-follower assumptions. In order to save space, 
all the tables in Section 3.5.3 to Section 3.5.5 only report the results of the main 
interested variables by using multinomial logit model27. 
It is difficult to identify the effects of common shocks on dynamic corporate 
tax interactions since some countries may respond more quickly to shocks than the 
others. But it is possible to partially rule out the effects of common shocks on 
contemporaneous corporate TSR interactions. Countries can be classified into 
different groups according to their economic or geographic characteristics. Figure 
3.5.3 shows when countries are classified into two groups, group A and group B, the 
possible situations with and without common shocks. 
Unobserved common shocks can cause different countries’ corporate TSRs 
change at the same time. The co-movement of corporate TSRs in different groups 
can falsely indicate that the probability of group A to change corporate TSRs is 
influenced by the contemporaneous TSR changes in group B, and vice versa. In 
other words, if the probabilities of countries in different groups change corporate 
TSRs are affected by each other, then, it is possible that these interactions are due to 
common causes. However, if the probability of one group changing corporate TSRs 
is influence by TSR changes in the other group, and not vice versa. Or the 
probabilities of different groups changing corporate TSRs are not affected by each 
                                                     
27 The author also uses multinomial probit model and obtains similar results. The 
results of the other explanatory variables are very similar to the basic model. The 




other. Then, the global shocks that contemporaneously affect countries’ corporate 
TSR changes are not of consequence. 
Leader follower relationship has always been difficult to identify in the tax 
competition literature. Burge and Rogers (2013) construct a leadership index to 
identify the leader jurisdictions in local option sales tax competition by using 
Oklahoma data. Because corporate TSR changes include increases and decreases, 
this paper uses another approach to identify leaders and followers in international 
corporate tax interactions.  
If the probability that group A changes corporate TSRs is significantly affected 
by group B’s corporate TSR changes in previous years, but not vice versa, then 
countries in group B are more likely to be leaders and those in group A are more 
likely to be followers in the corporate TSR competition. If the probabilities that 
group A and B to change corporate TSRs are significantly affected by each other’s 
corporate TSR changes in previous years, then these two groups dynamically 
interact with each other with regard to corporate TSR changes. Although this 
method is not the perfect way to identify leaders and followers in international 
corporate tax competition and cannot rule out the effects of common shocks, it 
provides some information about which countries are more likely to be leaders and 
which are more likely to be followers.  
Table 3.5.3 (a) reports the contemporaneous and one-year lagged corporate 




dependent variables of columns (1) to (6) and columns (7) to (12) in Table 3.5.3 (a) 
are corporate TSR changes in developing and developed countries, respectively. In 
the contemporaneous interactions, column (4) shows that developing countries are 
more likely to adopt corporate TSR increases at the same time as more developed 
countries increase their corporate TSRs. Columns (3) and (5) show that as more 
developed countries decrease corporate TSRs, developing countries are also more 
likely to adopt the same corporate tax policy. 
Overall, the developed countries’ corporate TSR changes contemporaneously 
affect the probability of developing countries to change their corporate TSRs, but 
not vice versa. This result suggests that the contemporaneous corporate TSR 
changes of developed and developing countries are not due to common shocks that 
affect corporate TSRs in all countries at the same time. Developing countries do 
adjust their corporate TSRs according to the policies taken in developed countries. 
In models with one-year lagged interactions, the results of columns (1), (3) and 
(5) indicate that developing countries are more likely to decrease corporate TSRs 
when more developed countries decreased their TSRs in the previous year. 
Moreover, the results of columns (7), (9) and (11) suggest that this positive and 
significant correlation is not vice versa, that is, the probability for developed 
countries to change corporate TSRs are not influenced by developing countries’ 




to be leaders and developing countries are more likely to be followers regarding 
corporate TSR decreases.  
Developing countries experiencing high economic growth for a long period of 
time are classified as emerging market countries. It is possible that compared to the 
other developing countries, emerging market countries interact with developed 
countries differently regarding corporate TSR changes. Table 3.5.3 (b) reports the 
contemporaneous and one-year lagged corporate TSR change interactions between 
developed and emerging market countries.  
Unlike the results from ordinary developing countries, columns (7), (9) and 
(11) indicate that emerging market countries’ corporate TSR changes are 
significantly related to the contemporaneous corporate TSR changes in developed 
countries. More specifically, the probability that developed countries decrease 
corporate TSRs is positively and significantly influenced by corporate TSR 
decreases in emerging countries, and negatively and significantly influenced by 
corporate TSR increases in emerging countries. However, the results in Section 2 
Table 3.5.3 (b) suggest that the one-year lagged corporate TSR changes in emerging 
market countries are not significantly related to developed countries’ current 
corporate TSR changes.  
Column (3) in Table 3.5.3 (b) suggests that developed countries’ corporate TSR 
changes significantly increase the probability that emerging market countries 




different standard error specifications. Still, the possibility that common shocks 
affect corporate TSR changes in both developed and emerging market countries 
cannot be completely ruled out. In columns (4) and (5), the significant effects of 
lagged developed countries’ corporate TSR changes on developing countries’ TSR 
policies are not robust to different specifications either. In sum, leader follower 
relationship may not exist between developed and emerging market countries with 
respect to corporate TSR changes. 
3.5.4 Extension: Corporate TSR Interactions between Big and Small Countries 
Big and small countries are identified by economic size, that is, the GDP level. 
The 20 countries with the top highest GDP in the world are classified as big 
countries, and the rest are classified as small countries. This classification is justified 
because the composition of countries with the highest GDPs did not change very 
much in the past thirty years, although the rankings of countries on the list changes 
tremendously. These 20 countries are listed in Appendix III. Table 3.5.4 (a) shows 
the interactions of corporate TSR changes between big and small countries. Because 
the previous literature (Davies and Voget, 2008) specifically mentioned that small 
European countries act more aggressively regarding corporate tax policies, Table 
3.5.4 (b) reports the results showing interactions between big countries and small 
European countries. The dependent variables of columns (1) to (6) in Table 3.5.4 (a) 




countries. The dependent variables used in columns (7) to (12) in Table 3.5.4 (a) and 
(b) are corporate TSR changes in small and small European countries, respectively. 
Columns (7), (9) and (11) of Section 1 in Table 3.5.4 (a) show that in the 
contemporaneous interactions, big countries’ corporate TSR increases and decreases 
both positively and significantly affect the probability for small countries to 
decrease TSRs. This effect does not hold the other way around, as showed in column 
(1) to (6) in Section 1. So, the possibility that these interactions are due to common 
shocks can be ruled out. The results of Section 2 in Table 3.5.4 (a) indicate that big 
and small countries do not dynamically interact with each other. Overall, the 
corporate TSR change interactions between small and big countries are 
contemporaneous ones instead of dynamic ones. The probability that small countries 
decrease corporate TSRs is significantly influenced by big countries’ simultaneous 
corporate TSR changes. 
The results in Table 3.5.4 (b) indicate that the corporate TSR change 
interactions between big countries and small European countries are more nuanced 
than the interactions between big and other small countries. Big countries and small 
European countries display both contemporaneous and dynamic interactions 
regarding corporate TSR changes. The results of Section 1 in Table 3.5.4 (b) show 
that the probability for small European countries to simultaneously decrease 
corporate TSRs is positively and significantly influence by the number of big 




TSR decreases in big and small European countries are not driven by common 
shocks, but by contemporaneous interactions. 
Columns (1) and (3) in Section 2 Table 3.5.4 (b) show that the probability that  
big countries  decrease corporate TSRs is negatively and significantly correlated 
with the number of small European countries’ TSR increases in the previous year. 
Columns (7) and (11) in Section 2 show that this negative correlation also exists the 
other way around. Moreover, the results of columns (2), (6) and (10) of Section 2 in 
Table 3.5.4 (b) suggest that the probability that big countries  increase corporate 
TSRs is positively and significantly correlated with number of small European 
countries’ TSR increases in the previous year, and vice versa. The results indicate 
that big countries and small European countries dynamically interact with each other 
regarding corporate TSR changes. Compared to the other small countries, small 
European countries’ corporate TSR policies are more sensitive to corporate TSR 
changes in big countries. 
3.5.5 Extension: Corporate TSR Interactions between Tax Haven and Non-Tax Haven 
Countries 
Corporate tax rates in tax haven countries are much lower than the rates in 
other countries in the world. The OECD report in 1998 Harmful Tax Competition: 
An Emerging Global Issue argues that the spreading of tax havens intensifies 
international tax competition and distorts capital flows. However, no previous 




the strategic tax policy interactions between tax haven and non-tax haven countries. 
Table 3.5.5 shows corporate TSR change interactions between tax haven and 
non-tax haven countries. Columns (1) to (6) show that the number of corporate TSR 
changes in non-tax haven countries, lagged or not, do not affect the probability for 
tax havens to change corporate TSRs.  
On the other hand, the effects of tax havens’ corporate TSR changes on non-tax 
haven countries’ TSR policies last for two years. Columns (7), (9) and (11) show 
that the probability that non-tax haven countries decrease corporate TSRs is 
positively and significantly correlated with the number of tax haven countries’ TSR 
decreases. This positive correlation not only exists contemporaneously but also lasts 
for two years. Columns (8), (10) and (12) shows that the probability that non-tax 
haven countries increase corporate TSRs is positively and significantly correlated 
with the number of tax havens’ TSR increases two years ago. As a result, tax havens 
are more likely to be leaders and non-tax haven countries are more likely to be 
followers in international corporate tax competition, at least with regard to rates. 
3.6 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This paper investigates dynamic interactions of neighboring countries’ 
corporate TSR changes and leader-follower behavior in international corporate tax 
competition. The results suggest several interesting artifacts concerning corporate 
TSR changes. First, neighboring countries dynamically interact with each other 




corporate TSR decreases than increases. Also, countries are sensitive to neighbors’ 
corporate TSR changes in the previous year, but not two or three years ago. Second, 
most of the explanatory variables, such as neighboring countries’ corporate TSR 
increases and decreases, trade and capital openness and GDP level, have asymmetric 
even opposite estimated effects on countries’ corporate TSR changes. Third, the 
structure of corporate tax competition is nuanced. Countries respond to each other 
both contemporaneously and dynamically regarding corporate tax policies. Fourth, 
there is no conclusive evidence about which countries are leaders and which 
countries are followers in the dynamic international corporate tax competition. I 
separate countries into two groups according to their economic characteristics, and 
test for asymmetric responses between two groups. The results suggest that 
developed countries and tax havens are more likely to be leaders than other 
countries. Corporate TSR changes adopted by emerging market countries have 
significant contemporaneous effects on developed countries’ corporate TSR 
policies.  
The OECD and EU have been trying to harness international tax competition 
and to encourage cooperation among member countries regarding tax policies. 
However, the effects of these efforts are limited. Corporate tax rates have been 
decreasing and the numbers of corporate TSR decreases have been increasing over 
the last thirty years. The previous methods, such as common consolidated corporate 




policymakers may consider some new measures to attenuate international corporate 
tax competition. 
First, Keen and Konrad (2012) mentioned “countries may be unable to 
coordinate on specific tax policies” (p.30). Harmonizing corporate tax structures of 
different countries is unlikely due to the political and economic consequences of 
doing so. However, it is possible for countries to come up with an agreement on 
enhancing corporate tax policy stability. The primary aim of enhancing corporate tax 
policy stability is to decrease the number of corporate tax changes, especially tax 
rate decreases. The results of this chapter show that countries are more likely to 
decrease corporate TSRs, when more neighboring countries and competitors did so 
in the previous year. Thus, fewer corporate TSR changes this year would lead to 
fewer changes next year. This virtuous cycle may stabilize the worldwide corporate 
tax rates and decrease the incentives for countries to adjust corporate tax policies. As 
a result, the intense level of international corporate tax competition may be reduced. 
Second, for OECD and EU countries to achieve corporate tax harmonization, 
regional coordination requires cooperation at the global level. Since corporate tax 
policy changes in emerging market countries and tax havens significantly influence 
OECD and EU countries’ corporate tax policies, corporate tax cooperation needs to 
expand  to a more global level. Moreover, because tax havens are more likely to be 
leaders in corporate tax competition, as the results in this chapter suggest, it is 




strategies, including low or no corporate income taxations, would help to lessen 
international corporate tax competition. Overall, achieving corporate tax 
harmonization in EU and OECD countries is perhaps insuperable because to be 




Table 3.1.3 (a) the Numbers of Corporate TSR Decreases and Increases across 
Regions from 1982 to 2011 (Five-year Period) 
 
Africa Asia Europe N. America S. America Oceania Caribbean 
 
+ - + - + - + - + - + - + - 
1982-1986 10 4 4 9 10 13 5 6 4 7 3 1 0 0 
1987-1991 4 16 6 15 4 33 1 17 5 7 1 4 0 2 
1992-1996 5 23 5 33 14 21 5 15 7 3 1 4 0 2 
1997-2001 1 12 9 21 4 40 2 3 2 2 0 4 0 0 
2002-2006 1 13 7 23 3 36 3 18 6 3 0 1 0 0 
2007-2011 3 14 4 30 5 42 4 11 1 6 1 6 1 4 
Total 24 82 35 131 40 185 20 70 25 28 6 20 1 8 







Table 3.1.3 (b) the Overall and Average Corporate TSR Change in Each Region from 





Increase Decrease Total Average 
Africa 24 24 82 106 4.42 
Asia 30 35 131 166 5.53 
Europe 44 40 185 225 5.11 
N. America 17 20 70 90 5.29 
S. America 12 25 28 53 4.42 
Oceania 7 6 20 26 3.71 
Caribbean 5 1 8 9 1.80 






Table 3.3.2 the Summation of the Basic statistics, Definitions and Sources of the Variables 
Variable Description Obs. Mean 
Std. 
dev. 
Min Max Data Source 
TSR 
federal level corporate top statutory tax rate, adjusted for 
sub-national corporate tax deductions, if applicable 





Categorical variable, equals -1, if the country decreases corporate 
TSR in year t; equals 1, if the country increases corporate TSR in 
year t; equals 0, if the country does not changed its corporate TSR 
in year t. 
3415 -0.11 0.432 -1 1 author’s calculation 
N_decrease 
the number of neighboring countries adopt corporate TSR decrease 
in year t 
4371 0.522 0.863 0 6 author’s calculation 
N_increase 
the number of neighboring countries adopt corporate TSR increase 
in year t 
4371 0.17 0.43 0 3 author’s calculation 
Neighbor 
the number of neighboring countries included in the sample, by 
land and maritime borders, a country has,  
4371 3.95 2.94 0 15 








capital openness, the index is for the extent of openness in capital 
account transactions, Chinn and Ito (2013) 
3582 0.279 1.578 -1.864 2.439 
Comparative 






Trade trade openness, (export+ import)/GDP 3722 85.371 52.098 6.32 446.047 
Comparative 
Political Data Set I 
Log(GDP) the logarithm of GDP in constant 2005 international dollars 3831 24.05 2.268 18.461 30.213 World Bank 
Growth the growth rate of real GDP 3836 3.333 5.889 -51.031 106.28 World Bank 
Gconsump 
the general government final consumption expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP 
3644 16.355 6.132 1.375 76.222 
Comparative 
Political Data Set I 
Low 
Dummy variable, equals 1, if the country’s corporate TSR in year t 
is lower than the world’s average; equals 0, otherwise. 
3520 0.429 0.495 0 1 author’s calculation 
Leader 
Dummy variable, equals 1, if there is a leader change in year t; 
equals 0, otherwise. 




Dummy variable, equals 1, if there is a legislative election in year t; 
equals 0, otherwise. 




Dummy variable, equals 1, if there is an executive election in year t; 
equals 0, otherwise. 




Dummy variable, equals 1, if the country is classified as a tax 
haven; equals 0, otherwise. 
4371 0.184 0.388 0 1 Gravelle (2013) 
Big20 
Dummy variable, equals 1, if the country’s GDP is listed in top 20 
in year t; equals 0, otherwise. 
4371 0.142 0.349 0 1 
World Bank, and 
author’s calculation 
Developed 
Dummy variable, equals 1, if the country is classified as developed 
country; equals 0, otherwise. 
4371 0.241 0.428 0 1 
International 
Monetary 
Fund (IMF)  
Emerging 
Dummy variable, equals 1, if the country is classified as emerging 
market country; equals 0, otherwise. 
4371 0.17 0.376 0 1 
International 
Monetary 







Dummy variable, equals 1, if the country is in Europe; equals 0, 
otherwise. 
4371 0.305 0.46 0 1 







Dummy variable, equals 1, if the country is in Africa; equals 0, 
otherwise. 
4371 0.17 0.376 0 1 













Table 3.4.1 (a) Legislative Election 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
N_%increase_1 -0.151* 0.017 -0.151* 0.017 -0.151 0.017 -0.130* 0.025 -0.130* 0.025 -0.130 0.025 
  (0.089) (0.024) (0.091) (0.024) (0.106) (0.027) (0.077) (0.027) (0.078) (0.027) (0.093) (0.029) 
N_%decrease_1 0.067* -0.061** 0.067* -0.061** 0.067* -0.061** 0.071** -0.063*** 0.071* -0.063** 0.071** -0.063*** 
  (0.035) (0.024) (0.038) (0.026) (0.035) (0.024) (0.036) (0.024) (0.039) (0.025) (0.036) (0.024) 




  (0.015) (0.008) (0.020) (0.006) (0.021) (0.007) (0.015) (0.008) (0.020) (0.007) (0.021) (0.008) 
K_open_1 -0.012** -0.000 -0.012** -0.000 -0.012 -0.000 -0.012** -0.001 -0.012*** -0.001 -0.012* -0.001 
  (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) 
Trade_1 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 0.018*** 0.000 0.018*** 0.000 0.018*** 0.000 0.019*** 0.000 0.019*** 0.000 0.019*** 0.000 
  (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) 
Growth_1 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Gconsump _1 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 






  (0.017) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.017) (0.008) (0.017) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.018) (0.009) 
European 0.017 0.010 0.017 0.010 0.017 0.010 0.018 0.010 0.018 0.010 0.018 0.010 
  (0.019) (0.009) (0.020) (0.008) (0.033) (0.010) (0.019) (0.010) (0.020) (0.008) (0.034) (0.011) 
N_obs 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 
Log-Likelihood -1,489.23 -1,489.23 -1,489.23 -1,489.23 -1,489.23 -1,489.23 -1,489.24 -1,489.24 -1,489.24 -1,489.24 -1,489.24 -1,489.24 
Pseudo R2 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045             
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 








Table 3.4.1 (b) Executive Election 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
N_%increase_1 -0.150* 0.016 -0.150* 0.016 -0.150 0.016 -0.129* 0.024 -0.129* 0.024 -0.129 0.024 
 
(0.089) (0.025) (0.091) (0.025) (0.105) (0.028) (0.077) (0.028) (0.078) (0.028) (0.092) (0.031) 
N_%decrease_1 0.067* -0.063** 0.067* -0.063** 0.067* -0.063*** 0.071** -0.064** 0.071* -0.064** 0.071** -0.064*** 
 
(0.035) (0.025) (0.038) (0.026) (0.035) (0.024) (0.036) (0.025) (0.039) (0.026) (0.036) (0.024) 





(0.015) (0.008) (0.020) (0.006) (0.021) (0.007) (0.015) (0.008) (0.020) (0.007) (0.021) (0.008) 
K_open_1 -0.012** -0.000 -0.012** -0.000 -0.012* -0.000 -0.013** -0.000 -0.013*** -0.000 -0.013* -0.000 
 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) 
Trade_1 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 0.018*** 0.001 0.018*** 0.001 0.018*** 0.001 0.019*** 0.001 0.019*** 0.001 0.019*** 0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) 
Growth_1 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Gconsump _1 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 







(0.025) (0.013) (0.027) (0.015) (0.024) (0.011) (0.025) (0.014) (0.028) (0.016) (0.025) (0.012) 
European 0.016 0.011 0.016 0.011 0.016 0.011 0.018 0.010 0.018 0.010 0.018 0.010 
 
(0.019) (0.009) (0.020) (0.008) (0.033) (0.010) (0.019) (0.010) (0.020) (0.009) (0.034) (0.011) 
N_obs 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 
Log-Likelihood -1,491.60 -1,491.60 -1,491.60 -1,491.60 -1,491.60 -1,491.60 -1,491.74 -1,491.74 -1,491.74 -1,491.74 -1,491.74 -1,491.74 
Pseudo R2 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 
      







Table 3.4.1 (c) Leader Changes 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
N_%increase_1 -0.157* 0.017 -0.157* 0.017 -0.157 0.017 -0.136* 0.024 -0.136* 0.024 -0.136 0.024 
  (0.086) (0.024) (0.090) (0.024) (0.101) (0.027) (0.075) (0.028) (0.077) (0.027) (0.090) (0.030) 
N_%decrease_1 0.060* -0.056** 0.060 -0.056** 0.060* -0.056** 0.064* -0.056** 0.064* -0.056** 0.064* -0.056** 
  (0.033) (0.023) (0.037) (0.026) (0.034) (0.023) (0.034) (0.023) (0.037) (0.026) (0.035) (0.023) 
Low_1 -0.099*** 0.027*** -0.099*** 0.027*** -0.099*** 0.027*** -0.102*** 0.030*** -0.102*** 0.030*** -0.102*** 0.030*** 
  (0.014) (0.007) (0.019) (0.007) (0.020) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.019) (0.007) (0.020) (0.008) 
K_open_1 -0.012** 0.000 -0.012** 0.000 -0.012* 0.000 -0.013** -0.000 -0.013*** -0.000 -0.013* -0.000 
  (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) 
Trade_1 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 0.019*** 0.000 0.019*** 0.000 0.019*** 0.000 0.020*** 0.000 0.020*** 0.000 0.020*** 0.000 
  (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) 
Growth_1 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Gconsump _1 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Leader_1 -0.003 0.015 -0.003 0.015* -0.003 0.015 -0.001 0.016 -0.001 0.016* -0.001 0.016 






European 0.019 0.011 0.019 0.011 0.019 0.011 0.020 0.011 0.020 0.011 0.020 0.011 
  (0.019) (0.009) (0.020) (0.008) (0.033) (0.009) (0.019) (0.010) (0.020) (0.009) (0.034) (0.010) 
N_obs 2,569 2,569 2,569 2,569 2,569 2,569 2,569 2,569 2,569 2,569 2,569 2,569 
Log-Likelihood -1,539.64 -1,539.64 -1,539.64 -1,539.64 -1,539.64 -1,539.64 -1,539.47 -1,539.47 -1,539.47 -1,539.47 -1,539.47 -1,539.47 
Pseudo R2 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045             






Table 3.5.1 Neighboring Countries Corporate TSR Change Interactions (Lagged) 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Section 1: 2-year lag only 
N_%increase_2 -0.048 -0.007 -0.048 -0.007 -0.048 -0.007 -0.046 -0.009 -0.046 -0.009 -0.046 -0.009 
  (0.073) (0.028) (0.088) (0.025) (0.078) (0.030) (0.068) (0.030) (0.081) (0.026) (0.072) (0.032) 
N_%decrease_2 0.011 -0.006 0.011 -0.006 0.011 -0.006 0.013 -0.004 0.013 -0.004 0.013 -0.004 
  (0.037) (0.020) (0.042) (0.021) (0.045) (0.020) (0.037) (0.020) (0.041) (0.022) (0.044) (0.021) 
N_obs 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 
Log-Likelihood -1,459.64 -1,459.64 -1,459.64 -1,459.64 -1,459.64 -1,459.64 -1,459.55 -1,459.55 -1,459.55 -1,459.55 -1,459.55 -1,459.55 
Pseudo R2 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040             
Section 2:1-year lag and 2-year lag 
N_%increase_1 -0.167* 0.020 -0.167* 0.020 -0.167 0.020 -0.145* 0.028 -0.145* 0.028 -0.145 0.028 
  (0.091) (0.023) (0.097) (0.021) (0.104) (0.023) (0.078) (0.027) (0.084) (0.025) (0.090) (0.026) 
N_%decrease_1 0.059 -0.056** 0.059 -0.056** 0.059* -0.056** 0.060 -0.058** 0.060 -0.058** 0.060* -0.058** 
  (0.036) (0.024) (0.038) (0.026) (0.035) (0.024) (0.037) (0.024) (0.039) (0.026) (0.036) (0.023) 
N_%increase_2 -0.056 -0.000 -0.056 -0.000 -0.056 -0.000 -0.052 -0.004 -0.052 -0.004 -0.052 -0.004 
  (0.071) (0.029) (0.087) (0.025) (0.072) (0.030) (0.067) (0.031) (0.082) (0.026) (0.068) (0.032) 
N_%decrease_2 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.009 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.009 0.004 






N_obs 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 
Log-Likelihood -1,450.87 -1,450.87 -1,450.87 -1,450.87 -1,450.87 -1,450.87 -1,450.92 -1,450.92 -1,450.92 -1,450.92 -1,450.92 -1,450.92 
Pseudo R2 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046             
Section 3:1-year lag, 2-year lag and 3-year lag 
N_%increase_1 -0.131 0.017 -0.131 0.017 -0.131 0.017 -0.110 0.023 -0.110 0.023 -0.110 0.023 
  (0.091) (0.023) (0.095) (0.021) (0.103) (0.021) (0.079) (0.027) (0.084) (0.026) (0.090) (0.023) 
N_%decrease_1 0.061* -0.052** 0.061 -0.052* 0.061* -0.052** 0.063* -0.055** 0.063 -0.055** 0.063* -0.055** 
  (0.037) (0.025) (0.039) (0.028) (0.036) (0.024) (0.038) (0.024) (0.039) (0.027) (0.037) (0.023) 
N_%increase_2 -0.051 0.001 -0.051 0.001 -0.051 0.001 -0.047 -0.001 -0.047 -0.001 -0.047 -0.001 
  (0.072) (0.029) (0.090) (0.025) (0.074) (0.031) (0.068) (0.031) (0.087) (0.026) (0.070) (0.032) 
N_%decrease_2 0.012 0.002 0.012 0.002 0.012 0.002 0.016 0.005 0.016 0.005 0.016 0.005 
  (0.040) (0.019) (0.044) (0.021) (0.048) (0.017) (0.040) (0.020) (0.045) (0.022) (0.048) (0.018) 
N_%increase_3 -0.128 0.025 -0.128 0.025 -0.128 0.025 -0.113 0.030 -0.113* 0.030 -0.113 0.030 
  (0.085) (0.022) (0.078) (0.019) (0.083) (0.022) (0.076) (0.026) (0.068) (0.023) (0.074) (0.025) 
N_%decrease_3 -0.046 -0.013 -0.046 -0.013 -0.046 -0.013 -0.048 -0.012 -0.048 -0.012 -0.048 -0.012 
  (0.041) (0.021) (0.044) (0.019) (0.044) (0.019) (0.041) (0.021) (0.044) (0.019) (0.043) (0.020) 
N_obs 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 
Log-Likelihood -1,414.29 -1,414.29 -1,414.29 -1,414.29 -1,414.29 -1,414.29 -1,414.11 -1,414.11 -1,414.11 -1,414.11 -1,414.11 -1,414.11 
Pseudo R2 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046            








Table 3.5.2 Neighboring Countries Corporate TSR Change Interactions (Excluding European and/or Tax Haven Countries) 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Section 1: No European Countries 
N_%increase_1 -0.113 0.020 -0.113 0.020 -0.113 0.020 -0.106 0.029 -0.106* 0.029 -0.106 0.029 
  (0.092) (0.025) (0.075) (0.023) (0.110) (0.029) (0.080) (0.028) (0.064) (0.027) (0.098) (0.031) 
N_%decrease_1 0.072* -0.066** 0.072* -0.066*** 0.072* -0.066*** 0.077* -0.070*** 0.077* -0.070*** 0.077** -0.070*** 
  (0.039) (0.027) (0.038) (0.024) (0.038) (0.023) (0.041) (0.026) (0.039) (0.023) (0.039) (0.023) 
Africa -0.035* 0.002 -0.035** 0.002 -0.035 0.002 -0.038* 0.003 -0.038** 0.003 -0.038 0.003 
 (0.020) (0.011) (0.018) (0.010) (0.025) (0.011) (0.021) (0.012) (0.019) (0.011) (0.026) (0.012) 
N_obs 1,749 1,749 1,749 1,749 1,749 1,749 1,749 1,749 1,749 1,749 1,749 1,749 
Log-Likelihood -1,012.20 -1,012.20 -1,012.20 -1,012.20 -1,012.20 -1,012.20 -1,011.44 -1,011.44 -1,011.44 -1,011.44 -1,011.44 -1,011.44 
Pseudo R2 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 
      
Section 2: No Tax Haven Countries 
N_%increase_1 -0.168* 0.021 -0.168 0.021 -0.168 0.021 -0.143* 0.029 -0.143 0.029 -0.143 0.029 
  (0.101) (0.028) (0.106) (0.028) (0.122) (0.032) (0.085) (0.032) (0.088) (0.032) (0.105) (0.034) 
N_%decrease_1 0.075* -0.062** 0.075* -0.062** 0.075* -0.062** 0.076* -0.062** 0.076* -0.062** 0.076** -0.062** 
  (0.038) (0.028) (0.045) (0.030) (0.038) (0.028) (0.040) (0.028) (0.046) (0.029) (0.039) (0.027) 
N_obs 2,228 2,228 2,228 2,228 2,228 2,228 2,228 2,228 2,228 2,228 2,228 2,228 
Log-Likelihood -1,369.83 -1,369.83 -1,369.83 -1,369.83 -1,369.83 -1,369.83 -1,369.95 -1,369.95 -1,369.95 -1,369.95 -1,369.95 -1,369.95 






Section 3: No European and No Tax Haven Countries 
N_%increase_1 -0.136 0.023 -0.136 0.023 -0.136 0.023 -0.124 0.032 -0.124* 0.032 -0.124 0.032 
  (0.104) (0.031) (0.087) (0.029) (0.128) (0.035) (0.087) (0.033) (0.071) (0.032) (0.110) (0.036) 
N_%decrease_1 0.076* -0.066** 0.076* -0.066** 
0.076*
* 
-0.066** 0.078* -0.067** 0.078 -0.067** 0.078** -0.067** 
  (0.042) (0.031) (0.045) (0.028) (0.038) (0.027) (0.044) (0.030) (0.048) (0.027) (0.039) (0.026) 
Africa -0.044** 0.004 -0.044*** 0.004 -0.044 0.004 -0.047** 0.005 -0.047*** 0.005 -0.047 0.005 
 
(0.021) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.028) (0.013) (0.022) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.030) (0.014) 
N_obs 1,563 1,563 1,563 1,563 1,563 1,563 1,563 1,563 1,563 1,563 1,563 1,563 
Log-Likelihood -919.36 -919.36 -919.36 -919.36 -919.36 -919.36 -918.79 -918.79 -918.79 -918.79 -918.79 -918.79 
Pseudo R2 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 
      
















































































 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Section 1: Contemporaneous Interaction 
Developed_incre
ase 
0.010 0.005 0.010 0.005* 0.010 0.005 
Developing_incre
ase 
-0.009 -0.000 -0.009 -0.000 -0.009 -0.000 
 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003)  (0.009) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) 
Developed_decre
ase 
0.005 0.001 0.005* 0.001 0.005* 0.001 
Developing_decr
ease 
0.004 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
N_obs 1,255 1,255 1,255 1,255 1,255 1,255 N_obs 794 794 794 794 794 794 
Log-Likelihood -643.06 -643.06 -643.06 -643.06 -643.06 -643.06 Log-Likelihood -496.76 -496.76 -496.76 -496.76 -496.76 -496.76 
Pseudo R2 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 Pseudo R2 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 
Section 2: One-year Lag Interaction 
Developed_incre
ase_1 
0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 
Developing_incre
ase_1 
-0.007 0.002 -0.007 0.002 -0.007 0.002 
 



















(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
N_obs 1,205 1,205 1,205 1,205 1,205 1,205 N_obs 770 770 770 770 770 770 
Log-Likelihood -607.52 -607.52 -607.52 -607.52 -607.52 -607.52 Log-Likelihood -482.05 -482.05 -482.05 -482.05 -482.05 -482.05 
Pseudo R2 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073 Pseudo R2 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 













































































 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Section 1: Contemporaneous Interaction 
Developed_incre
ase 
0.017 -0.005 0.017* -0.005 0.017 -0.005 
Emg_increas
e 




  (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.013) (0.009)   (0.014) (0.004) (0.013) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) 
Developed_decre
ase 
0.008 -0.003 0.008* -0.003 0.008 -0.003 
Emg_decreas
e 
0.018** -0.001 0.018* -0.001 0.018** -0.001 
  (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003)   (0.009) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) 
N_obs 575 575 575 575 575 575 N_obs 794 794 794 794 794 794 
Log-Likelihood -375.44 -375.44 -375.44 -375.44 -375.44 -375.44 
Log-Likeliho
od 
-493.37 -493.37 -493.37 -493.37 -493.37 -493.37 
Pseudo R2 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 Pseudo R2 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 
Section 2: One-year Lag Interaction 
Developed_increa
se_1 
0.016 -0.004 0.016 -0.004 0.016* -0.004 
Emg_increas
e_1 
-0.010 0.004 -0.010 0.004 -0.010 0.004 
  (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.004) (0.010) (0.006)   (0.015) (0.003) (0.015) (0.003) (0.012) (0.003) 







  (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)   (0.009) (0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) 
N_obs 558 558 558 558 558 558 N_obs 770 770 770 770 770 770 
Log-Likelihood -359.87 -359.87 -359.87 -359.87 -359.87 -359.87 
Log-Likeliho
od 
-481.72 -481.72 -481.72 -481.72 -481.72 -481.72 
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 Pseudo R2 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 








Table 3.5.4 (a) the Corporate TSR Interactions between Big and Small Countries 
 











































 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Section 1: Contemporaneous Interaction 










  (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003) (0.009) (0.004)   (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
Small_decrease 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 Big_decrease 0.010** 0.001 0.010 0.001 0.010** 0.001 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)   (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
N_obs 538 538 538 538 538 538 N_obs 2,071 2,071 2,071 2,071 2,071 2,071 















Pseudo R2 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 Pseudo R2 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 
Section 2: One-year Lag Interaction 
Small_increase_
1 
0.005 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.007 
Big_increase_
1 
-0.008 0.001 -0.008 0.001 -0.008 0.001 
  (0.009) (0.004) (0.011) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005)   (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) 
Small_decrease_
1 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Big_decrease_
1 
0.005 -0.002 0.005 -0.002 0.005 -0.002 






N_obs 521 521 521 521 521 521 N_obs 1,997 1,997 1,997 1,997 1,997 1,997 















Pseudo R2 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 Pseudo R2 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 









Table 3.5.4 (b) the Corporate TSR Interactions between Big and Small European Countries 
 





























































 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Section 1: Contemporaneous Interaction 
EUSmall_increase -0.002 -0.011 -0.002 -0.011 -0.002 -0.011 Big_increase -0.014 -0.008 -0.014 -0.008* -0.014 -0.008 
  (0.020) (0.007) (0.017) (0.008) (0.025) (0.009)   (0.016) (0.006) (0.016) (0.004) (0.016) (0.007) 
EUSmall_decrease 0.010 -0.004 0.010 -0.004 0.010* -0.004 Big_decrease 0.025** -0.002 0.025** -0.002 0.025** -0.002 
  (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)   (0.010) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004) 
N_obs 538 538 538 538 538 538 N_obs 502 502 502 502 502 502 
Log-Likelihood -385.98 -385.98 -385.98 -385.98 -385.98 -385.98 
Log-Likelihoo
d 
-299.78 -299.78 -299.78 -299.78 -299.78 -299.78 
Pseudo R2 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 Pseudo R2 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 













-0.022* 0.006 -0.022 0.006** -0.022* 0.006 








-0.011 -0.000 -0.011 -0.000 -0.011 -0.000 
Big_decrease
_1 
0.005 -0.000 0.005 -0.000 0.005 -0.000 
  (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004)   (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) 
N_obs 521 521 521 521 521 521 N_obs 485 485 485 485 485 485 
Log-Likelihood -370.04 -370.04 -370.04 -370.04 -370.04 -370.04 
Log-Likelihoo
d 
-288.19 -288.19 -288.19 -288.19 -288.19 -288.19 
Pseudo R2 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 Pseudo R2 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 
































































Decrease Increase  Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Section 1: Contemporaneous Interaction 
NonHaven_increase 0.007 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.007 0.001 Haven_increase -0.002 0.007 -0.002 0.007* -0.002 0.007 
  (0.007) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001)   (0.010) (0.005) (0.015) (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) 
NonHaven_decrease 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 Haven_decrease 0.016*** -0.000 0.016*** -0.000 0.016*** -0.000 
  (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)   (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
N_obs 281 281 281 281 281 281 N_obs 2,328 2,328 2,328 2,328 2,328 2,328 
Log-Likelihood -111.26 -111.26 -111.26 -111.26 -111.26 -111.26 Log-Likelihood -1,425.20 -1,425.20 -1,425.20 -1,425.20 -1,425.20 
-1,425.2
0 
Pseudo R2 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.157 Pseudo R2 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 
Section 2: One-year Lag Interaction 
NonHaven_increase_
1 
-0.004 0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.004 0.000 Haven_increase_1 0.016 -0.001 0.016 -0.001 0.016 -0.001 
  (0.008) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001)   (0.010) (0.005) (0.014) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) 
NonHaven_decrease
_1 
0.003 -0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.003 -0.000 
Haven_decrease_
1 






  (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)   (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) 
N_obs 271 271 271 271 271 271 N_obs 2,247 2,247 2,247 2,247 2,247 2,247 
Log-Likelihood -107.97 -107.97 -107.97 -107.97 -107.97 -107.97 Log-Likelihood -1,372.27 -1,372.27 -1,372.27 -1,372.27 -1,372.27 
-1,372.2
7 
Pseudo R2 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.146 Pseudo R2 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 
Section 3: Two-year Lag Interaction 
NonHaven_increase_
2 
-0.009* -0.001 -0.009 -0.001 -0.009 -0.001 Haven_increase_2 0.003 0.009** 0.003 0.009*** 0.003 0.009** 
  (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001)   (0.010) (0.004) (0.009) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) 
NonHaven_decrease
_2 
0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Haven_decrease_
2 
0.010* 0.002 0.010 0.002 0.010* 0.002 
  (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)   (0.005) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) 
N_obs 259 259 259 259 259 259 N_obs 2,154 2,154 2,154 2,154 2,154 2,154 
Log-Likelihood -100.34 -100.34 -100.34 -100.34 -100.34 -100.34 Log-Likelihood -1,312.59 -1,312.59 -1,312.59 -1,312.59 -1,312.59 
-1,312.5
9 
Pseudo R2 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.182 Pseudo R2 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 3.1.2 (a) the Average Corporate TSRs of Developing, Developed and 
Emerging Market Countries from 1981 to 2011 
 
Data Source: the AEI International Tax Database and author’s calculation. 
 
Figure 3.1.2 (b) the Regional Average Corporate TSR in 1991, 2001 and 2011 
 
Data Source: the AEI International Tax Database and author’s calculation. 
 
Figure 3.1.3 (a) Corporate TSR Changes in 139 Countries from 1982 to 2011
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Average Corporate TSR in Developing Countries














































Figure 3.1.3 (b) the Number of Corporate TSR Changes across 7 Regions from 1982 
to 2011 (Five-year Period) 
 





Figure 3.5.3 the Probability of Corporate TSR Changes of Group A and Group B with 











































Appendix I: OECD Country Names and Codes 
A.I.1 OECD Country Names and Corresponding IOC (the International Olympic 













Australia AUS Greece GRC Norway NOR 
Austria AUT Iceland ISL Portugal PRT 
Belgium BEL Ireland IRL Spain ESP 
Canada CAN Italy ITA Sweden SWE 
Denmark DNK Japan JPN Switzerland CHE 
Finland FIN Luxembourg LUX Turkey TUR 













Appendix II: The Corporate Effective Average Tax Rate and the Corporate 
Effective Marginal Tax Rate 
Appendix II. 1: The Corporate Effective Average Tax Rate 
Corporate EATR is calculated according to the method provided by Devereux 
and Griffith (2003). The data used to calculate the present value of the depreciation 
allowance rate is from the AEI International Tax Database. This corporate EATR is 
calculated based on a hypothetical investment project and can be showed as a 
weighted average of an adjusted corporate TSR and EMTR. Moreover, Devereux 
and Griffith (2003) point out, as the profitability of this hypothetical investment 
increasing, the corporate EATR is closer to the adjusted corporate TSR, which is 
adjusted for possible sub-national deductions. 
The formula used to calculate corporate EATR is: 
Corporate EATR= 
pre-tax net present value post-tax net present value
pre-tax net present value

 






where *R is the pre-tax economic rent and R is the post-tax economic rent. p is the 
financial return, which is assumed to be 20%, and r is the real annual discount rate, 
which is assumed to be 10%. All the assumptions and calculations of the corporate 
EATR are the same as those in Hassett and Mathur (2011)28.  
                                                     
28 For the detailed steps, instructions, and assumptions to calculate the corporate 
EATR and EMTR, please check the Appendix of Report Card on Effective Corporate 
Tax Rates United States Gets an F, by Kevin A. Hassett and Aparna Mathur, 2011. 
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To calculate the post economic rent R , the adjusted top statutory corporate tax 
rates and the inflation rates are also needed. The data of the 24 OECD countries’ 
adjusted corporate TSRs is provided by OECD tax database and is recently updated 
with the data of 2012. For the inflation rate, previous papers use two types of 
inflation rates to calculate the corporate EATR. One is the expected annual inflation 
rate and following Devereux et al. (2002), is assumed to be 3.5%; the other is the 
real annual inflation rate Consumer Price Index (CPI), which can be found in World 
Development Indicators. In this paper, the variable EATRcpi denotes the corporate 
EATR that is calculated using real annual inflation rate CPI and EATRex denotes the 
corporate EATR that is calculated using the expected 3.5% inflation rate.  
Appendix II. 2: The Corporate Effective Marginal Tax Rate 
The corporate EMTR is also calculated under the assumption of a hypothetical 
investment. Only in this case, this hypothetical investment is a marginal investment, 
which the post-tax economic return just equals to the capital cost. So, the main 
difference between corporate EATR and EMTR is that the latter’s financial return p 
just equals to the capital costs. Hassett and Mathur (2011) provide a simplified 
formula of corporate EMTR. Similarly, this paper also uses the expected and the real 
inflation rate to calculate corporate EMTR. The variable EMTRcpi denotes the 
corporate EMTR that is calculated using real annual inflation rate CPI and EMTRex 
                                                                                                                                                     





denotes the corporate EMTR that is calculated using the expected 3.5% inflation 
rate. 
Appendix II. 3: The Advantage of Corporate EATR and EMTR 
Both corporate EATR and EMTR are estimated variables based on a 
hypothetical investment on plant and machinery and financed by equity. Compare to 
the corporate TSR, these two variables have the advantage that they incorporate both 
corporate tax rates and bases. In other words, corporate EATR and EMTR can 
reflect the corporate tax policy changes on both rates and bases, but corporate TSR 
only shows the governments’ corporate tax policy changes on rates. 
Moreover, compare to the average corporate tax rate, which is calculated by 
using corporate tax revenue divided by corporate taxable income, the corporate 
EATR has at least two advantages. First of all, the corporate EATR is a 
forward-looking corporate tax rate, and is not influenced by factors that influence 
corporate taxable income29. That is, the changes of corporate EATR truly reflect the 
changes of governments’ corporate tax policies, both rates and bases.  
                                                     
29 Reed and Rogers (2006) use U.S. state-level data and show that half of the 
variation of Tax Burden, measured as the state tax revenue divided by personal 
income, is due to the changes of state income rather than the changes of state tax 
policy. So, it is reasonable to expect that the changes of average corporate tax rate, 
which is the real corporate tax burden on firms, not only contain the changes of 
corporate tax policies, but also contains the changes of corporate taxable income that 
are not due to tax policy changes. For example, the changes such as labor costs and 
technologic improvements can influence corporate income, but may have nothing to 
do with changes of corporate tax policies. 
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Second, the legal definition of corporate tax base varies significantly across 
time and country, and is very complicated30. So, it is impossible to accurately 
measure corporate tax bases. Moreover, a country’s the average corporate tax rate, 
which measures the actual corporate tax burden, is affected by the country’s 
corporate tax laws. Even use firm-level average corporate tax rates cannot properly 
measure corporate tax policy changes, because it can be influenced by firms’ ability 
of tax avoidance and management skills. Corporate EATR provides a measure of 
corporate average tax rates that has the same standards across country and time, and 
thus is comparable. 
Overall, corporate EATR and EMTR, which are calculated by Devereux and 
Griffith (2003), are more proper measures of corporate tax policies. So, this paper 
use corporate EATR and EMTR to measure the corporate tax policy changes on 
both corporate tax rates and bases. 
  
                                                     
30 For example, the American corporate tax laws are extremely complicated. The 
small business and large firms have different corporate income tax rates. Different 
corporate properties are subject to different tax rates, the tax rate on inventories is 
high, while the tax rates on airplane and transportation are relatively low. Moreover, 
in order to prevent tax avoidance and effectively tax multinational firms, especially 
their foreign incomes, the corporate tax deduction laws are extremely complex, and 
have exemptions of exemptions.  
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Appendix III: List of Countries 
A.III.1 List of Countries 
Albania # Honduras Paraguay 
Angola a Hong Kong d, h Peru & 
Antigua and Barbuda h Hungary #, &, * Philippines & 
Argentina & Iceland #, d, * Poland #, &, * 
Aruba h India &, b Portugal #, d, * 
Australia d, b, * Indonesia & Puerto Rico 
Austria #, d, * Iran Qatar 
Azerbaijan # Ireland #, d, h, * Romania & 
Bangladesh Isle of Man h Russia #, & 
Barbados h, Israel d, * Samoa 
Belgium #, d, b, * Italy #, d, b, * Saudi Arabia b 
Belize h Jamaica Senegal a 
Bolivia Japan d, b, * Serbia # 
Bosnia and Herzegovinia # Kazakhstan # Singapore d, h 
Botswana a Kenya a Slovak Republic #, d, * 
Brazil &, b Korea d, b, * Slovenia #, d, * 
Brunei Darussalam Kuwait Solomon Islands 
Bulgaria #, & Kyrgyz Republic South Africa &, a 
Cambodia Laos Spain #, d, b, * 
Canada d, b, * Latvia #, & Sri Lanka 
Channel Islands, Guernsey h Lebanon h St. Kitts and Nevis h 
Channel Islands, Jersey h Liberiaa, h St. Lucia h 
Chile &, * Libya a 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines h 
China &, b Liechtenstein #, h Sudan a 
Colombia Lithuania #, & Swaziland a 
Congo, Democratic 
Republic of a 
Luxembourg #, d, h, * Sweden #, d, b, * 
Costa Rica h Macedonia # Switzerland #, d, b, * 
Cote d'Ivoire a Malawi a Taiwan d 
Croatia # Malaysia& Tanzania a 
Cyprus #, d, h Malta #, d, h Thailand & 
Czech Republic #, d, * Mauritius a, h Trinidad and Tobago 
Denmark #, d, * Mexico &, b, * Turkey #, &, b, * 
Dominica h Moldova # Uganda a 
Dominican Republic Morocco a Ukraine #, & 
Ecuador Mozambique a United Kingdom #, d, b, * 
Egypt a Namibia a United States d , b, * 
El Salvador Netherlands #, d, b, * Uruguay 
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Estonia #, d, &, * Mozambique a Uzbekistan 
Fiji Namibia a Venezuela & 
Finland #, d, * Netherlands #, d, b, * Vietnam 
France #, d, b, * Netherlands Antilles h Zambia a 
Gabon a New Caledonia Zimbabwe a 
Georgia# New Zealand d, * Uruguay 
Germany #, d, b, * Nicaragua Uzbekistan 
Ghana a Nigeria a Venezuela & 
Gibraltar h Norway #, d, * Vietnam 
Greece #, d, * Oman Zambia a 
Grenada h Pakistan & Zimbabwe a 
Guatemala Panama h Venezuela & 
Guyana Papua New Guinea  
**Note: # represents European countries; d represents developed countries; & 
represents emerging market countries; a represents African countries; h represents tax 







Appendix IV: Tables of All Results 
A.IV.1 Neighboring Countries’ Corporate TSR Changes (Two-year Lag) (Table 3.5.1, Section 1) 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
N_%increase_2 -0.048 -0.007 -0.048 -0.007 -0.048 -0.007 -0.046 -0.009 -0.046 -0.009 -0.046 -0.009 
 
(0.073) (0.028) (0.088) (0.025) (0.078) (0.030) (0.068) (0.030) (0.081) (0.026) (0.072) (0.032) 
N_%decrease_2 0.011 -0.006 0.011 -0.006 0.011 -0.006 0.013 -0.004 0.013 -0.004 0.013 -0.004 
 
(0.037) (0.020) (0.042) (0.021) (0.045) (0.020) (0.037) (0.020) (0.041) (0.022) (0.044) (0.021) 
Low_1 -0.104*** 0.028*** -0.104*** 0.028*** -0.104*** 0.028*** -0.107*** 0.031*** -0.107*** 0.031*** -0.107*** 0.031*** 
 
(0.015) (0.008) (0.021) (0.007) (0.021) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008) (0.020) (0.007) (0.021) (0.008) 
K_open_1 -0.011** -0.000 -0.011** -0.000 -0.011 -0.000 -0.012** -0.000 -0.012** -0.000 -0.012 -0.000 
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) 
Trade_1 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001** -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 0.018*** -0.000 0.018*** -0.000 0.018** -0.000 0.019*** 0.000 0.019*** 0.000 0.019*** 0.000 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) 
Growth_1 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Gconsump_1 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 






Legislative_1 -0.002 0.024*** -0.002 0.024** -0.002 0.024*** 0.000 0.025** 0.000 0.025** 0.000 0.025*** 
 
(0.018) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.018) (0.009) (0.018) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.018) (0.010) 
European 0.017 0.010 0.017 0.010 0.017 0.010 0.019 0.009 0.019 0.009 0.019 0.009 
 
(0.019) (0.010) (0.021) (0.008) (0.034) (0.011) (0.020) (0.010) (0.022) (0.009) (0.035) (0.011) 
N_obs 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 
Log-Likelihood -1,459.64 -1,459.64 -1,459.64 -1,459.64 -1,459.64 -1,459.64 -1,459.55 -1,459.55 -1,459.55 -1,459.55 -1,459.55 -1,459.55 
Pseudo R2 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 
      









A.IV.2 Neighboring Countries’ Corporate TSR Changes (One-year and Two-year Lag) (Table 3.5.1, Section 2) 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
N_%increase_1 -0.167* 0.020 -0.167* 0.020 -0.167 0.020 -0.145* 0.028 -0.145* 0.028 -0.145 0.028 
 
(0.091) (0.023) (0.097) (0.021) (0.104) (0.023) (0.078) (0.027) (0.084) (0.025) (0.090) (0.026) 
N_%decrease_1 0.059 -0.056** 0.059 -0.056** 0.059* -0.056** 0.060 -0.058** 0.060 -0.058** 0.060* -0.058** 
 
(0.036) (0.024) (0.038) (0.026) (0.035) (0.024) (0.037) (0.024) (0.039) (0.026) (0.036) (0.023) 
N_%increase_2 -0.056 -0.000 -0.056 -0.000 -0.056 -0.000 -0.052 -0.004 -0.052 -0.004 -0.052 -0.004 
 
(0.071) (0.029) (0.087) (0.025) (0.072) (0.030) (0.067) (0.031) (0.082) (0.026) (0.068) (0.032) 
N_%decrease_2 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.009 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.009 0.004 
 
(0.038) (0.019) (0.043) (0.021) (0.046) (0.018) (0.038) (0.020) (0.044) (0.022) (0.046) (0.018) 
Low_1 -0.102*** 0.027*** -0.102*** 0.027*** -0.102*** 0.027*** -0.105*** 0.030*** -0.105*** 0.030*** -0.105*** 0.030*** 
 
(0.015) (0.008) (0.020) (0.006) (0.021) (0.007) (0.015) (0.008) (0.021) (0.007) (0.022) (0.008) 
K_open_1 -0.011** -0.000 -0.011** -0.000 -0.011 -0.000 -0.013** -0.000 -0.013*** -0.000 -0.013* -0.000 
 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) 
Trade_1 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001** -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001** -0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 0.018*** 0.000 0.018*** 0.000 0.018** 0.000 0.019*** 0.000 0.019*** 0.000 0.019*** 0.000 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) 







(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Gconsump_1 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Legislative_1 -0.003 0.023** -0.003 0.023** -0.003 0.023*** -0.001 0.025** -0.001 0.025** -0.001 0.025** 
 
(0.017) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.018) (0.009) (0.018) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.018) (0.010) 
European 0.018 0.010 0.018 0.010 0.018 0.010 0.019 0.010 0.019 0.010 0.019 0.010 
 
(0.019) (0.009) (0.021) (0.008) (0.034) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.021) (0.009) (0.035) (0.011) 
N_obs 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 
Log-Likelihood -1,450.87 -1,450.87 -1,450.87 -1,450.87 -1,450.87 -1,450.87 -1,450.92 -1,450.92 -1,450.92 -1,450.92 -1,450.92 -1,450.92 
Pseudo R2 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 
      









A.IV.3 Neighboring Countries’ Corporate TSR Changes (One-year Lag, Two-year Lag and Three-year Lag) (Table 3.5.1, Section 3) 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
N_%increase_1 -0.131 0.017 -0.131 0.017 -0.131 0.017 -0.110 0.023 -0.110 0.023 -0.110 0.023 
 
(0.091) (0.023) (0.095) (0.021) (0.103) (0.021) (0.079) (0.027) (0.084) (0.026) (0.090) (0.023) 
N_%decrease_1 0.061* -0.052** 0.061 -0.052* 0.061* -0.052** 0.063* -0.055** 0.063 -0.055** 0.063* -0.055** 
 
(0.037) (0.025) (0.039) (0.028) (0.036) (0.024) (0.038) (0.024) (0.039) (0.027) (0.037) (0.023) 
N_%increase_2 -0.051 0.001 -0.051 0.001 -0.051 0.001 -0.047 -0.001 -0.047 -0.001 -0.047 -0.001 
 
(0.072) (0.029) (0.090) (0.025) (0.074) (0.031) (0.068) (0.031) (0.087) (0.026) (0.070) (0.032) 
N_%decrease_2 0.012 0.002 0.012 0.002 0.012 0.002 0.016 0.005 0.016 0.005 0.016 0.005 
 
(0.040) (0.019) (0.044) (0.021) (0.048) (0.017) (0.040) (0.020) (0.045) (0.022) (0.048) (0.018) 
N_%increase_3 -0.128 0.025 -0.128 0.025 -0.128 0.025 -0.113 0.030 -0.113* 0.030 -0.113 0.030 
 
(0.085) (0.022) (0.078) (0.019) (0.083) (0.022) (0.076) (0.026) (0.068) (0.023) (0.074) (0.025) 
N_%decrease_3 -0.046 -0.013 -0.046 -0.013 -0.046 -0.013 -0.048 -0.012 -0.048 -0.012 -0.048 -0.012 
 
(0.041) (0.021) (0.044) (0.019) (0.044) (0.019) (0.041) (0.021) (0.044) (0.019) (0.043) (0.020) 
Low_1 -0.105*** 0.025*** -0.105*** 0.025*** -0.105*** 0.025*** -0.109*** 0.028*** -0.109*** 0.028*** -0.109*** 0.028*** 
 
(0.015) (0.008) (0.020) (0.006) (0.021) (0.007) (0.015) (0.008) (0.020) (0.007) (0.021) (0.008) 
K_open_1 -0.012** 0.001 -0.012** 0.001 -0.012* 0.001 -0.013** 0.001 -0.013*** 0.001 -0.013* 0.001 
 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) 







(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 0.018*** 0.000 0.018*** 0.000 0.018** 0.000 0.019*** 0.000 0.019*** 0.000 0.019*** 0.000 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) 
Growth_1 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Gconsump_1 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Legislative_1 -0.006 0.020** -0.006 0.020** -0.006 0.020** -0.004 0.022** -0.004 0.022** -0.004 0.022** 
 
(0.018) (0.009) (0.014) (0.010) (0.017) (0.009) (0.018) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.018) (0.010) 
European 0.023 0.011 0.023 0.011 0.023 0.011 0.025 0.011 0.025 0.011 0.025 0.011 
 
(0.020) (0.010) (0.021) (0.008) (0.033) (0.011) (0.020) (0.010) (0.022) (0.009) (0.035) (0.012) 
N_obs 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 
Log-Likelihood -1,414.29 -1,414.29 -1,414.29 -1,414.29 -1,414.29 -1,414.29 -1,414.11 -1,414.11 -1,414.11 -1,414.11 -1,414.11 -1,414.11 
Pseudo R2 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 
      









A.IV.4 Neighboring Countries’ Corporate TSR Changes (Excluding European Countries) (Table 3.5.2, Section 1) 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
N_%increase_1 -0.113 0.020 -0.113 0.020 -0.113 0.020 -0.106 0.029 -0.106* 0.029 -0.106 0.029 
 
(0.092) (0.025) (0.075) (0.023) (0.110) (0.029) (0.080) (0.028) (0.064) (0.027) (0.098) (0.031) 
N_%decrease_1 0.072* -0.066** 0.072* -0.066*** 0.072* -0.066*** 0.077* -0.070*** 0.077* -0.070*** 0.077** -0.070*** 
 
(0.039) (0.027) (0.038) (0.024) (0.038) (0.023) (0.041) (0.026) (0.039) (0.023) (0.039) (0.023) 
Low_1 -0.111*** 0.020** -0.111*** 0.020** -0.111*** 0.020** -0.114*** 0.022** -0.114*** 0.022** -0.114*** 0.022** 
 
(0.017) (0.010) (0.020) (0.008) (0.026) (0.009) (0.017) (0.010) (0.020) (0.009) (0.025) (0.010) 
K_open_1 -0.018*** 0.002 -0.018*** 0.002 -0.018** 0.002 -0.020*** 0.002 -0.020*** 0.002 -0.020** 0.002 
 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) 
Trade_1 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 0.016*** -0.000 0.016*** -0.000 0.016** -0.000 0.017*** -0.000 0.017*** -0.000 0.017** -0.000 
 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) 
Growth_1 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Gconsump_1 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 







(0.021) (0.012) (0.018) (0.013) (0.019) (0.011) (0.022) (0.013) (0.019) (0.013) (0.020) (0.012) 
Africa -0.035* 0.002 -0.035** 0.002 -0.035 0.002 -0.038* 0.003 -0.038** 0.003 -0.038 0.003 
 
(0.020) (0.011) (0.018) (0.010) (0.025) (0.011) (0.021) (0.012) (0.019) (0.011) (0.026) (0.012) 
N_obs 1,749 1,749 1,749 1,749 1,749 1,749 1,749 1,749 1,749 1,749 1,749 1,749 
Log-Likelihood -1,012.20 -1,012.20 -1,012.20 -1,012.20 -1,012.20 -1,012.20 -1,011.44 -1,011.44 -1,011.44 -1,011.44 -1,011.44 -1,011.44 
Pseudo R2 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 
      









A.IV.5 Neighboring Countries’ Corporate TSR Changes (Excluding Tax Haven Countries) (Table 3.5.2, Section 2) 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
N_%increase_1 -0.168* 0.021 -0.168 0.021 -0.168 0.021 -0.143* 0.029 -0.143 0.029 -0.143 0.029 
 
(0.101) (0.028) (0.106) (0.028) (0.122) (0.032) (0.085) (0.032) (0.088) (0.032) (0.105) (0.034) 
N_%decrease_1 0.075* -0.062** 0.075* -0.062** 0.075* -0.062** 0.076* -0.062** 0.076* -0.062** 0.076** -0.062** 
 
(0.038) (0.028) (0.045) (0.030) (0.038) (0.028) (0.040) (0.028) (0.046) (0.029) (0.039) (0.027) 
Low_1 -0.101*** 0.033*** -0.101*** 0.033*** -0.101*** 0.033*** -0.103*** 0.036*** -0.103*** 0.036*** -0.103*** 0.036*** 
 
(0.016) (0.009) (0.022) (0.008) (0.023) (0.009) (0.016) (0.010) (0.022) (0.008) (0.023) (0.009) 
K_open_1 -0.011** -0.000 -0.011** -0.000 -0.011 -0.000 -0.012** -0.000 -0.012** -0.000 -0.012 -0.000 
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) 
Trade_1 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 0.011** 0.000 0.011** 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.012** -0.000 0.012** -0.000 0.012 -0.000 
 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) 
Growth_1 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Gconsump_1 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 







(0.018) (0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.019) (0.010) (0.019) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.019) (0.011) 
European 0.042* 0.012 0.042 0.012 0.042 0.012 0.043* 0.012 0.043* 0.012 0.043 0.012 
 
(0.022) (0.011) (0.026) (0.009) (0.039) (0.011) (0.022) (0.012) (0.026) (0.010) (0.040) (0.012) 
N_obs 2,228 2,228 2,228 2,228 2,228 2,228 2,228 2,228 2,228 2,228 2,228 2,228 
Log-Likelihood -1,369.83 -1,369.83 -1,369.83 -1,369.83 -1,369.83 -1,369.83 -1,369.95 -1,369.95 -1,369.95 -1,369.95 -1,369.95 -1,369.95 
Pseudo R2 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 
      









A.IV.6 Neighboring Countries’ Corporate TSR Changes (Excluding European and Tax Haven Countries) (Table 3.5.2, Section 3) 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
N_%increase_1 -0.136 0.023 -0.136 0.023 -0.136 0.023 -0.124 0.032 -0.124* 0.032 -0.124 0.032 
 
(0.104) (0.031) (0.087) (0.029) (0.128) (0.035) (0.087) (0.033) (0.071) (0.032) (0.110) (0.036) 
N_%decrease_1 0.076* -0.066** 0.076* -0.066** 0.076** -0.066** 0.078* -0.067** 0.078 -0.067** 0.078** -0.067** 
 
(0.042) (0.031) (0.045) (0.028) (0.038) (0.027) (0.044) (0.030) (0.048) (0.027) (0.039) (0.026) 
Low_1 -0.107*** 0.027** -0.107*** 0.027** -0.107*** 0.027** -0.110*** 0.027** -0.110*** 0.027** -0.110*** 0.027** 
 
(0.018) (0.012) (0.022) (0.011) (0.029) (0.011) (0.018) (0.012) (0.021) (0.011) (0.028) (0.012) 
K_open_1 -0.018*** 0.003 -0.018*** 0.003 -0.018* 0.003 -0.020*** 0.003 -0.020*** 0.003 -0.020* 0.003 
 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) 
Trade_1 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 0.009 -0.000 0.009* -0.000 0.009 -0.000 0.011* -0.000 0.011** -0.000 0.011 -0.000 
 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) 
Growth_1 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Gconsump_1 0.002 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 







(0.022) (0.014) (0.020) (0.015) (0.021) (0.013) (0.023) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.021) (0.014) 
Africa -0.044** 0.004 -0.044*** 0.004 -0.044 0.004 -0.047** 0.005 -0.047*** 0.005 -0.047 0.005 
 
(0.021) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.028) (0.013) (0.022) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.030) (0.014) 
N_obs 1,563 1,563 1,563 1,563 1,563 1,563 1,563 1,563 1,563 1,563 1,563 1,563 
Log-Likelihood -919.36 -919.36 -919.36 -919.36 -919.36 -919.36 -918.79 -918.79 -918.79 -918.79 -918.79 -918.79 
Pseudo R2 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 
      








A.IV.7 Corporate TSR Interactions between Developed and Developing Countries (Contemporaneously), Table 3.5.3 (a), Section 1, Developing 
Countries as Dependent Variables 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
Developed_increase 0.010 0.005 0.010 0.005* 0.010 0.005 0.010 0.005* 0.010 0.005* 0.010 0.005 
 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) 
Developed_decrease 0.005 0.001 0.005* 0.001 0.005* 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.005* 0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
Low_1 -0.122*** 0.017 -0.122*** 0.017 -0.122*** 0.017 -0.129*** 0.021 -0.129*** 0.021* -0.129*** 0.021* 
 
(0.017) (0.013) (0.019) (0.012) (0.020) (0.012) (0.017) (0.013) (0.019) (0.012) (0.019) (0.012) 
K_open_1 -0.018** 0.003 -0.018*** 0.003 -0.018 0.003 -0.020*** 0.003 -0.020*** 0.003 -0.020* 0.003 
 
(0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.011) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) 
Trade_1 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) 
Growth_1 0.001 -0.001** 0.001 -0.001** 0.001 -0.001* 0.002 -0.002* 0.002 -0.002** 0.002 -0.002* 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Gconsump_1 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Legislative_1 0.034 0.037** 0.034* 0.037** 0.034 0.037*** 0.036 0.040** 0.036* 0.040** 0.036 0.040*** 
 






European 0.107* 0.009 0.107 0.009 0.107 0.009 0.112* 0.008 0.112* 0.008 0.112* 0.008 
 
(0.062) (0.026) (0.068) (0.032) (0.069) (0.017) (0.059) (0.026) (0.065) (0.033) (0.067) (0.017) 
Africa -0.043** 0.001 -0.043*** 0.001 -0.043* 0.001 -0.050*** 0.003 -0.050*** 0.003 -0.050* 0.003 
 
(0.018) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.025) (0.012) (0.019) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011) (0.026) (0.012) 
N_obs 1,255 1,255 1,255 1,255 1,255 1,255 1,255 1,255 1,255 1,255 1,255 1,255 
Log-Likelihood -643.06 -643.06 -643.06 -643.06 -643.06 -643.06 -641.66 -641.66 -641.66 -641.66 -641.66 -641.66 
Pseudo R2 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 
      









A.IV.8 Corporate TSR Interactions between Developed and Developing Countries (One-year Lag), Table 3.5.3 (a), Section 2, Developing 
Countries as Dependent Variables 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
Developed_increase_1 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) 
Developed_decrease_1 0.009*** -0.000 0.009*** -0.000 0.009*** -0.000 0.009*** -0.000 0.009*** -0.000 0.009*** -0.000 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Low_1 -0.122*** 0.018 -0.122*** 0.018 -0.122*** 0.018 -0.130*** 0.021* -0.130*** 0.021* -0.130*** 0.021* 
 
(0.018) (0.013) (0.019) (0.012) (0.022) (0.012) (0.018) (0.013) (0.019) (0.012) (0.021) (0.012) 
K_open_1 -0.019*** 0.003 -0.019*** 0.003 -0.019* 0.003 -0.022*** 0.003 -0.022*** 0.003 -0.022* 0.003 
 
(0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004) 
Trade_1 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 
 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) 
Growth_1 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Gconsump_1 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 






Legislative_1 0.039 0.042*** 0.039** 0.042*** 0.039* 0.042*** 0.042* 0.045*** 0.042** 0.045*** 0.042* 0.045*** 
 
(0.024) (0.016) (0.019) (0.014) (0.022) (0.015) (0.025) (0.017) (0.019) (0.015) (0.023) (0.015) 
European 0.095 0.000 0.095 0.000 0.095 0.000 0.098* -0.001 0.098* -0.001 0.098 -0.001 
 
(0.061) (0.022) (0.060) (0.020) (0.072) (0.015) (0.059) (0.023) (0.057) (0.021) (0.071) (0.016) 
Africa -0.045** 0.005 -0.045*** 0.005 -0.045* 0.005 -0.053*** 0.006 -0.053*** 0.006 -0.053** 0.006 
 
(0.018) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) (0.024) (0.012) (0.019) (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.025) (0.012) 
N_obs 1,205 1,205 1,205 1,205 1,205 1,205 1,205 1,205 1,205 1,205 1,205 1,205 
Log-Likelihood -607.52 -607.52 -607.52 -607.52 -607.52 -607.52 -606.40 -606.40 -606.40 -606.40 -606.40 -606.40 
Pseudo R2 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073 
      








 A.IV.9 Corporate TSR Interactions between Developed and Developing Countries (Contemporaneously), Table 3.5.3 (a), Section 1, 
Developed Countries as Dependent Variables 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
Developing_increase -0.009 -0.000 -0.009 -0.000 -0.009 -0.000 -0.010 0.000 -0.010 0.000 -0.010 0.000 
 
(0.009) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) 
Developing_decrease 0.004 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
Low_1 -0.048 0.029*** -0.048* 0.029** -0.048 0.029*** -0.048 0.035*** -0.048* 0.035*** -0.048 0.035*** 
 
(0.030) (0.011) (0.028) (0.011) (0.037) (0.009) (0.030) (0.012) (0.028) (0.012) (0.037) (0.009) 
K_open_1 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.005 
 
(0.014) (0.004) (0.014) (0.003) (0.016) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.015) (0.004) 
Trade_1 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 0.021* -0.003 0.021* -0.003 0.021 -0.003* 0.022* -0.004 0.022** -0.004 0.022 -0.004 
 
(0.011) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.019) (0.002) (0.011) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004) (0.019) (0.003) 
Growth_1 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.006) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) 
Gconsump_1 0.013*** 0.001 0.013*** 0.001 0.013*** 0.001 0.013*** 0.001 0.013*** 0.001 0.013*** 0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) 
Legislative_1 -0.057* 0.010 -0.057** 0.010 -0.057** 0.010 -0.056* 0.013 -0.056** 0.013 -0.056** 0.013 
 






European -0.100** -0.008 -0.100*** -0.008 -0.100* -0.008 -0.102** -0.008 -0.102*** -0.008 -0.102* -0.008 
 
(0.040) (0.010) (0.037) (0.009) (0.055) (0.008) (0.040) (0.012) (0.038) (0.011) (0.056) (0.009) 
N_obs 794 794 794 794 794 794 794 794 794 794 794 794 
Log-Likelihood -496.76 -496.76 -496.76 -496.76 -496.76 -496.76 -497.66 -497.66 -497.66 -497.66 -497.66 -497.66 
Pseudo R2 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 
      









A.IV.10 Corporate TSR Interactions between Developed and Developing Countries (One-year Lag), Table 3.5.3 (a), Section 2, Developed 
Countries as Dependent Variables 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
Developing_increase_1 -0.007 0.002 -0.007 0.002 -0.007 0.002 -0.007 0.003 -0.007 0.003 -0.007 0.003 
 
(0.009) (0.003) (0.010) (0.002) (0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) 
Developing_decrease_1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
Low_1 -0.044 0.027** -0.044 0.027** -0.044 0.027*** -0.045 0.033*** -0.045 0.033*** -0.045 0.033*** 
 
(0.031) (0.011) (0.030) (0.011) (0.037) (0.008) (0.031) (0.012) (0.030) (0.012) (0.037) (0.009) 
K_open_1 0.004 -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.015) (0.004) (0.015) (0.003) (0.017) (0.004) (0.015) (0.004) (0.015) (0.004) (0.017) (0.005) 
Trade_1 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 0.020* -0.004 0.020* -0.004 0.020 -0.004** 0.021* -0.004 0.021* -0.004 0.021 -0.004* 
 
(0.012) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004) (0.020) (0.002) (0.012) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004) (0.020) (0.003) 
Growth_1 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 
 
(0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) 
Gconsump_1 0.012*** 0.001 0.012*** 0.001 0.012*** 0.001 0.012*** 0.001 0.012*** 0.001 0.012** 0.001* 
 






Legislative_1 -0.064** 0.012 -0.064** 0.012 -0.064** 0.012 -0.063** 0.013 -0.063** 0.013 -0.063** 0.013 
 
(0.030) (0.009) (0.027) (0.011) (0.029) (0.011) (0.031) (0.011) (0.028) (0.013) (0.030) (0.012) 
European -0.100** -0.007 -0.100*** -0.007 -0.100* -0.007 -0.102** -0.008 -0.102*** -0.008 -0.102* -0.008 
 
(0.041) (0.010) (0.039) (0.010) (0.055) (0.008) (0.041) (0.012) (0.039) (0.012) (0.056) (0.009) 
N_obs 770 770 770 770 770 770 770 770 770 770 770 770 
Log-Likelihood -482.05 -482.05 -482.05 -482.05 -482.05 -482.05 -482.68 -482.68 -482.68 -482.68 -482.68 -482.68 
Pseudo R2 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 
      








A.IV.11 Corporate TSR Interactions between Developed and Emerging Market Countries (Contemporaneously), Table 3.5.3 (b), Section 1, 
Emerging Market Countries as Dependent Variables 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
Developed_increase 0.017 -0.005 0.017* -0.005 0.017 -0.005 0.017 -0.004 0.017* -0.004 0.017 -0.004 
 
(0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.013) (0.009) 
Developed_decrease 0.008 -0.003 0.008* -0.003 0.008 -0.003 0.008 -0.004 0.008* -0.004 0.008 -0.004 
 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) 
Low_1 -0.170*** 0.030 -0.170*** 0.030 -0.170*** 0.030 -0.168*** 0.032 -0.168*** 0.032 -0.168*** 0.032 
 
(0.036) (0.019) (0.039) (0.020) (0.035) (0.024) (0.036) (0.021) (0.040) (0.022) (0.036) (0.026) 
K_open_1 -0.004 0.003 -0.004 0.003 -0.004 0.003 -0.006 0.004 -0.006 0.004 -0.006 0.004 
 
(0.012) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.012) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.014) (0.009) 
Trade_1 0.001 -0.001* 0.001 -0.001* 0.001 -0.001** 0.001 -0.001* 0.001 -0.001* 0.001 -0.001** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 0.000 0.015* 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.015* -0.000 0.016* -0.000 0.016 -0.000 0.016* 
 
(0.018) (0.009) (0.018) (0.011) (0.020) (0.009) (0.017) (0.010) (0.019) (0.012) (0.020) (0.010) 
Growth_1 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) 
Gconsump_1 0.003 -0.004* 0.003 -0.004** 0.003 -0.004** 0.003 -0.004* 0.003 -0.004** 0.003 -0.004* 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
Legislative_1 0.002 0.014 0.002 0.014 0.002 0.014 0.007 0.013 0.007 0.013 0.007 0.013 
 






European 0.081 0.064* 0.081* 0.064* 0.081* 0.064* 0.083* 0.068* 0.083** 0.068* 0.083 0.068* 
 
(0.050) (0.036) (0.042) (0.037) (0.048) (0.032) (0.050) (0.037) (0.042) (0.037) (0.053) (0.035) 
N_obs 575 575 575 575 575 575 575 575 575 575 575 575 
Log-Likelihood -375.44 -375.44 -375.44 -375.44 -375.44 -375.44 -375.88 -375.88 -375.88 -375.88 -375.88 -375.88 
Pseudo R2 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 
      








A.IV.12 Corporate TSR Interactions between Developed and Emerging Market Countries (One-year Lag), Table 3.5.3 (b), Section 2, Emerging 
Market Countries as Dependent Variables 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
Developed_increase_1 0.016 -0.004 0.016 -0.004 0.016* -0.004 0.020* -0.006 0.020* -0.006 0.020* -0.006 
 
(0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.004) (0.010) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006) 
Developed_decrease_1 -0.004 0.003 -0.004 0.003* -0.004 0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.003 
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
Low_1 -0.187*** 0.032* -0.187*** 0.032 -0.187*** 0.032 -0.186*** 0.037* -0.186*** 0.037 -0.186*** 0.037 
 
(0.037) (0.019) (0.040) (0.020) (0.036) (0.024) (0.036) (0.020) (0.040) (0.023) (0.037) (0.026) 
K_open_1 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.005 
 
(0.012) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.013) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.014) (0.009) 
Trade_1 0.001 -0.001** 0.001 -0.001** 0.001 -0.001*** 0.001 -0.001** 0.001 -0.001** 0.001 -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 0.002 0.012 0.002 0.012 0.002 0.012 0.003 0.013 0.003 0.013 0.003 0.013 
 
(0.017) (0.009) (0.017) (0.010) (0.019) (0.010) (0.018) (0.010) (0.017) (0.012) (0.020) (0.011) 
Growth_1 0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
Gconsump_1 0.004 -0.004* 0.004 -0.004** 0.004 -0.004** 0.003 -0.004* 0.003 -0.004** 0.003 -0.004** 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
Legislative_1 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.008 0.003 0.008 0.003 0.008 0.003 
 






European 0.069 0.069** 0.069 0.069** 0.069 0.069** 0.073 0.069* 0.073* 0.069* 0.073 0.069** 
 
(0.049) (0.035) (0.043) (0.035) (0.045) (0.031) (0.050) (0.036) (0.044) (0.036) (0.051) (0.034) 
N_obs 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 
Log-Likelihood -359.87 -359.87 -359.87 -359.87 -359.87 -359.87 -360.20 -360.20 -360.20 -360.20 -360.20 -360.20 
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 
      








A.IV.13 Corporate TSR Interactions between Developed and Emerging Market Countries (Contemporaneously), Table 3.5.3 (b), Section 1, 
Developed Countries as Dependent Variables 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
Emg_increase -0.030** -0.007 -0.030** -0.007 -0.030*** -0.007* -0.030** -0.009* -0.030** -0.009* -0.030** -0.009* 
 
(0.014) (0.004) (0.013) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.014) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) 
Emg_decrease 0.018** -0.001 0.018* -0.001 0.018** -0.001 0.017* 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.017* 0.000 
 
(0.009) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.009) (0.002) 
Low_1 -0.050* 0.027*** -0.050* 0.027*** -0.050 0.027*** -0.050* 0.032*** -0.050* 0.032*** -0.050 0.032*** 
 
(0.030) (0.010) (0.028) (0.010) (0.037) (0.008) (0.030) (0.011) (0.029) (0.011) (0.036) (0.008) 
K_open_1 0.002 -0.004 0.002 -0.004 0.002 -0.004 0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.005 
 
(0.014) (0.004) (0.014) (0.003) (0.016) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.013) (0.004) (0.016) (0.004) 
Trade_1 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 0.021* -0.003 0.021* -0.003 0.021 -0.003 0.021* -0.003 0.021** -0.003 0.021 -0.003 
 
(0.011) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.019) (0.002) (0.011) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004) (0.020) (0.003) 
Growth_1 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 
 
(0.006) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) 
Gconsump_1 0.013*** 0.001 0.013*** 0.001 0.013*** 0.001* 0.013*** 0.001 0.013*** 0.001 0.013*** 0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) 
Legislative_1 -0.056* 0.010 -0.056** 0.010 -0.056** 0.010 -0.054* 0.012 -0.054** 0.012 -0.054* 0.012 
 






European -0.101** -0.007 -0.101*** -0.007 -0.101* -0.007 -0.103*** -0.007 -0.103*** -0.007 -0.103* -0.007 
 
(0.040) (0.010) (0.037) (0.009) (0.056) (0.007) (0.040) (0.011) (0.037) (0.010) (0.056) (0.009) 
N_obs 794 794 794 794 794 794 794 794 794 794 794 794 
Log-Likelihood -493.37 -493.37 -493.37 -493.37 -493.37 -493.37 -493.97 -493.97 -493.97 -493.97 -493.97 -493.97 
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 
      







A.IV.14 Corporate TSR Interactions between Developed and Emerging Market Countries (One-year Lag), Table 3.5.3 (b), Section 2, Developed 
Countries as Dependent Variables 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
Emg_increase_1 -0.010 0.004 -0.010 0.004 -0.010 0.004 -0.009 0.004 -0.009 0.004 -0.009 0.004 
 
(0.015) (0.003) (0.015) (0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.015) (0.004) (0.016) (0.004) (0.012) (0.004) 
Emg_decrease_1 0.008 -0.003 0.008 -0.003 0.008 -0.003 0.008 -0.004 0.008 -0.004 0.008 -0.004 
 
(0.009) (0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.009) (0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) 
Low_1 -0.046 0.027** -0.046 0.027** -0.046 0.027*** -0.047 0.032*** -0.047 0.032*** -0.047 0.032*** 
 
(0.031) (0.011) (0.030) (0.011) (0.038) (0.008) (0.031) (0.012) (0.030) (0.012) (0.037) (0.009) 
K_open_1 0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 
 
(0.015) (0.003) (0.015) (0.003) (0.017) (0.004) (0.015) (0.004) (0.015) (0.004) (0.017) (0.004) 
Trade_1 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 0.021* -0.004 0.021* -0.004 0.021 -0.004** 0.021* -0.004 0.021* -0.004 0.021 -0.004* 
 
(0.012) (0.002) (0.011) (0.003) (0.020) (0.002) (0.012) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004) (0.020) (0.003) 
Growth_1 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.006) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) 
Gconsump_1 0.012*** 0.001 0.012*** 0.001 0.012*** 0.001* 0.012*** 0.001 0.012*** 0.001 0.012** 0.001* 
 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) 







(0.031) (0.009) (0.027) (0.010) (0.029) (0.010) (0.031) (0.010) (0.028) (0.012) (0.030) (0.012) 
European -0.099** -0.006 -0.099*** -0.006 -0.099* -0.006 -0.101** -0.007 -0.101*** -0.007 -0.101* -0.007 
 
(0.041) (0.010) (0.037) (0.009) (0.055) (0.007) (0.041) (0.012) (0.038) (0.011) (0.056) (0.009) 
N_obs 770 770 770 770 770 770 770 770 770 770 770 770 
Log-Likelihood -481.72 -481.72 -481.72 -481.72 -481.72 -481.72 -482.56 -482.56 -482.56 -482.56 -482.56 -482.56 
Pseudo R2 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 
      









A.IV.15 Corporate TSR Interactions between Big and Small Countries (Contemporaneously), Table 3.5.4 (a), Section 1, Big Countries as 
Dependent Variables 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
Small_increase 0.005 -0.004 0.005 -0.004 0.005 -0.004 0.005 -0.004 0.005 -0.004 0.005 -0.004 
 
(0.008) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003) (0.009) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) 
Small_decrease 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
Low_1 -0.055 0.050** -0.055* 0.050* -0.055 0.050** -0.056 0.054** -0.056* 0.054** -0.056 0.054** 
 
(0.039) (0.023) (0.032) (0.027) (0.058) (0.023) (0.039) (0.024) (0.031) (0.027) (0.055) (0.023) 
K_open_1 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 
 
(0.021) (0.011) (0.020) (0.010) (0.027) (0.011) (0.020) (0.011) (0.019) (0.010) (0.027) (0.011) 
Trade_1 0.001 -0.001** 0.001 -0.001* 0.001 -0.001*** 0.001 -0.001** 0.001 -0.001* 0.001 -0.001*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 0.003 -0.014 0.003 -0.014 0.003 -0.014 0.006 -0.017 0.006 -0.017 0.006 -0.017 
 
(0.022) (0.013) (0.022) (0.014) (0.036) (0.012) (0.023) (0.014) (0.023) (0.014) (0.038) (0.012) 
Growth_1 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 
 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003) 
Gconsump_1 0.005 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 
 






Legislative_1 -0.057 0.016 -0.057 0.016 -0.057 0.016 -0.058 0.017 -0.058 0.017 -0.058 0.017 
 
(0.039) (0.019) (0.040) (0.019) (0.038) (0.022) (0.038) (0.021) (0.040) (0.021) (0.038) (0.025) 
European -0.046 0.015 -0.046 0.015 -0.046 0.015 -0.051 0.017 -0.051 0.017 -0.051 0.017 
 
(0.047) (0.020) (0.044) (0.014) (0.080) (0.016) (0.045) (0.021) (0.042) (0.014) (0.076) (0.017) 
Emerging 0.027 0.030 0.027 0.030 0.027 0.030 0.029 0.038 0.029 0.038 0.029 0.038 
 
(0.069) (0.035) (0.071) (0.041) (0.091) (0.026) (0.068) (0.039) (0.069) (0.045) (0.090) (0.027) 
N_obs 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 
Log-Likelihood -386.97 -386.97 -386.97 -386.97 -386.97 -386.97 -387.01 -387.01 -387.01 -387.01 -387.01 -387.01 
Pseudo R2 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 
      









A.IV.16  Corporate TSR Interactions between Big and Small Countries (One-year Lag), Table 3.5.4 (a), Section 2, Big Countries as Dependent 
Variables 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
Small_increase_1 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.009* 0.005 0.009* 0.005 0.009 
 
(0.009) (0.004) (0.011) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) 
Small_decrease_1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
Low_1 -0.059 0.036* -0.059* 0.036 -0.059 0.036** -0.061 0.040* -0.061* 0.040* -0.061 0.040** 
 
(0.040) (0.021) (0.032) (0.023) (0.059) (0.018) (0.039) (0.022) (0.031) (0.024) (0.057) (0.019) 
K_open_1 0.010 0.007 0.010 0.007 0.010 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
 
(0.023) (0.011) (0.022) (0.012) (0.029) (0.010) (0.022) (0.011) (0.021) (0.012) (0.028) (0.010) 
Trade_1 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001* 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 -0.000 -0.006 -0.000 -0.006 -0.000 -0.006 0.003 -0.009 0.003 -0.009 0.003 -0.009 
 
(0.023) (0.012) (0.022) (0.013) (0.040) (0.012) (0.025) (0.013) (0.023) (0.013) (0.042) (0.012) 
Growth_1 0.004 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 
 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.009) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.009) (0.003) 
Gconsump_1 0.005 -0.002 0.005 -0.002 0.005 -0.002 0.005 -0.002 0.005 -0.002 0.005 -0.002 
 






Legislative_1 -0.065 0.016 -0.065 0.016 -0.065* 0.016 -0.064 0.017 -0.064 0.017 -0.064 0.017 
 
(0.040) (0.019) (0.040) (0.018) (0.039) (0.022) (0.039) (0.020) (0.040) (0.020) (0.039) (0.025) 
European -0.049 0.019 -0.049 0.019 -0.049 0.019 -0.054 0.021 -0.054 0.021 -0.054 0.021 
 
(0.048) (0.020) (0.046) (0.015) (0.083) (0.015) (0.046) (0.021) (0.044) (0.015) (0.079) (0.016) 
Emerging 0.031 0.074 0.031 0.074 0.031 0.074** 0.031 0.086* 0.031 0.086 0.031 0.086*** 
 
(0.075) (0.049) (0.077) (0.064) (0.103) (0.029) (0.073) (0.051) (0.074) (0.067) (0.101) (0.030) 
N_obs 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 
Log-Likelihood -371.36 -371.36 -371.36 -371.36 -371.36 -371.36 -370.72 -370.72 -370.72 -370.72 -370.72 -370.72 
Pseudo R2 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 
      









A.IV.17 Corporate TSR Interactions between Big and Small Countries (Contemporaneously), Table 3.5.4 (a), Section 1, Small Countries as 
Dependent Variables 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
Big_increase 0.017*** -0.003 0.017*** -0.003 0.017*** -0.003 0.017*** -0.003 0.017*** -0.003 0.017*** -0.003 
 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) 
Big_decrease 0.010** 0.001 0.010 0.001 0.010** 0.001 0.010** 0.002 0.010 0.002 0.010** 0.002 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
Low_1 -0.117*** 0.027*** -0.117*** 0.027*** -0.117*** 0.027*** -0.122*** 0.030*** -0.122*** 0.030*** -0.122*** 0.030*** 
 
(0.015) (0.009) (0.018) (0.008) (0.018) (0.009) (0.015) (0.010) (0.018) (0.008) (0.018) (0.009) 
K_open_1 -0.008 0.001 -0.008 0.001 -0.008 0.001 -0.009* 0.001 -0.009* 0.001 -0.009 0.001 
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003) 
Trade_1 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001** -0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 0.013*** -0.001 0.013*** -0.001 0.013* -0.001 0.014*** -0.001 0.014*** -0.001 0.014* -0.001 
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) 
Growth_1 0.000 -0.001** 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 -0.002** 0.000 -0.002* 0.000 -0.002* 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Gconsump_1 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 






Legislative_1 0.016 0.028*** 0.016 0.028** 0.016 0.028*** 0.019 0.029*** 0.019 0.029** 0.019 0.029*** 
 
(0.018) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.018) (0.009) (0.019) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.019) (0.009) 
European 0.041* 0.005 0.041* 0.005 0.041 0.005 0.048** 0.003 0.048** 0.003 0.048 0.003 
 
(0.023) (0.010) (0.022) (0.009) (0.038) (0.009) (0.023) (0.011) (0.022) (0.010) (0.039) (0.009) 
Africa -0.026 0.003 -0.026 0.003 -0.026 0.003 -0.029 0.004 -0.029* 0.004 -0.029 0.004 
 
(0.018) (0.010) (0.016) (0.009) (0.026) (0.010) (0.019) (0.011) (0.017) (0.010) (0.026) (0.011) 
N_obs 2,071 2,071 2,071 2,071 2,071 2,071 2,071 2,071 2,071 2,071 2,071 2,071 
Log-Likelihood -1,151.66 -1,151.66 -1,151.66 -1,151.66 -1,151.66 -1,151.66 -1,150.98 -1,150.98 -1,150.98 -1,150.98 -1,150.98 -1,150.98 
Pseudo R2 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 
      









A.IV.18 Corporate TSR Interactions between Big and Small Countries (One-year Lag), Table 3.5.4 (a), Section 2, Small Countries as Dependent 
Variables 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
Big_increase_1 -0.008 0.001 -0.008 0.001 -0.008 0.001 -0.008 0.001 -0.008 0.001 -0.008 0.001 
 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) 
Big_decrease_1 0.005 -0.002 0.005 -0.002 0.005 -0.002 0.005 -0.003 0.005 -0.003 0.005 -0.003 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
Low_1 -0.121*** 0.029*** -0.121*** 0.029*** -0.121*** 0.029*** -0.126*** 0.033*** -0.126*** 0.033*** -0.126*** 0.033*** 
 
(0.015) (0.009) (0.019) (0.008) (0.019) (0.009) (0.015) (0.010) (0.019) (0.009) (0.019) (0.009) 
K_open_1 -0.009 0.001 -0.009* 0.001 -0.009 0.001 -0.011* 0.001 -0.011** 0.001 -0.011 0.001 
 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003) 
Trade_1 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001** -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001** -0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 0.012** 0.000 0.012*** 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.012** 0.000 0.012*** 0.000 0.012 0.000 
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) 
Growth_1 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Gconsump_1 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 






Legislative_1 0.018 0.027*** 0.018 0.027*** 0.018 0.027*** 0.021 0.028** 0.021 0.028** 0.021 0.028*** 
 
(0.019) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.019) (0.009) (0.020) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.019) (0.010) 
European 0.038* 0.002 0.038* 0.002 0.038 0.002 0.044* 0.001 0.044* 0.001 0.044 0.001 
 
(0.023) (0.009) (0.023) (0.008) (0.038) (0.009) (0.024) (0.010) (0.023) (0.009) (0.039) (0.010) 
Africa -0.028 0.004 -0.028* 0.004 -0.028 0.004 -0.032 0.005 -0.032* 0.005 -0.032 0.005 
 
(0.019) (0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.025) (0.010) (0.019) (0.011) (0.017) (0.011) (0.026) (0.011) 
N_obs 1,997 1,997 1,997 1,997 1,997 1,997 1,997 1,997 1,997 1,997 1,997 1,997 
Log-Likelihood -1,104.20 -1,104.20 -1,104.20 -1,104.20 -1,104.20 -1,104.20 -1,103.55 -1,103.55 -1,103.55 -1,103.55 -1,103.55 -1,103.55 
Pseudo R2 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 
      









A.IV.19 Corporate TSR Interactions between Big Countries and Small European Countries (Contemporaneously), Table 3.5.4 (b), Section 1, Big 
Countries as Dependent Variables 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
EUSmall_increase -0.002 -0.011 -0.002 -0.011 -0.002 -0.011 -0.001 -0.011 -0.001 -0.011 -0.001 -0.011 
 
(0.020) (0.007) (0.017) (0.008) (0.025) (0.009) (0.019) (0.008) (0.016) (0.009) (0.024) (0.010) 
EUSmall_decrease 0.010 -0.004 0.010 -0.004 0.010* -0.004 0.010 -0.004 0.010 -0.004 0.010* -0.004 
 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Low_1 -0.055 0.050** -0.055* 0.050* -0.055 0.050** -0.056 0.054** -0.056* 0.054* -0.056 0.054** 
 
(0.039) (0.023) (0.032) (0.028) (0.058) (0.022) (0.038) (0.024) (0.031) (0.028) (0.056) (0.022) 
K_open_1 -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.004 -0.003 0.005 -0.003 0.005 -0.003 0.005 
 
(0.021) (0.011) (0.021) (0.011) (0.027) (0.011) (0.020) (0.011) (0.020) (0.011) (0.026) (0.011) 
Trade_1 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001** 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 -0.005 -0.008 -0.005 -0.008 -0.005 -0.008 -0.003 -0.010 -0.003 -0.010 -0.003 -0.010 
 
(0.022) (0.014) (0.022) (0.015) (0.035) (0.012) (0.024) (0.014) (0.023) (0.014) (0.037) (0.012) 
Growth_1 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 
 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003) 
Gconsump_1 0.005 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 
 






Legislative_1 -0.058 0.016 -0.058 0.016 -0.058 0.016 -0.058 0.016 -0.058 0.016 -0.058 0.016 
 
(0.038) (0.019) (0.040) (0.018) (0.036) (0.023) (0.038) (0.021) (0.040) (0.020) (0.037) (0.026) 
European -0.049 0.016 -0.049 0.016 -0.049 0.016 -0.054 0.018 -0.054 0.018 -0.054 0.018 
 
(0.047) (0.020) (0.044) (0.015) (0.080) (0.017) (0.045) (0.021) (0.042) (0.015) (0.077) (0.018) 
Emerging 0.008 0.054 0.008 0.054 0.008 0.054* 0.011 0.061 0.011 0.061 0.011 0.061* 
 
(0.067) (0.047) (0.070) (0.055) (0.088) (0.032) (0.067) (0.047) (0.069) (0.054) (0.088) (0.032) 
N_obs 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 
Log-Likelihood -385.98 -385.98 -385.98 -385.98 -385.98 -385.98 -386.06 -386.06 -386.06 -386.06 -386.06 -386.06 
Pseudo R2 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 
      









A.IV.20 Corporate TSR Interactions between Big Countries and Small European Countries (One-year Lag), Table 3.5.4 (b), Section 2, Big 
Countries as Dependent Variables 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
EUSmall_increase_1 -0.040** 0.015* -0.040** 0.015 -0.040 0.015** -0.039** 0.018* -0.039** 0.018 -0.039 0.018** 
 
(0.020) (0.009) (0.017) (0.011) (0.025) (0.007) (0.019) (0.009) (0.017) (0.012) (0.024) (0.007) 
EUSmall_decrease_1 -0.011 -0.000 -0.011 -0.000 -0.011 -0.000 -0.010 -0.001 -0.010 -0.001 -0.010 -0.001 
 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) 
Low_1 -0.053 0.035* -0.053 0.035 -0.053 0.035* -0.054 0.037* -0.054* 0.037 -0.054 0.037* 
 
(0.040) (0.021) (0.033) (0.022) (0.058) (0.018) (0.039) (0.022) (0.032) (0.023) (0.057) (0.019) 
K_open_1 0.012 0.003 0.012 0.003 0.012 0.003 0.010 0.005 0.010 0.005 0.010 0.005 
 
(0.023) (0.011) (0.022) (0.011) (0.029) (0.009) (0.022) (0.011) (0.021) (0.011) (0.029) (0.009) 
Trade_1 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 -0.001** 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 0.001 -0.008 0.001 -0.008 0.001 -0.008 0.002 -0.011 0.002 -0.011 0.002 -0.011 
 
(0.023) (0.012) (0.023) (0.012) (0.040) (0.009) (0.024) (0.013) (0.024) (0.013) (0.043) (0.010) 
Growth_1 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.004 -0.002 
 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) 
Gconsump_1 0.005 -0.002 0.005 -0.002 0.005 -0.002 0.006 -0.002 0.006 -0.002 0.006 -0.002 
 






Legislative_1 -0.064 0.019 -0.064 0.019 -0.064* 0.019 -0.065* 0.021 -0.065 0.021 -0.065 0.021 
 
(0.039) (0.019) (0.041) (0.018) (0.039) (0.023) (0.039) (0.021) (0.041) (0.020) (0.040) (0.026) 
European -0.052 0.019 -0.052 0.019 -0.052 0.019 -0.057 0.021 -0.057 0.021 -0.057 0.021 
 
(0.048) (0.020) (0.045) (0.015) (0.081) (0.015) (0.046) (0.021) (0.044) (0.016) (0.077) (0.016) 
Emerging 0.046 0.049 0.046 0.049 0.046 0.049** 0.038 0.067 0.038 0.067 0.038 0.067*** 
 
(0.078) (0.042) (0.081) (0.051) (0.110) (0.023) (0.074) (0.046) (0.077) (0.058) (0.106) (0.026) 
N_obs 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 
Log-Likelihood -370.04 -370.04 -370.04 -370.04 -370.04 -370.04 -369.76 -369.76 -369.76 -369.76 -369.76 -369.76 
Pseudo R2 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 
      









A.IV.21 Corporate TSR Interactions between Big Countries and Small European Countries (Contemporaneously), Table 3.5.4 (b), Section 1, Small 
European Countries as Dependent Variables 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
Big_increase -0.014 -0.008 -0.014 -0.008* -0.014 -0.008 -0.017 -0.008 -0.017 -0.008* -0.017 -0.008 
 
(0.016) (0.006) (0.016) (0.004) (0.016) (0.007) (0.016) (0.007) (0.016) (0.005) (0.014) (0.008) 
Big_decrease 0.025** -0.002 0.025** -0.002 0.025** -0.002 0.023** -0.002 0.023** -0.002 0.023** -0.002 
 
(0.010) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004) 
Low_1 -0.108*** 0.039*** -0.108** 0.039*** -0.108*** 0.039*** -0.105*** 0.044*** -0.105** 0.044*** -0.105*** 0.044*** 
 
(0.037) (0.015) (0.044) (0.013) (0.037) (0.015) (0.038) (0.015) (0.043) (0.013) (0.038) (0.014) 
K_open_1 0.017 -0.009 0.017* -0.009 0.017* -0.009 0.017 -0.010* 0.017* -0.010* 0.017* -0.010 
 
(0.012) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.013) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) 
Trade_1 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001* -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001* -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 -0.010 0.002 -0.010 0.002 -0.010 0.002 -0.008 0.002 -0.008 0.002 -0.008 0.002 
 
(0.016) (0.006) (0.016) (0.006) (0.018) (0.005) (0.016) (0.006) (0.016) (0.006) (0.018) (0.005) 
Growth_1 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) 
Gconsump_1 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002* -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 
 






Legislative_1 -0.028 0.001 -0.028 0.001 -0.028 0.001 -0.023 -0.000 -0.023 -0.000 -0.023 -0.000 
 
(0.036) (0.014) (0.030) (0.018) (0.039) (0.012) (0.038) (0.015) (0.032) (0.019) (0.042) (0.014) 
Emerging 0.082* -0.011 0.082 -0.011 0.082* -0.011 0.077 -0.007 0.077 -0.007 0.077* -0.007 
 
(0.050) (0.015) (0.067) (0.016) (0.046) (0.017) (0.048) (0.016) (0.066) (0.017) (0.045) (0.019) 
N_obs 502 502 502 502 502 502 502 502 502 502 502 502 
Log-Likelihood -299.78 -299.78 -299.78 -299.78 -299.78 -299.78 -300.41 -300.41 -300.41 -300.41 -300.41 -300.41 
Pseudo R2 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 
      








A.IV.22 Corporate TSR Interactions between Big Countries and Small European Countries (One-year Lag), Table 3.5.4 (b), Section 2, Small 
European Countries as Dependent Variables 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
Big_increase_1 -0.022* 0.006 -0.022 0.006** -0.022* 0.006 -0.022* 0.007 -0.022 0.007** -0.022* 0.007 
 
(0.013) (0.005) (0.017) (0.003) (0.013) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.018) (0.003) (0.013) (0.006) 
Big_decrease_1 0.005 -0.000 0.005 -0.000 0.005 -0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 
 
(0.008) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) 
Low_1 -0.108*** 0.043*** -0.108** 0.043*** -0.108*** 0.043*** -0.105*** 0.046*** -0.105** 0.046*** -0.105*** 0.046*** 
 
(0.039) (0.015) (0.046) (0.011) (0.038) (0.014) (0.038) (0.015) (0.046) (0.012) (0.039) (0.013) 
K_open_1 0.016 -0.007 0.016 -0.007 0.016* -0.007 0.017 -0.008 0.017 -0.008 0.017* -0.008 
 
(0.013) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.013) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) 
Trade_1 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001* -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) . (0.000) . (0.000) . (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 -0.007 0.003 -0.007 0.003 -0.007 0.003 -0.006 0.004 -0.006 0.004 -0.006 0.004 
 
(0.017) (0.005) (0.016) (0.004) (0.020) (0.004) (0.017) (0.006) (0.016) (0.005) (0.020) (0.004) 
Growth_1 0.003 -0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 
 
(0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) 
Gconsump_1 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003* 0.000 0.003** -0.001 0.003* -0.001 0.003* -0.001 0.003** 
 






Legislative_1 -0.028 -0.000 -0.028 -0.000 -0.028 -0.000 -0.024 -0.004 -0.024 -0.004 -0.024 -0.004 
 
(0.037) (0.014) (0.028) (0.017) (0.043) (0.014) (0.038) (0.014) (0.030) (0.019) (0.045) (0.014) 
Emerging 0.055 -0.007 0.055 -0.007 0.055 -0.007 0.048 -0.005 0.048 -0.005 0.048 -0.005 
 
(0.049) (0.014) (0.062) (0.015) (0.044) (0.016) (0.047) (0.015) (0.061) (0.016) (0.044) (0.018) 
N_obs 485 485 485 485 485 485 485 485 485 485 485 485 
Log-Likelihood -288.19 -288.19 -288.19 -288.19 -288.19 -288.19 -288.51 -288.51 -288.51 -288.51 -288.51 -288.51 
Pseudo R2 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 
      









A.IV.23 Corporate TSR Interactions between Tax Haven and Non-Tax Haven Countries (Contemporaneously), Table 3.5.5, Section 1, Tax Haven 
Countries as Dependent Variables 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
NonHaven_increase 0.007 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.007 0.001 
 
(0.007) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) 
NonHaven_decrease 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 
 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
Low_1 -0.135*** -0.003 -0.135*** -0.003 -0.135*** -0.003 -0.139*** -0.001 -0.139*** -0.001 -0.139*** -0.001 
 
(0.043) (0.003) (0.046) (0.004) (0.035) (0.003) (0.043) (0.002) (0.046) (0.002) (0.039) (0.002) 
K_open_1 -0.023 -0.001 -0.023 -0.001 -0.023* -0.001 -0.025 -0.001 -0.025 -0.001 -0.025* -0.001 
 
(0.016) (0.002) (0.019) (0.003) (0.013) (0.002) (0.017) (0.001) (0.020) (0.001) (0.013) (0.001) 
Trade_1 0.001** -0.000 0.001** -0.000 0.001*** -0.000 0.001** -0.000 0.001** -0.000 0.001*** -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 0.045** 0.002 0.045* 0.002 0.045*** 0.002 0.051*** 0.001 0.051** 0.001 0.051*** 0.001 
 
(0.019) (0.002) (0.025) (0.002) (0.015) (0.002) (0.020) (0.001) (0.025) (0.001) (0.015) (0.001) 
Growth_1 0.003 -0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.003 -0.000* 0.003 -0.000 
 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
Gconsump_1 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 






Legislative_1 -0.031 0.002 -0.031 0.002 -0.031 0.002 -0.039 0.002 -0.039 0.002 -0.039 0.002 
 
(0.035) (0.005) (0.028) (0.005) (0.032) (0.004) (0.037) (0.004) (0.028) (0.004) (0.035) (0.003) 
European -0.087*** -0.001 -0.087*** -0.001 -0.087*** -0.001 -0.090*** 0.000 -0.090** 0.000 -0.090** 0.000 
 
(0.031) (0.003) (0.032) (0.003) (0.034) (0.003) (0.034) (0.002) (0.035) (0.002) (0.038) (0.002) 
Africa 0.014 -0.006 0.014 -0.006 0.014 -0.006 0.021 -0.006 0.021 -0.006 0.021 -0.006 
 
(0.103) (0.007) (0.099) (0.007) (0.090) (0.007) (0.100) (0.005) (0.095) (0.006) (0.091) (0.006) 
N_obs 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 
Log-Likelihood -111.26 -111.26 -111.26 -111.26 -111.26 -111.26 -111.24 -111.24 -111.24 -111.24 -111.24 -111.24 
Pseudo R2 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.157 
      









A.IV.24 Corporate TSR Interactions between Tax Haven and Non-Tax Haven Countries (One-year Lag), Table 3.5.5, Section 2, Tax Haven 
Countries as Dependent Variables 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
NonHaven_increase_1 -0.004 0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.005 0.000 
 
(0.008) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.008) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) 
NonHaven_decrease_1 0.003 -0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.003 -0.000 
 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
Low_1 -0.139*** -0.000 -0.139*** -0.000 -0.139*** -0.000 -0.140*** 0.000 -0.140*** 0.000 -0.140*** 0.000 
 
(0.047) (0.006) (0.050) (0.006) (0.038) (0.005) (0.046) (0.000) (0.049) (0.000) (0.042) (0.000) 
K_open_1 -0.025 -0.000 -0.025 -0.000 -0.025* -0.000 -0.027 -0.000 -0.027 -0.000 -0.027* -0.000 
 
(0.017) (0.001) (0.019) (0.001) (0.014) (0.002) (0.018) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) 
Trade_1 0.001*** -0.000** 0.001** -0.000** 0.001*** -0.000** 0.001*** -0.000 0.001** -0.000 0.001*** -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 0.041** 0.000 0.041* 0.000 0.041*** 0.000 0.048** -0.000 0.048* -0.000 0.048*** -0.000 
 
(0.020) (0.001) (0.025) (0.001) (0.015) (0.001) (0.021) (0.000) (0.026) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) 
Growth_1 0.003 -0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.004 -0.000 0.004 -0.000 0.004 -0.000 
 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
Gconsump_1 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 






Legislative_1 -0.032 0.008 -0.032 0.008 -0.032 0.008 -0.038 0.000 -0.038 0.000 -0.038 0.000 
 
(0.035) (0.006) (0.029) (0.006) (0.029) (0.005) (0.039) (0.000) (0.030) (0.000) (0.033) (0.000) 
European -0.088*** 0.002 -0.088** 0.002 -0.088** 0.002 -0.091** 0.000 -0.091** 0.000 -0.091** 0.000 
 
(0.033) (0.005) (0.034) (0.004) (0.036) (0.006) (0.036) (0.000) (0.038) (0.000) (0.040) (0.000) 
Africa 0.044 -0.008 0.044 -0.008 0.044 -0.008 0.037 -0.008 0.037 -0.008 0.037 -0.008 
 
(0.133) (0.008) (0.126) (0.008) (0.113) (0.007) (0.117) (0.006) (0.108) (0.006) (0.102) (0.005) 
N_obs 271 271 271 271 271 271 271 271 271 271 271 271 
Log-Likelihood -107.97 -107.97 -107.97 -107.97 -107.97 -107.97 -107.79 -107.79 -107.79 -107.79 -107.79 -107.79 
Pseudo R2 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.146 
      









A.IV.25 Corporate TSR Interactions between Tax Haven and Non-Tax Haven Countries (Two-year Lag), Table 3.5.5, Section 3, Tax Haven 
Countries as Dependent Variables 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
NonHaven_increase_2 -0.009* -0.001 -0.009 -0.001 -0.009 -0.001 -0.009 -0.001 -0.009 -0.001 -0.009 -0.001 
 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) 
NonHaven_decrease_2 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 
 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Low_1 -0.083*** -0.0004766 -0.083*** -0.000 -0.083*** -0.000 -0.085*** 0.000 -0.085*** 0.000 -0.085*** 0.000 
 
(0.031) (0.003) (0.030) (0.003) (0.028) (0.003) (0.032) (0.002) (0.031) (0.002) (0.030) (0.002) 
K_open_1 -0.018 -0.001 -0.018 -0.001 -0.018* -0.001 -0.019 -0.000 -0.019 -0.000 -0.019** -0.000 
 
(0.011) (0.001) (0.012) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.012) (0.001) (0.013) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) 
Trade_1 0.000*** -0.000 0.000** -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000** -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 0.025* 0.000 0.025* 0.000 0.025** 0.000 0.030** -0.000 0.030** -0.000 0.030*** -0.000 
 
(0.013) (0.001) (0.015) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.014) (0.001) (0.015) (0.001) (0.011) (0.001) 
Growth_1 0.002 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 
 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Gconsump_1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 






Legislative_1 -0.022 0.006 -0.022 0.006 -0.022 0.006 -0.027 0.006 -0.027 0.006 -0.027 0.006 
 
(0.022) (0.006) (0.019) (0.006) (0.018) (0.006) (0.023) (0.005) (0.020) (0.005) (0.020) (0.005) 
European -0.058*** 0.002 -0.058*** 0.002 -0.058*** 0.002 -0.059*** 0.002 -0.059** 0.002 -0.059*** 0.002 
 
(0.020) (0.005) (0.021) (0.005) (0.021) (0.005) (0.022) (0.003) (0.024) (0.003) (0.023) (0.004) 
Africa -0.096*** -0.004 -0.096*** -0.004 -0.096*** -0.004 -0.103*** -0.003 -0.103*** -0.003 -0.103*** -0.003 
 
(0.023) (0.004) (0.022) (0.004) (0.026) (0.005) (0.023) (0.003) (0.021) (0.003) (0.023) (0.003) 
N_obs 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 
Log-Likelihood -100.34 -100.34 -100.34 -100.34 -100.34 -100.34 -100.32 -100.32 -100.32 -100.32 -100.32 -100.32 
Pseudo R2 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.182 
      









A.IV.26 Corporate TSR Interactions between Tax Haven and Non-Tax Haven Countries (Contemporaneously), Table 3.5.5, Section 1, Non-Tax 
Haven Countries as Dependent Variables 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
Haven_increase -0.002 0.007 -0.002 0.007* -0.002 0.007 -0.003 0.008 -0.003 0.008* -0.003 0.008 
 
(0.010) (0.005) (0.015) (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.014) (0.004) (0.010) (0.006) 
Haven_decrease 0.016*** -0.000 0.016*** -0.000 0.016*** -0.000 0.017*** 0.000 0.017*** 0.000 0.017*** 0.000 
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Low_1 -0.109*** 0.037*** -0.109*** 0.037*** -0.109*** 0.037*** -0.112*** 0.039*** -0.112*** 0.039*** -0.112*** 0.039*** 
 
(0.015) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.021) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.021) (0.010) 
K_open_1 -0.014** -0.001 -0.014*** -0.001 -0.014* -0.001 -0.015*** -0.001 -0.015*** -0.001 -0.015* -0.001 
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) 
Trade_1 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.007 -0.000 0.007 -0.000 0.007 -0.000 
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.003) 
Growth_1 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Gconsump_1 0.002* -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.003* -0.001 0.003* -0.001 0.003 -0.001 
 






Legislative_1 0.004 0.026** 0.004 0.026** 0.004 0.026*** 0.006 0.027** 0.006 0.027** 0.006 0.027*** 
 
(0.018) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.010) (0.018) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.010) 
European 0.037* 0.011 0.037 0.011 0.037 0.011 0.037* 0.011 0.037 0.011 0.037 0.011 
 
(0.021) (0.011) (0.024) (0.010) (0.037) (0.012) (0.022) (0.012) (0.025) (0.011) (0.038) (0.013) 
Africa -0.056*** 0.003 -0.056*** 0.003 -0.056** 0.003 -0.058*** 0.002 -0.058*** 0.002 -0.058** 0.002 
 
(0.019) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.025) (0.013) (0.020) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.026) (0.013) 
N_obs 2,328 2,328 2,328 2,328 2,328 2,328 2,328 2,328 2,328 2,328 2,328 2,328 
Log-Likelihood -1,425.20 -1,425.20 -1,425.20 -1,425.20 -1,425.20 -1,425.20 -1,424.77 -1,424.77 -1,424.77 -1,424.77 -1,424.77 -1,424.77 
Pseudo R2 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 
      









A.IV.27 Corporate TSR Interactions between Tax Haven and Non-Tax Haven Countries (One-year Lag), Table 3.5.5, Section 2, Non-Tax Haven 
Countries as Dependent Variables 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
Haven_increase_1 0.016 -0.001 0.016 -0.001 0.016 -0.001 0.018* -0.001 0.018 -0.001 0.018* -0.001 
 
(0.010) (0.005) (0.014) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.014) (0.004) (0.011) (0.005) 
Haven_decrease_1 0.009* 0.001 0.009 0.001 0.009* 0.001 0.010* 0.001 0.010 0.001 0.010* 0.001 
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) 
Low_1 -0.113*** 0.037*** -0.113*** 0.037*** -0.113*** 0.037*** -0.117*** 0.040*** -0.117*** 0.040*** -0.117*** 0.040*** 
 
(0.016) (0.010) (0.021) (0.010) (0.021) (0.010) (0.016) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.022) (0.010) 
K_open_1 -0.011** -0.002 -0.011** -0.002 -0.011 -0.002 -0.012** -0.002 -0.012*** -0.002 -0.012 -0.002 
 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) 
Trade_1 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 0.007 -0.000 0.007 -0.000 0.007 -0.000 0.008 -0.000 0.008 -0.000 0.008 -0.000 
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.009) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.003) 
Growth_1 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Gconsump_1 0.002 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 
 






Legislative_1 0.005 0.025** 0.005 0.025** 0.005 0.025** 0.008 0.026** 0.008 0.026** 0.008 0.026** 
 
(0.018) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.019) (0.010) (0.019) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.019) (0.011) 
European 0.038* 0.010 0.038 0.010 0.038 0.010 0.039* 0.010 0.039 0.010 0.039 0.010 
 
(0.022) (0.011) (0.024) (0.010) (0.038) (0.013) (0.022) (0.011) (0.025) (0.011) (0.039) (0.013) 
Africa -0.053*** -0.000 -0.053*** -0.000 -0.053** -0.000 -0.055*** -0.000 -0.055*** -0.000 -0.055** -0.000 
 
(0.020) (0.012) (0.018) (0.012) (0.025) (0.013) (0.021) (0.013) (0.019) (0.012) (0.027) (0.013) 
N_obs 2,247 2,247 2,247 2,247 2,247 2,247 2,247 2,247 2,247 2,247 2,247 2,247 
Log-Likelihood -1,372.27 -1,372.27 -1,372.27 -1,372.27 -1,372.27 -1,372.27 -1,371.49 -1,371.49 -1,371.49 -1,371.49 -1,371.49 -1,371.49 
Pseudo R2 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 
      









A.IV.28 Corporate TSR Interactions between Tax Haven and Non-Tax Haven Countries (Two-year Lag), Table 3.5.5, Section 3, Non-Tax Haven 
Countries as Dependent Variables 
 





















Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase 
Haven_increase_2 0.003 0.009** 0.003 0.009*** 0.003 0.009** 0.003 0.011** 0.003 0.011*** 0.003 0.011** 
 
(0.010) (0.004) (0.009) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) 
Haven_decrease_2 0.010* 0.002 0.010 0.002 0.010* 0.002 0.010* 0.002 0.010 0.002 0.010** 0.002 
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Low_1 -0.116*** 0.029*** -0.116*** 0.029*** -0.116*** 0.029*** -0.119*** 0.031*** -0.119*** 0.031*** -0.119*** 0.031*** 
 
(0.016) (0.010) (0.021) (0.009) (0.022) (0.009) (0.016) (0.010) (0.021) (0.009) (0.022) (0.009) 
K_open_1 -0.012** 0.001 -0.012** 0.001 -0.012 0.001 -0.013** 0.001 -0.013*** 0.001 -0.013 0.001 
 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) 
Trade_1 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(GDP)_1 0.006 -0.001 0.006 -0.001 0.006 -0.001 0.007 -0.001 0.007 -0.001 0.007 -0.001 
 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.009) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.009) (0.002) 
Growth_1 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Gconsump_1 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 






Legislative_1 0.002 0.023** 0.002 0.023** 0.002 0.023** 0.005 0.024** 0.005 0.024** 0.005 0.024** 
 
(0.019) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.019) (0.010) (0.019) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.019) (0.010) 
European 0.047** 0.008 0.047* 0.008 0.047 0.008 0.047** 0.007 0.047* 0.007 0.047 0.007 
 
(0.023) (0.011) (0.025) (0.011) (0.038) (0.014) (0.023) (0.012) (0.025) (0.012) (0.040) (0.014) 
Africa -0.047** -0.006 -0.047** -0.006 -0.047* -0.006 -0.049** -0.007 -0.049** -0.007 -0.049* -0.007 
 
(0.021) (0.012) (0.019) (0.011) (0.026) (0.011) (0.022) (0.012) (0.019) (0.011) (0.027) (0.012) 
N_obs 2,154 2,154 2,154 2,154 2,154 2,154 2,154 2,154 2,154 2,154 2,154 2,154 
Log-Likelihood -1,312.59 -1,312.59 -1,312.59 -1,312.59 -1,312.59 -1,312.59 -1,311.84 -1,311.84 -1,311.84 -1,311.84 -1,311.84 -1,311.84 
Pseudo R2 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 
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